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Abstract
There is considerable dispute over the nature of the relationship between ethics and the 
natural sciences. This thesis argues that ethics is substantially independent of the natural 
sciences because the appeals to the natural sciences fail to adequately justify moral 
judgements about human beings. Specifically, I argue that if appeals to the natural sciences 
are not adequate to justify the normative assessment of living organisms, then they are not 
adequate to justify moral judgements about human beings. I consider the following appeals 
to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. These include the appeals to: (1) 
typicality; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) natural selection; (5) functions; (6) 
development; (7) species; and (8) the experience of pleasure and pain. I claim that these 
appeals are inadequate for one or more of the following reasons. One, some versions of the 
appeals are incompatible with the natural sciences. Two, the appeals justify implausible 
and counterintuitive moral judgements. Three, the appeals fail to adequately determine 
what should occur in contrast to what occurs. Four, there are many different appeals which 
justify contrary moral judgements and no objective means within the natural sciences to 
privilege one appeal over another. Finally, five, for some appeals there are various 
parameters which determine what is justified, but there are no objective means within the 
natural sciences to justify any particular set of parameters over and against alternatives.
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1Introduction
At the time of writing in the United Kingdom there is considerable debate over the creation 
and use of human-animal embryos.1 The focus of the debate is over plans to update the 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 to permit the creation of these embryos for 
the purpose of scientific research.
It ought not to be surprising that opponents of these plans, such as the Catholic Church,
are those who believe that human embryos are sacred. For example, in his Easter Sunday
2008 homily, Cardinal Keith O’Brien, the Roman Catholic Bishop of St. Andrews and
Edinburgh claimed,
... I believe that a greater challenge than that even faces us -  the 
possibility now facing our country is that animal -  human embryos be 
produced with the excuse that perhaps certain diseases might find a cure 
from these resulting embryos.
What I am speaking of is the process whereby scientists create an 
embryo containing a mixture of animal and human genetic material. If I 
were preaching this homily in France, Germany, Italy, Canada or 
Australia I would be commending the government for rightly banning 
such grotesque procedures.
However here in Great Britain I am forced to condemn our 
government for not only permitting but encouraging such hideous 
practices.
Our Prime Minister, Gordon Brown has given the Government’s 
support to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. It is difficult to 
imagine a single piece of legislation which, more comprehensively, 
attacks the sanctity and dignity of human life than this particular Bill. ...
This Bill represents a monstrous attack on human rights, human 
dignity and human life.2
However, religious opinions on this matter are far from monolithic. There are religious
proponents of creating human-animal embryos as a means of alleviating human sickness
1 Human-animal embryos share DNA, cell components, or cells from different sources. For example, 
recently, a human-animal embryo was created by inserting a human nucleus (taken from a human skin cell) 
into a de-nucleated cow cytoplasm (taken from a cow egg cell). See: Fergus W alsh." UK's first hybrid 
embryos created." [Webpage]. In: BBC News Website. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/health/7323298.stm. Accessed: 24 April 2008.
2 Cited from a copy of the Cardinal’s sermon reproduced on the Times Online website. See: Ruth Gledhill. 
"Cardinal: stop this 'Frankenstein' evil." [Webpage]. In: Times Online. Available at 
http://timescolumns.typepad.com/gledhill/2008/03/cardinal-stop-t.html. Accessed: 24 April 2008.
2and suffering. For instance, Ruth Gledhill and David Lister, writing in the TimesOnline 
note,
At least one other senior religious leader also backed the bill. Dr 
Jonathan Romain, Rabbi of Maidenhead Synagogue, said Judaism was 
just as concerned at the sanctity of human life as Catholicism but did not 
condemn the creation of human-animal hybrid embryos for medical 
research. Instead, it was to be “welcomed as a life-saving development 
that uses our God-given skills in the noblest of causes.”3
Nor ought it be surprising that proponents of creating these embryos and of updating 
the Act are often those with a stake in this medical and scientific research, such as 
scientists.4 The embryos are very useful in studies of various diseases including 
Parkinson’s Disease and Alzheimer’s Disease. For instance, they are a source of cell-lines, 
including stem-cell lines.
Proponents of creating these embryos and of updating the Act have responded
vigorously to the Roman Catholic Church’s view. For instance, the Nobel Laureate
Professor Sir Martin Evans said it was not acceptable because using these embryos was
needed to develop lifesaving treatments.5 Labour peer Lord Winston said statements made
by Cardinal Keith O’Brien were discrediting the Church, and that his statements were
inaccurate.6 Finally, Professor Chris Shaw of Kings College, London, remarks,
We think there is nothing illegal, immoral or unethical about this. While 
we understand the concerns, we think they are largely founded on 
misinformation. People think we are generating some sort of hybrid
3 Ruth Gledhill and David Lister. "Cardinal Keith O’Brien attacks 'monstrous' human embryo Bill." 
[Webpage]. In: Times Online. Available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article359785 l.ece?token=null&offset=12. Accessed: 24 
April 2008.
4 Interestingly, the Human Embryology and Fertilization Authority authorized the creation of one type of 
chimaeric embryos prior to the passing of this update of the Act. See: W alsh." UK's first hybrid embryos 
created."
5 Pallab Ghosh. "Stem cell pioneer backs embryo research." [Webpage]. In: BBC News Website. Available 
at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/health/7338706.stm. Accessed: 24 April 2008.
6 "Peer and Church clash on embryos" [Webpage]. In: BBC News Website. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk_politics/7310918.stm. Accessed: 24 April 2008.
3animal. This is just cells, just for science. No animal is ever going to be 
created.7
Clearly, the two views are deadlocked. So how could they be reconciled or resolved? 
Ought we create and use human-animal embryos? Are those scientists who create and use 
them guilty of committing a monstrous act?
The purpose of this project is to look at the role, if any, the natural sciences have in 
answering such ethical questions.8 More specifically, its goal is to ascertain the extent to 
which ethics depends upon the natural sciences.9 My conclusion is that ethics is 
substantially but not completely independent of the natural sciences.
Of course, such a conclusion is not novel. However, I believe my rationale for holding 
it is. Specifically, it does not draw upon the standard lines of argument within the 
philosophical literature which would also support this conclusion. Rather my argument 
adopts the metaphysical assumptions of my naturalistic opponents who do believe the 
natural sciences can and do adequately justify moral judgments about human beings.10 For 
instance, I assume, for the sake of argument, the premises of this form of ethical 
naturalism, that: (1) ethical terms are definable in non-ethical, natural terms; (2) ethical 
conclusions are derivable from non-ethical premises; (3) ethical properties are natural
7 "Bioethics: Human-animal hybrid embryos." [Webpage]. In: BBC News Website. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/animals/using/hybridembryos_2.shtml. Accessed: 24 April 2008.
8 What I mean by the natural sciences are: “1. the sciences collectively that are involved in the study of the 
physical world and its phenomena, including biology, physics, chemistry, and geology, but excluding social 
sciences, abstract or theoretical sciences such as mathematics, and applied sciences. 2. any one of these 
sciences.” See: "natural science," in Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, 1991).
9 What I mean by ethics is: “.. .the philosophical study of the moral value of human conduct and of the ruiles 
and principles that ought to govern it; moral philosophy.” See: "ethics," in Collins English Dictionary 
(Glasgow, 1991).
101 should stress at the outset that I do not have any quarrel with either a broadly construed naturalism or 
ethical naturalism. That is, I do not have problems with a naturalism or ethical naturalism which accepts there 
are facts which may be investigated and understood outside the natural sciences. However, I do take issue 
with these doctrines when they hold that facts must be investigated and understood solely within the natural 
sciences. In other words, I take issue with these doctrines where they hold that natural or objective 
phenomena must be conceived, investigated, and understood purely in terms of the natural sciences. For 
instance, I object to the claim that ultimately ethics can be reduced to biology, chemistry, and physics.
properties—where a natural term or property is one that can be employed or referred to in 
natural scientific explanations.11 In other words, I assume, for the sake of argument, that 
ethics is dependent upon the natural sciences. I then argue that this kind of project fails 
because the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral judgements about human 
beings are not adequate.
Together the conclusion and rationale form what I call the central claim of the thesis. 
This is:
Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because 
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral 
judgements about human beings.12
However, at the outset, I ought to be clear about the kind of appeals I consider. I take it 
that the adequate justification of moral judgements consists of sufficiently privileging 
particular occurrences, to which the judgements refer, over and against the possible 
alternatives. That is, I believe that to adequately justify the claim “X ought to occur,” one 
must sufficiently privilege the occurrence of X  over and against its alternatives Y,Z, A, ... 
etc. This involves providing some basis for privileging the occurrence of X over and 
against its alternatives. So for example, to adequately justify the claim that “One ought to 
tell the truth,” one must sufficiently privilege the occurrence of ‘telling the truth’ over and 
against ‘telling lies’. This involves some basis for privileging ‘telling the truth’ over and 
against ‘telling lies’. In this case, Kant would argue that Reason provides the basis for 
privileging telling the truth over and against telling lies. The appeals I consider and 
examine are appeals to the natural sciences which attempt to objectively privilege 
particular occurrences over and against the alternatives. That is, they are appeals to some 
objective aspect or feature of the causal order or to some state of affairs which supervenes
11 Roger Crisp, "naturalism, ethical," in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford; 
New York, 1995).
12 Henceforth, I shall generally refer to this proposition as the Central Claim.
upon it. It is these aspects or features which distinguishes between what ought to occur and 
what does occur. (They are objective precisely in the sense they do not rely upon any kind 
of [subjective] agency to distinguish between what ought to occur and what does occur.) 
One example is the appeal to typicality. This tries to privilege particular occurrences on the 
basis of its regularity within the causal order.
I also ought to note that the appeals I consider come from both the scientific and 
philosophical literature. In the latter case, I look at the work of Larry Arnhart, William 
Casebeer, and Philippa Foot. However, in the former case, the appeals are not made to 
justify moral judgements of human beings. Rather they are made to justify normative 
assessments of living organisms which occur in the literature on organisms’ character 
traits, health, and welfare.
I look at these appeals for four reasons. The first is that the natural sciences generally 
do not consider moral judgements of human beings but they do consider normative 
assessments of living organisms. The second is that I believe that the moral judgement of 
human beings is a special case of the normative assessment of living organisms. In other 
words, I take it that the moral judgement of human beings is a kind of normative 
assessment of living organisms.13 Consequently, if the appeals are not adequate in the 
general case they are not adequate in the specific case. The third reason is that the 
normative assessment of living organisms avoids the complications of human agency and 
rationality. Finally, the general case has the advantage of broader applicability.
I then argue that these appeals are not adequate to justify normative assessments 
because one or more of the following reasons apply: (1) they fail to sufficiently privilege
13 Even if this proposition is incorrect, it is a very natural proposition for my opponents to hold.
what should occur over and against alternatives; (2) they justify normative assessments 
which are strongly counter-intuitive; or (3) some appeals, or versions of some appeals are 
not compatible with the natural sciences.
I ought to stress that the sense of ‘should’ I use here is evaluative. One must not 
confuse this use with the descriptive and predictive senses of should, which is easily done. 
Take for example, the claim “Human beings should be born with two eyes.” The ‘should’ 
here could equally be descriptive, predictive, or evaluative.
These different senses of ‘should’ refer to different kinds of norm which are 
respectively descriptive, predictive and evaluative. Descriptive norms refer to various 
states of affairs which may be distinguished from alternatives. For instance, what is typical 
or what is functional can delineate descriptive norms. In our example, it is typical that 
human beings are born with two eyes. Predictive norms refer to what we have good reason 
to expect ceteris paribus. And in our example, all other things being equal, human beings 
will be born with two eyes rather than one. Finally evaluative norms refer to various states 
of affairs which should occur (for some reason) in contrast to alternatives. In our example, 
there is some reason why human beings should be born with two eyes rather than one, such 
as the occurrences are good, valuable, or appropriate. The different kinds of norm may also 
be distinguished by what we would say where they fail to obtain. In the case of descriptive 
norms we would say something like that it is unusual. While in the case of predictive 
norms we would say something like it is surprising. And in the case of evaluative norms 
we would say something like it is defective.
The confusion between the evaluative sense of should and the other senses of ‘should’ 
generally occurs where descriptive or predictive senses of should are understood
evaluatively. In other words, claims concerning what typically occurs, or will occur ceteris 
paribus, are understood as evaluative norms, such that something is defective if it is 
atypical or unanticipated. Of course, one could argue that something is defective if it is 
atypical or unanticipated. But this needs some argument to back it up, and, if I am correct, 
the arguments fail.
So to be clear, I distinguish the evaluative sense of should from other senses by the use 
of a subscript e. That is, the evaluative sense of should is denoted by shoulde. The 
descriptive and predictive senses of should are respectively denoted by shouldd and 
shouldp.
The thesis is divided into eight further chapters. Chapter 1 lays the foundation for my 
defence of the Central Claim of the thesis. It begins by describing what I take the claim of 
substantial independence to entail. It then distinguishes my argument from the standard 
arguments within the philosophical literature and introduces it. Finally, I consider three 
philosophers, Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot, whose work can be 
viewed as a challenge to the Central Claim because they provide an account of moral 
judgement grounded within the natural sciences. However, criticism of their work is 
deferred to Chapter 7 so that the arguments of this thesis can be bought to bear.
Chapter 2 provides an account of the normative assessment of living organisms using 
the example of domesticated pigs. It also characterizes the appeals used within the natural 
sciences to justify normative assessments of living organisms. These include appeals to:
(1) typicality; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) natural selection; (5) the experience of 
pleasure and pain; (6) functions; (7) development; and (8) species.
I claim that these appeals to justify normative assessments of living organisms are not 
adequate. Chapters 3-6 present my case. Chapter 3 examines the appeals to: (1) typicality;
(2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) natural selection; and the experience of pleasure and 
pain. Chapters 4-6 respectively scrutinizes the appeals to function, development, and 
species.
Chapter 7 then applies the arguments of Chapters 3-6 to the work of Larry Arnhart, 
William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot discussed in Chapter 1. These authors make use of 
one or more of the above appeals in justifying moral judgements of human beings.
Finally, in the Conclusion I look at the implications of my argument.
Chapter 1: Ethics and the Natural Sciences
9
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for my defence of the central claim of
this thesis. This is:
Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because the 
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral 
judgements about human beings.1
This foundation will involve four elements. The first consists of spelling out what I mean
by ethics being ‘substantially independent’ of the natural sciences. I do this by exploring
the kinds of contribution the natural sciences could conceivably make to ethics. This is
explained in terms of six different hypotheses concerning the extent of the connection
between ethics and the natural sciences. I then specify what the claim that ethics is
substantially independent of the natural sciences means with respect to these kinds of
contribution.
The second element consists of distinguishing my argument for the Central Claim from 
the standard arguments, doctrines and traditions within the philosophical literature which 
would also support it. For example, it is thought that the natural sciences have no role in 
ethics—let alone a role in justifying moral judgements—because logically one cannot 
directly move from matters of fact to matters of value. In contrast to this, like my 
opponents, I believe that this argument is not decisive. My argument does not draw upon 
these. Rather I engage with opponents of the Central Claim on their own ground not on 
grounds sympathetic to my position.
1 Henceforth, I shall generally refer to this proposition as the Central Claim.
The third element involves introducing my argument for the Central Claim. This 
connects moral judgments concerning human beings with the normative assessments of 
living organisms. Specifically, I claim that if the natural sciences are not adequate to justify 
normative assessments of living organisms, then they are not adequate to justify moral 
judgements about human beings.2 1 argue that the natural sciences are not adequate to 
justify normative assessments of living organisms. Therefore, the natural sciences are not 
adequate to justify moral judgements about human beings.
The Central Claim will follow given that the justification of moral judgements is a core 
task of ethics. Consequently, if the natural sciences do not justify moral judgements about 
human beings then they fail to make a foundational contribution to ethics, which means 
that ethics must be substantially independent of them.
It emerges that the contentious premiss of my argument for the Central Claim is the 
claim that the natural sciences are not adequate to justify normative assessments of living 
organisms. It is for this reason that the remainder of the thesis focuses upon demonstrating 
that this is the case.
Finally, I end the chapter by considering some views that run counter to my own. 
Specifically, I examine the work of three philosophers: Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, 
and Philippa Foot. These authors apparently hold that the natural sciences are sufficient to 
justify moral judgements about human. Consequently, their views present a challenge to 
my Central Claim.
2 Clearly, moral judgements about human beings are a kind of normative assessments of living organisms. 
However, if this point is not clear I will make it so in section 4.1.
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2. Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences
2.1 The relationship between ethics and the natural sciences
William Rottschaefer remarks that the sciences might make six different and increasingly
<2
controversial kinds of contribution to ethics. These are expressed in terms of hypotheses 
concerning the degree to which the natural sciences and ethics could be connected.4 1 adopt 
his descriptions because I believe they provide an excellent characterization of the different 
kinds of contributions the natural sciences might make to ethics. The first of his six 
hypotheses proposes the minimal connection between the two domains, while the last 
hypothesis proposes the maximal connection between them. The others range in strength 
between these lower and upper limits.
The first hypothesis is called the Informational Connection Hypothesis.5 It asserts that 
factual information of the kind provided by the natural sciences is important in both ethical 
decision-making and understanding.6 For instance, human normative theories may state 
that human beings have an obligation to feed the hungry. But in order to properly discharge 
this obligation human beings need to know the facts with respect to human nutrition.
n
Presumably, the best source of these facts is the sciences of biology. And as Rottschaefer 
notes, this minimal connection between the two domains is acknowledged even by those 
who maintain that ethics and the natural sciences are substantially separate.8
3 William A. Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency (Cambridge, 1998), 21.
4 Rottschaefer cashes out the continuum in terms of moral agency, which is the focus of his work. However, I 
believe it is evident that what he says concerning the relationship between the sciences and moral agency 
applies directly to the relationship between the sciences and ethics.
5 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 21.
6 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 21.
7 1 believe they are not the only source for such facts pace certain kinds of eliminativists.
8 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 21.
The second hypothesis is called the Explanatory Connection Hypothesis.9 It claims that 
human moral capacities have various biological components and that the biological and 
psychological sciences provide descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information 
concerning these capacities.10 (Broadly speaking, human moral capacities are those 
capacities required for human beings to act morally.) Rottschaefer uses the example of 
human developmental psychology which provides an explanation of the origin and 
development of empathy in human children. This connection is obvious given that 
empathy is an important, if not essential component of moral character and agency. For 
example, those without empathy typically have little regard for others because they cannot 
understand how they think and feel. Again, those who hold that ethics and the natural 
sciences are substantially separate do not object to this hypothesis.
The third hypothesis is called the Critical Connection Hypothesis.11 This contends that 
the sciences may properly critique the claims of morality and ethics.12 For instance, it holds 
that the sciences of biology and psychology may appraise common sense or philosophical 
views of human moral capacities and the nature and function of morality and determine 
that they are wrong or in error. Take for example, the common sense and philosophical 
view that human beings can genuinely be altruistic.13 The Critical Connection Hypothesis 
would maintain that if biologists demonstrated that all apparently altruistic action was 
ultimately ‘selfish’, that is, all ‘altruistic’ actions were ultimately undertaken for the benefit 
of the agent rather than the beneficiary, then the biologists could rightly claim that the view 
human beings ought to be altruistic is wrong. On this hypothesis, separatists may demur.
9 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 22.
10 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 22.
11 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 22-23.
12 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 22-23.
13 The example is adapted from Rottschaefer.
The fourth hypothesis is called the Normative Connection Hypothesis.14 This maintains 
that, general prima facie normative principles can be derived concerning what is good for 
human beings to do morally and what is morally permissible and impermissible from 
biological knowledge in conjunction with knowledge from other sources.15
The generation of normative principles concerning what is good for human beings to 
do morally and what is morally permissible and impermissible is at the heart of ethics. 
Arguably, it is one of the central tasks of any system of ethics which by definition is 
concerned with the actions and character of moral agents. Consequently, the Normative 
Connection Hypothesis is the most divisive. Rottschaefer notes, it is controversial because 
it asserts that the so-called fact-value gap may be bridged.16
The fifth hypothesis is called the Metaethical Connection Hypothesis.17 This 
hypothesis claims that if the explanatory hypothesis is established, then it may be 
concluded that the (biological) capacities human beings have for morality, such as our 
capacity for moral agency, provide us with relatively reliable means for achieving moral 
ends.18 Consequently, we can appeal to these capacities in attempting to understand the 
nature and function of morality, and in attempts to justify particular aspects of morality 
such as moral beliefs, motivations, and actions.19 Rottschaefer uses the case of 
evolutionary biology which has apparently established that morality plays a significant role 
in contributing to biological fitness, and thus to the probability of survival and 
reproduction. In effect, if the hypothesis is true, the sciences of biology can identify what is 
morally valuable, and thus what actions are morally forbidden, required, or permissible.
14 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 23.
15 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 23.
16 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 23.
17 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24.
18 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24.
19 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24.
14
For example, if the Metaethical Connection Hypothesis is true, biological fitness is either 
intrinsically or instrumentally morally valuable. Therefore, Rottschaefer says one could 
justify actions promoting biological fitness as being morally required or permissible.20 So 
if the Metaethical Connection Hypothesis is true, one can make the move ‘good’, ‘bad’, 
‘correct’, ‘wrong’ etc., biologically speaking to ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘correct’, ‘wrong’ etc., 
morally speaking. In other words, the metaethical hypothesis implies the normative 
hypothesis.
The final hypothesis is called the Meaningful Hypothesis. This contends that accounts 
of morality and ethics derived from the sciences of biology can make an important 
contribution to the conception of a meaningful human life.21 However, in Rottschaefer’s 
formulation of the hypothesis, other conceptions of ethics and morality are not eliminated, 
unlike other views at this end of the continuum like E. O. Wilson’s.22 This is because he is 
a self-described integrationalist with respect to the relationship between the natural 
sciences and ethics.23 So on Rottschaefer’s view, other conceptions of ethics and morality 
are not eliminated because instead the natural sciences are integrated with them.
I am not convinced that Rottschaefer’s Meaningful Connection Hypothesis represents a 
greater degree of connection than the Metaethical Connection Hypothesis. This is because 
his description of the Meaningful Connection Hypothesis seems to be entailed by accepting 
the Metaethical Connection Hypothesis. Nevertheless, I include it for the sake of 
completeness.
20 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24.
21 Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24-25.
22 See Michael Ruse and O. Wilson Edward, "Moral Philosophy as Applied Science," Philosophy 61 (1986), 
Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity o f Knowledge (London, 1998), Edward O. Wilson, On Human 
Nature (London, 1995).
23 The integrationalist claims that both biology and psychology have the resources to contribute to the 
delineation and refinement of these visions [of a meaningful human life] and thus to making the life of moral 
agency meaningful. See: Rottschaefer, The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency, 24.
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I take it that acceptance of any particular hypothesis entails acceptance of the prior 
hypotheses. For instance, acceptance of the Critical Connection Hypothesis entail 
acceptance of the Explanatory and Information Connection Hypotheses. And acceptance of 
the Meaningful Connection Hypothesis entails acceptance of the Metaethical, Normative, 
Critical, Explanatory, and Informational Connection Hypotheses. This is because the prior 
hypotheses (if any) are pre-requisites for the later ones. For example sustaining the 
Normative Connection Hypothesis requires that the natural sciences make informational, 
explanatory, and critical contributions to ethics. One could not claim that the natural 
sciences can help to determine what shoulde occur in contrast to what actually does occur, 
if the natural sciences could not provide information relevant to ethical decisions or if we 
could not use the natural sciences to criticise ethical claims.
So having described a scale for the possible relationships of dependence between ethics 
and the natural sciences, I now need to spell out what the claim of substantial 
independence means. Essentially, the claim of substantial independence makes two 
assertions. The first is that the Critical Connection Hypothesis is true, although this 
assertion is made with a caveat I shall come to. The second is that the Normative 
Connection Hypothesis is false.
2.2 The Critical Connection Hypothesis is true
I argue that the Critical Connection Hypothesis is true is because I believe the maxim, 
“Ought implies can,” is true. That is, I believe it must be possible for a human being to be 
or do X, if we are to rightly claim that they ought to be or do X. For instance, the claim, 
“Human beings ought to refrain from murder,” assumes that human beings have the 
capacity to refrain from murder. And I take it that it is correct to criticize the moral theories
or some pertinent piece of moral discourse if the natural sciences can demonstrate that it is 
true that human beings lack some moral capacity that moral theory and moral discourse 
claim they have. For instance, it would be untenable for some moral theory to claim that 
human beings are morally responsible if the natural sciences demonstrate that human 
behaviour is hard-wired by sequences of DNA such that the hard-wiring does not permit 
meaningful choices.
Yet this acceptance of the Hypothesis is made with the following caveat in mind: any 
criticisms of common moral intuitions or ethical theories made by the natural sciences 
must be tentative. This is because scientific explanations are not necessarily true, and may 
well be false. Indeed, the natural sciences are littered with explanations of phenomena that 
were once believed to be true, but ultimately have been shown to be false. Furthermore, on 
one view of the natural sciences, the natural sciences do not present true propositions.
24Rather they present propositions which have not yet been falsified.
2.3 The Normative Connection Hypothesis is false
I argue that the Normative Connection Hypothesis is false. That is, I maintain that the 
natural sciences do not objectively sustain adequate general prima facie normative 
principles about what is good for human beings to do morally, and what is morally 
permissible and impermissible. I maintain this because I believe I can demonstrate that the 
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral judgements about 
human beings. Specifically, I argue that the appeals fail to sufficiently privilege particular 
outcomes. As a result they fail to effectively sustain the difference between what shoulde 
occur and what actually does.
24 This is the doctrine of falsificationalism which was advocated and made popular by the philosopher of 
science Karl Popper. For an overview of falsificationism see: Alain Chalmers, What is This Thing Called 
Science?, 3rd ed. (Buckingham, 1999), esp. Chapters 5-7, pp 59-103
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I call this difference the Normative Distinction. Take for example, the moral judgement 
“Beatrice the burglar is bad because she steals.” Justifying this claim involves adequately 
privileging one possible causal outcome: Beatrice’s not stealing in contrast to the fact that 
Beatrice does in fact steal. My argument is that I can demonstrate that the appeals made to 
the natural sciences fail to do this sufficiently or adequately.
Now if the Normative Distinction is not adequately sustained by the natural sciences 
then the Normative Connection Hypothesis is false. Adequate prima facie normative 
principles concerning what is morally permissible and impermissible requires that the 
difference between what shoulde occur in contrast to what actually does occur ought to be 
adequately sustained. So if I am correct that the natural sciences do not adequately sustain 
this difference, then they cannot derive adequate prima facie normative principles, and the 
Normative Connection Hypothesis is false.
The claim that ethics is substantially but not completely independent of the natural 
sciences follows from the claim that the Critical Connection Hypothesis is true and the 
Normative Connection Hypothesis is false. Specifically, I hold that ethics is substantially 
rather than completely independent of the natural sciences because accepting the Critical 
Connection Hypothesis entails that I accept the natural sciences make a contribution to the 
characterization, explanation, and criticism of ethics. I take it that this entails that there is a 
degree of dependence between them. However, the claim that the Normative Connection 
Hypothesis is false entails that the natural sciences cannot support the crux of ethics. That 
is, if the hypothesis cannot be sustained then the natural sciences cannot properly formulate 
general prima facie principles about what it is good for human beings to do morally, and 
therefore what is morally permissible and impermissible. But to formulate these principles
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and permissions is the raison d'etre of ethics. Consequently, ethics is substantially 
independent of the natural sciences.
3. A distinctive approach
The claim that the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral judgements about 
human beings is not new to moral philosophy. Indeed, there are long standing normative 
theories within moral philosophy, which either directly or indirectly maintain that this is 
the case. Take for instance the following examples.
Anti-naturalistic normative theories such as Divine Command Theory argue that the 
natural sciences are irrelevant to the issue of justifying moral judgements about human 
beings because it is God who justifies them. So to take our burglar Beatrice for example, 
the reason why Beatrice shoulde not steal in contrast to the fact that she does steal is 
because God decrees that stealing is wrong.
The doctrine of non-cognitivism holds that moral statements, such as moral judgements 
are not propositions. That is, they hold that moral judgements such as, “It is wrong to 
murder,” is not a statement which is either true or false since it has no truth conditions. Yet 
the natural sciences are concerned with propositions—with statements which have truth
97conditions. Consequently, the natural sciences are largely orthogonal to the justification
25 The point assumes that the Divine Command Theorist holds that what is good and right is that which God 
commands rather than God commanding what is good and right. If God commands what is good and right 
then it is possible that the natural sciences slip in the back-door if they can discover what is good and right. 
However, in this case, God is somewhat superfluous and consequently Divine Command theory collapses 
into something else.
26 The fact that God may burn her for eternity in to punish her for not doing what she was told to do may also 
give her a reason to obey, although it is not this fact which technically justifies the claim according to Divine 
Command Theory.
27 That is, according to orthodox accounts of the natural sciences the natural sciences are concerned with 
propositions. There are alternative accounts of the natural sciences, which hold otherwise, such as those 
which claim that the natural sciences are socially constructed.
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of moral judgements if non-cognitivism and the orthodox account of the natural sciences 
are correct.
Finally there are long standing arguments against the use of the natural sciences to 
justify moral judgements. These assert that the appeal to the natural sciences involves an 
invalid form of argument. Specifically, they maintain that their use involves the 
Naturalistic Fallacy or a failure to recognise Hume’s law.
My approach, however, is different and distinctive. It does not draw upon ethical or 
metaethical theories sympathetic to my claim. Neither does it involve arguments based 
upon the Naturalistic Fallacy or an appeal to Hume’s Law. Yet ultimately I reach the same 
conclusion that would be entailed if the ethical traditions and doctrines sympathetic to my 
claim were true, or if the Naturalistic Fallacy or an appeal to Hume’s Law applied to all 
uses of the natural sciences to justify moral judgements.
However, before I go on to describe my argument for the Central Claim, I believe it is 
worthwhile to discuss why I do not wish to avail myself of arguments based upon the 
Naturalistic Fallacy or Hume’s Law since these have be been the mainstays of objections 
to the idea that the natural sciences can be used to justify moral judgements about human 
beings. I do not discuss them in detail because my argument for the Central Claim is 
independent argument: its success does not depend on either the success or the failure of 
these other approaches.
3.1 Not an appeal to the Naturalistic Fallacy
What the naturalistic fallacy is supposed to be, and what it encompasses when invoked in 
the literature varies somewhat. The term is used to refer to appeals to: (1) Hume’s Law; (2) 
G. E. Moore’s open question argument; (3) G. E. Moore’s argument from the addition of
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meaning; (4) the genetic fallacy; or (5) various combinations of the above.28 However, the 
term properly ought to refer to appeals to Moore’s open question argument and the 
argument from the addition of meaning since these are the arguments Moore appealed to in 
his Principia Ethica to contend that naturalistic theories are guilty of a naturalistic fallacy.
So given that it is more accurate to distinguish between appeals to Hume’s Law and 
Moore’s arguments rather than conflate them, I shall examine these different arguments 
separately.
Roughly, the Naturalistic Fallacy refers to the conflation of some naturalistic property 
with the property of goodness. 29 This is an error, or so Moore contends, because it will 
always be an open question whether the naturalistic property in question is indeed good. 
The open question argument is a formalization of this position. However, this error can 
also be highlighted by the argument from the addition of meaning.30 This is the argument 
that because statements such as, “What is pleasurable is good,” provide extra information 
concerning what is good, we cannot reduce the good to the pleasurable or indeed to any 
naturalistic property. In this case if ‘good’ meant pleasurable, then to say, “What is 
pleasurable is good,” would not add any information, since ‘pleasurable’ would be 
identical to ‘good’. However, Moore asserts that it does.
28 William F. Rottschaefer claims that there are three forms of the naturalistic fallacy: (1) the genetic— which 
is the genetic fallacy in another guise; (2) the deductive— which is Hume’s Law under another name; and (3) 
the open question form— which is Moore’s open question argument. See 28 William A. Rottschaefer, 
"Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber’s The Temptation of 
Evolutionary Ethics," Biology and Philosophy 12 (1997). Given its minor role in the literature I do not 
consider the genetic form of the fallacy.
29 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903).
30 William D. Casebeer includes the open-question argument and the argument from the addition of meaning 
in his discussion of the naturalistic fallacy qua Moore. See William D. Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: 
Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition (London, 2003).
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I take it that the open question argument and the argument from the addition of 
meaning fail because they mistakenly hold that claims concerning what is good are 
analytic statements rather than synthetic statements.31 In other words, they mistakenly hold 
that such propositions are definitions rather than being contestable matters which are 
contingent upon the nature of the world. The open question argument and the argument 
from the addition of meaning fail because they hold that propositions such as “what is 
pleasurable is good” is not true in virtue of the meaning of the words. Rather the truth of 
such propositions is something that we need to discover.
So one of the main reasons I do not employ the Naturalistic Fallacy objection to argue 
against appealing to the natural sciences to justify moral judgements about human beings is 
that it largely misses the point. It would apply if the applicable moral propositions were 
definitions, but they are mostly contestable matters contingent upon the nature of the 
world.
3.2 Not an appeal to Hume’s Law
Hume’s law claims that it is impossible to derive an ‘ought’ (or normative proposition) 
from an ‘is’ (or descriptive proposition).32 In other words, it asserts that there is a logical 
gulf between fact and norm, which cannot be bridged.
The ‘law’ is derived from a passing discussion in Hume’s A Treatise o f Human Nature.
Almost as an afterthought he notes,
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, 
perhaps, be of some importance. In every system of morality, which I 
have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds 
for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being 
of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
31 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 20-21.
32 Simon Blackburn, "Hume's Law," in The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy (Oxford, 1994).
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connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d 
be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this relation can be 
a deduction from the others, which are entirely different from it. But as 
authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention 
wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relation of 
objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason. [Italics in original]
The following is an example taken from Rottschaefer.34
(I.) 1. Evolution has shaped humans to pursue the communal good.
2. Therefore, the communal good is morally valuable.
In this example there is a move from purely factual premises to a normative conclusion.
The reason such arguments are fallacious is because the conclusion is not contained in 
the premises. However, as Rottschaefer (among others) has noted, this argument can be 
made valid by adding another premise.35 For example,
(II.) 1. Evolution has shaped humans to pursue the communal good.
2. What is morally valuable is what evolution has shaped human beings to 
pursue_____________________________________________________
3. Therefore, the communal good is morally valuable.
(II) is a logically valid argument, though perhaps not a convincing one. However, this is a 
significant point. As long as there is a bridging premise Hume’s Law does not apply 
notwithstanding we move from a factual premise to a normative conclusion.
33 L. A. and Nidditch Selby-Bigge, P. H., ed., Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1978), 
469.
34 Rottschaefer, "Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber’s The 
Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics," 372.
35 Rottschaefer, "Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber’s The 
Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics," 372.
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Moreover, the bridging premises are empirical or synthetic propositions which come 
under the rubric of the natural sciences. For instance, the claim, “What is morally valuable 
is what evolution has shaped human beings to pursue,” is a proposition which the natural 
sciences could, at least in principle, address.
In contrast, what I shall argue is that where such propositions are used in moral 
judgements of human beings, say as norms, they are not adequately justified by appeals to 
the natural sciences. Take for example, the premise above, “Evolution has shaped humans 
to pursue the communal good.” If this is to be used in the moral judgement of human 
beings, human beings shoulde pursue the communal good. Otherwise, we cannot say of 
human beings who do not pursue it that they are bad or defective (or some other negative 
evaluative term). Likewise, we cannot say of human beings who do pursue it that they are 
good. My contention is that we cannot appeal to evolution to justify this as a norm because 
such an appeal is either implausible—it justifies counterintuitive moral judgements—or it 
does not adequately sustain the Normative Distinction. In other words, I reject such 
appeals because they are implausible or they do not sufficiently determine what shoulde 
occur in contrast with the alternatives. In other words, my objection is not that one cannot 
move from is to ought in an argument. With bridging premises one can. Rather my 
objection is that the bridging premises are such that the resulting argument is either 
indeterminate about what shoulde occur, or that the determination is clearly mistaken.
Of course, one could argue that bridging premises are open to the objections provided 
by the open question argument and the argument from the addition of meaning. However, 
they would only succeed if such premises were analytic propositions rather than synthetic 
ones. And as I argued above, such propositions might be synthetic rather than analytic.
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So in summary, I agree that Hume’s Law constitutes an objection to using the natural 
sciences to justify the moral judgement of human beings where there are no bridging 
premises. However, bridging premises in principle can be supplied. In contrast, my 
objection is that one or more premises in such arguments are used in moral judgements, 
they not justified by the natural sciences because the appeal to them does not in fact sustain 
the Normative Distinction.
4. My argument for the Central Claim
In this section I explain how I shall argue for the Central Claim of the thesis. Namely:
Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral
judgements about human beings.
It consists of the following premises and conclusion:
Premiss 1: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate, 
then the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify 
moral judgements about human beings are not adequate;
Premiss 2: The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate;
Intermediate conclusion:
The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral 
judgements about human beings are not adequate. (From 1 
and 2)
Premiss 3: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral
judgements about human beings are not adequate, then 
ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences.
Conclusion: Therefore, ethics is substantially independent of the natural 
sciences. (From intermediate conclusion and 3)
At the outset, I concede that this strategy for defending the Central Claim is indirect.
Yet I contend it has two significant advantages. The first is that the normative assessment
of living organisms is a more general category compared to the moral judgement of human
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beings. The second is that it avoids the complications raised by human rationality and 
agency. For instance, non-human living organisms which do not reproduce are clearly 
defective. Yet the same cannot be said of human beings who do not reproduce because of 
some rational choice. Indeed, arguably, such a choice is a good one.36
4.2 The connection between moral judgements and normative assessments 
The first premiss claims there is a deep connection between moral judgements about
human beings and normative assessments such that if the natural sciences are not adequate
to justify normative assessments of living organisms they are not adequate to justify moral
judgements about human beings.
Underlying this claim is the thought that moral judgements about human beings are a 
subset of the normative assessment of living organisms. That is, the latter encompasses the 
former. What drives this thought are two facts. The first is that human beings are a kind of 
living organism. The second is that moral judgements are a kind of normative assessment. 
That is moral judgements make normative claims. Specifically, they claim that morally 
something shoulde be the case in contrast to what is or may be the case. Furthermore, all 
moral claims are normative claims but not all normative claims are moral claims. 
Consequently, I take it that any failure of the natural sciences to justify normative 
assessments of living organisms equally applies to moral judgements about human beings.
36 In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the differences between human rationality and agency and other 
living organisms obviates the connection between the moral judgement of human beings and the normative 
assessment of living organisms. If recent scientific research is true, the difference between human rationality 
and agency and the rationality and agency of other living organisms, such as dolphins and apes, is not as 
great as commonly supposed. For a discussion of this topic see: John Dupre, Humans and Other Animals 
(Oxford, 2002), esp. pp. 217-256, Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals : Why Human Beings 
Need the Virtues (London, 1999), esp. 11-61. Furthermore, as I shall discuss later, Philippa Foot, in her 
Natural Goodness argues that the evaluation of non-human organisms can serve as a template for the moral 
judgement of human beings. See: Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford, 2001), esp. pp. 25-51.
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I take it that the first premiss is not controversial. Consequently, the crux of my 
argument is establishing the second premiss; that appeals to the natural sciences to justify 
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate. However, before I do this, I 
believe it is important to clarify what sustaining the Normative Distinction entails.
4.3 Sustaining the Normative Distinction
For all normative claims, there is an assertion that some occurrence X  is privileged in 
contrast to alternatives Y,Z, A. For example, take the moral claim, “Human beings shoulde 
be honest.” This asserts that honesty is privileged in contrast to dishonesty. Or take the 
normative claim, “Porky the piglet shoulde be born with two eyes, two ears, and a curly 
tail.” This asserts that being born with two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail is privileged in 
contrast to the alternatives characteristics piglets could be born with. It is privileged in the 
sense that it is being picked out as the state of affairs that shoulde occur, as opposed to 
some alternative.
Of course, the alternatives Y, Z, A ..., do not necessarily preclude X. For example, the 
normative claim “Human beings shoulde be honest,” does not preclude human beings being 
brave, kind or wise. Neither does the normative claim “Porky the piglet shoulde be bom 
with two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail,” preclude Porky being born with four limbs, a 
snout, and a bristly coat. Yet some do. For instance, the normative claim “Porky the piglet 
shoulde be born with two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail,” does preclude her being born 
with one eye, one ear and no curly tail.
Sustaining the Normative Distinction then is establishing the privileging of X  in 
contrast to the alternatives Y, Z, A. For example, sustaining the Normative Distinction in 
the claim “Human beings shoulde be honest” involves privileging of honesty over 
dishonesty. Or sustaining the Normative Distinction in the claim “Porky the piglet shoulde
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be born with two eyes, ears and a curly tail” involves privileging of being born with these 
characteristics in contrast to the alternatives.
Now the natural sciences could make a number of appeals to sustain the Normative 
Distinction. For instance, to use the example of Porky above, they could appeal to the fact 
that piglets such as Porky are typically born with two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail. In 
this case, what privileges Porky being born with two eyes, ears, and a curly tail rather than 
one eye, ear, and no curly tail is the fact that the former is typical whereas the latter is not.
So what I argue for in this thesis is that the appeals made to the natural sciences, such 
as the appeal to typicality, do not adequately justify the normative assessment of living 
organisms. Specifically, they are not adequate to justify normative assessments for one or 
more of the following reasons. The first is that some versions of the appeals cannot be 
understood purely in terms of the natural sciences. For instance, some versions of the 
appeals are incompatible with the purported ontology of the natural sciences, such as a 
version of the appeal to functions which ostensibly draws upon an incompatible 
teleology.371 should also note that the appeals I discuss have versions which are 
compatible with the ontology of the natural sciences, but vulnerable to one or more of the 
remaining objections so this objection plays only a minor role in my argument.
The second reason is that some of the appeals justify counter-intuitive normative 
assessments. For example, the appeal to development justifies the normative assessment 
“Porky the piglet is not defective [being bom with three legs, one eye, and no ears or curly 
tail]” when this outcome is specified in Porky’s genome. Of course, this reason assumes
371 ought to note that this reason assumes that the natural sciences have a single ontology, but this 
assumption is subject to significant challenge, most notably in John Dupre’s The Disorder of Things. See: 
John Dupre, The Disorder o f Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, 1995), 1.
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that our intuitions are reliable, and in this example at least, it appears that they are. On the 
other hand, the natural sciences are known for demonstrating in other spheres, that human 
intuitions with respect to nature are not reliable. Take for instance, the intuition that the 
earth is flat.
So the obvious response to this objection is to ask why should we trust human 
intuitions instead of the natural sciences? After all, the track record of the natural sciences 
is much better than human intuitions when it comes to understanding the natural world. My 
reply is that our intuitions are the means by which we evaluate whether any kind of appeal 
justifies normative assessments or moral judgements. For example, in ethics we evaluate 
whether normative theories justify moral judgements via our intuitions. This is despite of 
the fact our intuitions often vary and even contradict each other presently and over time.38 
While this is problematic, there seems to be no better way to evaluate whether any kind of 
appeal to the natural sciences to justify normative assessments or moral judgements 
succeeds or fails. Moreover, given the long-standing entrenchment of this system, the 
burden of proof is upon any alternative to show why we should prefer it without begging 
the question in its favour.
The third and final reason I argue these appeals are not adequate is that they fail to 
sufficiently and rightly privilege particular occurrences over and against the alternatives. 
That is, they do not satisfactorily determine what should occur over and against 
alternatives. This is necessary because both moral judgements and normative assessments 
are making some implicit or explicit claims concerning what should occur. For instance, to 
justify the moral judgement “Scientists who create human-animal embryos are bad,” it is
381 minimize the impact of this issue by only drawing upon intuitions which I believe would be shared by 
every rational agent.
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necessary to establish that human-animal embryos should not be created. On the other 
hand, if human-animal embryos should be created then this moral judgement is
o n
untenable.
These reasons are recurring motifs throughout the thesis. Moreover, the third reason 
occurs in at least three different guises. That is, there are three different reasons why 
appeals to the natural sciences fail to satisfactorily determine what should occur over and 
against alternatives. The first of these is that the appeal itself is not normative. That is, it 
makes no distinction between what should occur and alternatives. For example, one 
conception of the appeal to functions is not normative. The second reason is that some 
appeals embed unjustified assumptions which effectively beg the question concerning 
which normative assessments are justified. (Different assumptions would justify different 
even contradictory normative assessments.) Take for instance, the normative assessment X, 
which is justified by an appeal to Y. If Y embeds unjustified assumptions where alternative 
assumptions justify not-X, then the question is begged concerning which normative 
assessment (say X  or not-X) is justified by an appeal to Y. For example, one version of the 
appeal to functions embeds unjustified assumptions concerning the timeframe for the 
contribution to fitness which delineates what the function is. Another way to put this is that 
some appeals have parameters, such as the timeframe in the case above, which need to be 
specified in order to ascertain what should occur, yet the specification of these parameters 
cannot be rightly justified. The third reason is that there are many different versions of 
some of the appeals yet no single version of the appeal can be justified over and against the 
alternatives. Given that different versions can justify different and even contradictory 
normative assessments the appeal does not satisfactorily determine what should occur. This
39 Unless there is something specifically wrong with scientists creating them rather other kinds of agent.
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is because if the different versions are given equal credence then contradictory normative 
assessments would be equally justified.
However, before I begin my argument proper, I believe it is worthwhile to examine the 
work of three philosophers—Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot—who 
can be interpreted as arguing for the view that the natural sciences justify moral 
judgements about human beings. If any of their views are correct, then clearly the appeals 
used by the natural sciences to justify moral judgements are adequate, which contradicts 
my Central Claim. The aim is give some idea of the different ways in which philosophers 
have appealed to the natural sciences to justify moral judgements.
5. Au Contraire
Arnhart, Casebeer, and Foot either explicitly or implicitly use an account of the good or 
end for human beings drawn from the natural sciences to make a claim concerning what 
shoulde occur for human beings. For example, Arnhart uses the notion of the desirable for 
human life and makes extensive use of the natural sciences to specify what the desirable 
for human life is. Casebeer uses the notion of human functions, which he takes to be 
grounded in the natural sciences. And finally, Foot uses the notion of the human life form 
and fleshes out this notion drawing upon the natural sciences. Consequently, at least a 
prima facie case can be made that each of authors provides a challenge to the Central 
Claim of the thesis because they implicitly or explicitly contradict the second premiss of 
my argument for it.
However, before I begin my discussion of these authors I ought to note that my aim in 
the next section is not to criticize their arguments. Rather, my purpose is to set the scene so 
that I may criticize them in Chapter 7.
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5.1 Larry Arnhart
The philosopher Larry Arnhart’s work Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics o f 
Human Nature, provides an account of the notion of Darwinian natural right .40 He says it 
is a combination of ideas from the classic texts of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin, as well as 
the work and writings of contemporary political theorists like Roger Masters, Robert 
McShea, James Q. Wilson, and the biologist E. O. Wilson.41 Arnhart claims that this notion 
can be stated in ten propositions, which he then defends in the book.42
However, for my purposes, the book is significant for two reasons. The first is that the
notion of Darwinian natural right is directly concerned with moral judgements about
human beings. For example, Arnhart claims,
We can judge divergent ways of life by how well they nurture the natural 
desires and cognitive capacities of human beings in different 
circumstances ...43
The second is that he uses the natural sciences, especially the sciences of biology, in his 
account of moral judgements about human beings. For instance he uses them in his moral 
judgement of the practice of female genital mutilation.
For the uninitiated, female genital mutilation encompasses a range of practices which 
encompass the light ‘nicking’ of the clitoris, to its complete removal (clitoridectomy). 
Clitoridectomy is often accompanied by the sewing together of the vulva, only leaving a 
small hole for the flow or urine and menstrual blood (infibulation). It is practiced in Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia, or in those communities from these places that have emigrated.
40 Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right (New York, 1998).
41 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 6.
42 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 6-7.
43 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 6.
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There are various justifications given for the practice, which include custom, religion, 
guarding virginity, and preventing infidelity.
The moral judgment that Arnhart makes about female genital mutilation is based on a
notion of universal human nature. The justification of moral judgements involves an appeal
to this notion. For instance, he says,
Some feminists would seem to say that in the conflicts between men and 
women and between different cultural groups, there is no common 
ground of shared interests. If that is so, then there can be no resolutions 
of such conflicts except through force or fraud in which one side exploits 
the other. I would argue, however, that even in the absence of a universal 
sympathy, there is a universal human nature—a universal pattern of 
human desires—to which all human beings can appeal in searching for 
shared interests to settle their disputes.44
Indeed, his notion of universal human nature forms the heart of his account of moral
judgement.
Arnhart’s account of universal human nature begins with a defence of the claim that the
good [for human beings] is the desirable [for human beings].45 He identifies the
desirable—the good for human beings—by identifying the universal desires of the human
species. This is done through a variety of sources. These encompass ancient philosophical
literature, but they particularly focus upon research drawn from the natural sciences,
especially the sciences of biology. And in this case, Arnhart draws deeply upon the science
of sociobiology (or evolutionary psychology as it is now known).46
For example he says,
The twenty desires that I identify as natural and universal is based on 
various kinds of evidence. Donald Brown, in his Human Universals
(1991), and Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, in his Human Ethology (1989), have 
surveyed the anthropological and biological research showing that there
44 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 149.
45 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 17.
46 I should also note that he also seems to use the natural sciences to bolster and perhaps justify his normative 
framework via their evident virtues, especially their epistemic virtues.
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are hundreds of human universals, which include the twenty desires on 
my list. Anthropologists such as Carol and Melvin Ember (1993) and 
sociologists such as Joseph Loperato (1984) confirm the universality of 
the twenty desires. Psychologists who study the psychology of 
motivation would recognize these twenty desires as manifesting the basic 
motives for human action (McClelland 1985). When Aristotle, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric, reviews the common opinions of 
human beings about what is desirable in life, he includes the twenty 
desires on my list. When an Aristotelian scholar like Martha Nussbaum
(1992) describes “the basic human functions” that support universal 
norms of moral judgement, she includes the desires on my list. ... Thus, 
some contemporary social scientific research and some classic texts of 
philosophy and literature confirm the universality of these twenty desires 
as rooted in human nature.47
The human desires on his list include the desire for: (1) a complete life; (2) parental care;
(3) sexual identity; (4) sexual mating; (5) familial bonding; (6) friendship; (7) social
ranking; (8) justice as reciprocity; (9) political rule; (10) war; (11) health; (12) beauty; (13)
wealth; (14) speech; (15) practical habituation; (16) practical reasoning; (17) practical arts;
(18) aesthetic pleasure; (19) religious understanding; (20) intellectual understanding.48
For Arnhart the role of the natural sciences, particularly, the sciences of biology, is to 
give flesh (or content) to his account of human nature. That is, the natural sciences are 
largely employed to describe what these universal desires of the species are, such that the 
desirable, and thus the good, can be ascertained. On Arnhart’s account, the properties of 
human nature are derived from some statistical aggregation of the properties of the human 
species over a particular period of time.
Of course, the significant point about Arnhart’s account is that he takes the justification 
of moral judgements to rely upon a number of appeals to the natural sciences. These 
include appeals to typicality, what is natural, natural selection, and species. For example, 
Arnhart’s justification of his moral judgement of the practice of female genital mutilation,
47 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 29-30.
48 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 31-36.
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and the human beings who engage in it, involves appealing to the natural and universal 
desires of Homo sapiens.49 Specifically, he appeals to such desires which are frustrated by 
female genital mutilation, like the desire for sexual pleasure and bodily health.50 But as we 
shall see, these appeals to typicality (Chapter 3), what is natural (Chapter 3), natural 
selection (Chapter 3), and species (Chapter 6) are not adequate to justify normative 
assessments of living organisms and thus moral judgements of human beings. However, 
how my objections to these appeals apply to Arnhart will be discussed in Chapter 7.
5.2 William Casebeer
In Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, William
Casebeer attempts to provide and defend a naturalized ethic in terms of the natural
sciences.51 Like Foot’s and Arnhart’s account, this account effectively defends the claim
that the sciences of biology do justify moral judgements about human beings. On
Rottschaefer’s scale there is little doubt that he would hold to The Normative Connection
Hypothesis. For instance, early on in Natural Ethical Facts Casebeer discusses an
analogous scale coined by Philip Kitcher which postulates four possibilities for
biologicizing ethics.52 The most radical of these possibilities is the possibility that,
... Evolutionary theory can lead us to revise our system of ethical 
principles, not simply by leading us to accept new derivative statements 
... but by teaching us new fundamental normative principles. In short, 
evolutionary biology is not just a source of facts but a source of norms.53
Whereupon he subsequently explicitly claims that collectively the natural sciences can
fulfil all four possibilities, including the most radical.54 Consequently, clearly he holds that
the Normative Connection Hypothesis is true. Therefore, his account provides a direct
challenge to the Central Claim of the thesis.
49 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 149-157.
50 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 155.
51 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 1-2.
52 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 14.
53 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 14.
54 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 14.
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Casebeer characterizes his project as an attempt to reconcile the sciences of cognition 
with a fully naturalized notion of morality.55 He argues that one can better understand the 
nature of moral theory and its role in moral judgement(s) if we properly understood what 
morality is.56
Casebeer is not unaware that his project faces significant objections. He notes that such 
attempts to naturalize ethics have been beset by difficulties, and points to three historical 
reasons why this is so.57 The first, he suggests, were theoretical arguments based on the 
claims that naturalistic theories of ethics commit the (so-called) naturalistic fallacy, which 
purportedly showed that it was impossible to reduce the normative domain to the natural 
domain. The second were claims that the domain of human morality was too complex for 
empirical explanation by the natural sciences. The final reason, he suggests, is that the 
previous attempts to construct a scientifically informed moral theory have been too simple. 
Perhaps to this reason we could add that some attempts to construct a scientifically 
informed moral theory have provided bad, if not egregious, moral theories.
Casebeer therefore, focuses upon addressing the first two objections to his project of a 
scientifically naturalized ethic in conjunction with articulating his own position. In 
summary, he attempts to show that the modern natural sciences are up to the task of 
providing an explanation of human morality by offering an account of human morality. 
And he offers a number of arguments to defuse the objections raised by: (1) Hume’s Law; 
(2) the open question argument; (3) the argument from the addition of meaning; and (4) 
Mackie’s error-theory regarding the meaning of moral terms. He then provides an account
55 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 3.
56 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 3.
57 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 2.
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of how one can move from non-normative premises to normative conclusions through a 
recent-history theory of functions.58
For example, he claims that, “Moral claims should be reduced to functional claims
technically construed .. .”59 And that,
Such functional claims should be treated as they are in biology and the 
life sciences, with a suitably modified Wright-style telenomic analysis: a 
Godfrey-Smith flavoured “modern-history” theory of functions.60
The reason Casebeer uses this notion of function is because it provides a completely
naturalistic and science-based grounding for normativity. And it is at this point I depart
from Casebeer, although for reasons rather different to those typically offered.
For instance, I agree with Casebeer that the objections based on the Hume’s Law, the 
open question argument, and the argument from the addition of meaning are either 
inadequate or can be addressed. I also agree that a priori the natural sciences are capable 
of explaining or providing an account of human morality including the phenomenon of the 
moral judgement(s) of human beings.
Where I depart from Casebeer where he claims that moral claims ought to be reduced 
to functional claims of the recent-history kind. I do so because I believe that appeals to 
recent-history functions do not adequately sustain the Normative Distinction, and thus they 
cannot justify moral judgements about human beings. Furthermore, if I can show that his 
use of the concept of functions does not adequately sustain the Normative Distinction then 
moral claims cannot be so-reduced to functional claims so technically construed. However, 
my argument for these claims remains for Chapter 4, where I explicitly deal with the
58 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 3-4.
59 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 4.
60 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 4.
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appeal to functions to justify normative assessments of living organisms. And how they 
apply to Casebeer will be discussed in Chapter 7.
5.3 Philippa Foot
An explicit aim of philosopher Philippa Foot’s work Natural Goodness is to give a
naturalistic account of moral judgement(s). She claims that it diverges wildly from most
contemporary accounts of moral judgement(s). For example, in the beginning of chapter
one, she summarizes her project as follows and claims,
For better or worse—and many will say worse—I have in this book the 
overt aim of setting out a view of moral judgement very different from 
that of most moral philosophers writing today. For I believe that 
evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with 
evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and 
can only be understood in these terms. I want to show moral evil as ‘a 
kind of natural defect’. Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and 
the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be 
taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living 
thing. [Italics in original]61
Her account of moral judgement is of interest because it makes use of the natural sciences.
Consequently, there is at least prima facie evidence to suggest that her account of moral
judgement challenges the Central Claim.
Foot begins her account of the moral judgement of human beings by contrasting it with 
the accounts of theorists whom she takes to be her primary opposition. She identifies these 
as proponents of non-cognitivist theories of ethics and followers of the anti-naturalist G. E. 
Moore. In short, Foot claims that her opponents have made a mistake. For instance, she 
claims that it is a mistake for non-cognitive theorists to give conditions of use for ‘moral’
61 Foot, Natural Goodness, 5.
62 Foot, Natural Goodness, 5.
63 Foot, Natural Goodness, 8.
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statements (such as evaluations) in terms of something which must be true of the speaker— 
her feelings, attitudes or commitments to act.64
In contrast to her opponents, Foot seeks to establish that there are ‘natural norms’ for 
organisms, including human beings, derived from the fact that they are living. These 
‘natural norms’ refer to what Foot calls the ‘natural goodness’ of living things.65 This is 
only attributable to living things, their parts, characteristics, and operations—in other 
words, to their intrinsic or autonomous goodness.66
In characterizing the natural goodness of living things Foot makes use of the concept of
species, which at least gives a prima facie reason to suppose she is using the natural
sciences to justify moral judgements about human beings. However, her usage of the term
is drawn directly from the work of the philosopher Michael Thompson in his paper ‘The
Representation of Life’. For instance she remarks,
For help I shall turn to a paper published by Michael Thompson: a paper 
I admire very much.
Michael Thompson’s subject in this paper, which is called ‘The 
Representation of Life’, is the description of living things. His thesis is 
that to understand certain distinctive ways in which we describe 
individual living organisms, we must recognize the logical dependence of 
these descriptions on the nature of the species to which the individual 
belongs. Species-dependence is leitmotif. For this reason he concerns 
himself with propositions of the form ‘S’s are F’ or ‘The S is F’, where 
‘S’ holds a place for the name of a species (or ‘life form’ as he is ready to 
say for the sake of those who want to give ‘species’ a technical 
definition) and ‘F’ a place for a predicate; .. .68
64 Foot, Natural Goodness, 9.
65 Foot, Natural Goodness, 26-27.
66 Foot, Natural Goodness, 27.
67 Foot, Natural Goodness, 27. is where Foot acknowledges her debt to Thompson and his paper ‘The 
Representation of Life’. See: Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons: 
Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford, 
1995).
68 Foot, Natural Goodness, 27-28.
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A representative proposition would include, “Dogs are carnivores.” They also use the form 
"S’s do V  (where V refers to some verb.) A representative proposition would include, 
“Dogs eat meat.” (Foot uses rabbits.69)
Propositions of this form are logically unquantifiable.70 In other words, they do not 
speak of an individual dog, although they can; nor do they predicate something that is true 
of every dog. For instance, “Dogs have tails,” but Fang, the Doberman, does not have a tail 
(because it was docked). Foot claims that in order to understand what such propositions 
assert or claim one needs to look at the context, or in Thompson’s terms, “... the natural-
71history account of the life form  or species: of how creatures of this kind live.” For 
instance, we cannot understand what ‘reproduction’ or ‘growth’ (or any element of a 
species/life form) is, unless we know something of its natural history. As Foot notes, 
mitosis in amoebae and human beings is given the same description in textbooks, whereas 
in the former it is the reproduction of the individual organisms, whereas in the latter case it 
is not.72 Or more broadly, such natural history sentences speak of the life cycle of 
individuals of a given species.73 These ‘natural history sentences’ are also called 
Aristotelian categoricals.74
Foot emphasizes that these normative ‘Aristotelian categoricals’ are not statistical 
propositions. That is, they do not apply to a particular species because the predicate in 
question predominates in the species. So the norms that they describe are not norms 
because they predominate in species. Rather, she suggests they are normative because they 
are part of teleology of the species described by the life form.
69 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28.
70 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28.
71 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28.
72 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28-29.
73 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28-29.
74 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28-29.
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She also points out that Aristotelian categoricals are context sensitive, and asserts that 
what counts as excellence or defect is relative to the ‘natural’ habitat of the species.75
Foot connects her concept of species or life form to the normative evaluation of living
organisms in the following way,
Let us now ask how all this is relevant to the normative judgements that 
we make about plants and animals when we say, for instance, that a plant 
in our garden is diseased, or not growing properly, or that a certain 
lioness is a neglectful parent, or a particular rabbit not as reproductive as 
a rabbit should be. Thompson suggests that the relation between the 
Aristotelian categorical and the evaluative assessment is very close 
indeed. In fact, he says that if we have a true natural-history proposition 
to the effect that S’ s are F, then if a certain individual S—the individual 
here and now or then and there—is not F  it is therefore not as it should
nf\be, but rather weak, diseased, or in some other way defective.
And it is her contention that this form of evaluation is also applicable to moral judgements 
about human beings. The fundamental issue for the human case, as Foot notes, is,
“.. .whether characteristics of humans can be evaluated in relation to the part they play in 
human life, according to the schema of natural normativity that we found in the case of 
plants and animals.”77 That is, the schema discussed above.
Of course, Foot admits that there are important differences between the evaluation of 
plants and (non-human) animals and moral judgements about human beings.78 Yet she 
maintains that despite these differences the conceptual and formal structure of the 
evaluation of plants and (non-human) animals and of moral judgements about human 
beings is the same. She also admits that as a result of the differences, the human case is
75 Foot, Natural Goodness, 34.
76 Foot, Natural Goodness, 29-30.
77 Foot, Natural Goodness, 40.
78 Foot, Natural Goodness, 39.
deeply problematic.79 Yet, she believes that it can be addressed through considering what 
the human good is and how human beings live—in other words, the problems can be 
addressed through considering what kind of living thing human beings are and how they 
conduct their lives.80
Clearly, the central issue of Foot’s account for this thesis concerns whether her account 
objectively uses the natural sciences to adequately justify moral judgements about human 
beings. In concrete terms, the central issue is whether her account appeals to the natural 
sciences to justify the moral judgement, “Human beings ought to refrain from murder,” 
and if so whether this use is adequate to justify it.
I argue that the answer to this issue is unclear. That is, a case could be made that she 
does and does not use the natural sciences to justify moral judgements about human 
beings. The negative case is supported by the fact she explicitly distances herself from the 
technical or scientific use of the term ‘species’.81 Obviously, Foot would not be appealing 
to the natural sciences if her account owes very little to that.
Moreover, the concept of species qua Foot’s life form and the concept of species qua 
particular evolutionary lineage are inconsistent. (The latter is the predominant account of 
species in the scientific literature, although, as we shall see, in a subsequent chapter, it is 
by no means the only one.) In essence, they are inconsistent because form is only 
incidental on the ‘lineage’ species concept. One is not a member of a lineage in virtue of 
sharing characteristics in common, but in virtue of sharing a particular ancestor in
79 Foot, Natural Goodness, 43.
80 Foot, Natural Goodness, 5 1.
81 For instance see, Foot, Natural Goodness, 27-28, Thompson, "Virtue and Reasons," 276-277.
common. Consequently, on the latter species concept, no matter how divergent 
characteristics are between individuals, they are members of the same species if they share 
the relevant ancestor in common. In contrast, on the ‘life form’ species concept, if the 
characteristics of an individual are divergent enough they are either a defective member, or 
a member of a different species. For example, Foot argues that a wolf belonging to the
83species Wolf qua life form who hunts selfishly rather than cooperatively is defective. In 
contrast, a wolf belonging to the species Wolf qua sharing a common ancestor who hunts 
selfishly rather than cooperatively is not. She just is a member notwithstanding she is 
statistically abnormal. Furthermore, on Foot’s account, if hunting selfishly quickly became 
pervasive for wolves sharing a common ancestor; those wolves would still be defective 
qua Wolf life form.
The positive case for the claim that Foot makes use of the natural sciences to justify 
moral judgements is supported by the fact that there are concepts of the species from the 
natural sciences which are compatible with Foot’s concept of the species qua life form. (A 
point I will explore in Chapter 6.) So while species qua evolutionary lineages is the 
predominant species concept, it is not the only one. There is no reason why her account 
could not use a compatible species concept.
So if the notion of a species qua life form is compatible with the natural sciences, it 
looks like this might give us a way to sustain the Normative Distinction. For instance, it 
could be sustained by the relationship between the life form (which is constituted 
scientifically) and the individual being morally judged.84 What shoulde occur in the
82 Although, sharing characteristics in common is used to infer that an individual is a member of a particular 
lineage. As Darwin observed long ago, offspring resemble their parents, and families typically share 
characteristics in common.
83 Foot, Natural Goodness, 16.
84 For human beings we could name the life form ‘Human Beings’ and the individual a ‘human being’.
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individual being morally judged is determined by the life form to which the individual 
belongs, which is cashed-out in terms of the natural sciences.
It is for this reason that Foot’s account prima facie could present a direct challenge to 
the Central Claim of the thesis. There are two matters to determine: (1) whether Foot 
conceives species qua life form in terms compatible with the natural sciences; (2) if she 
does, whether this concept of species can be employed to adequately justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms. I contend that whether Foot conceives species qua life 
form is not clear. One could make a case for either view. However, the compatible species 
concept qua life form cannot be employed to adequately justify the normative assessment 
of living organisms.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to lay the foundation for my defence of the Central Claim. 
Namely,
Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because the 
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral
o c
judgements about human beings.
It consisted of four elements. First I spelt out what I mean by ethics being ‘substantially 
independent’ by exploring the kinds of contribution the natural sciences could potentially 
make to ethics. I characterized this relationship of ‘substantial dependence’ by locating it 
on a scale drawn from the work of William Rottschaefer, which described in terms of six 
hypotheses the extent the natural sciences could contribute to ethics. On this scale I 
accepted the Critical Connection Hypothesis as being true and claimed that the Normative
85 Henceforth, I shall generally refer to this proposition as the Central Claim.
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Connection Hypothesis is false. I then argued that this entailed that ethics is substantially 
independent of the natural sciences.
Secondly, I distinguished my argument for the Central Claim from the standard 
arguments, doctrines and traditions within the philosophical literature which would also 
support it. The motivation was to make my case on my opponents’ grounds rather than in 
terms sympathetic to my thesis. Specifically, I do not use a metaethical framework 
sympathetic to my claim but a metaethical framework sympathetic to my opponents’ 
position. For instance, I assume naturalism and cognitivism. Neither do I draw upon the 
Naturalistic Fallacy or Hume’s Law.
In the third element I introduced my argument for the Central Claim. Namely,
Premiss 1: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate, 
then the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify 
moral judgements about human beings are not adequate;
Premiss 2: The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate;
Intermediate conclusion:
The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral 
judgements about human beings are not adequate. (From 1 
and 2)
Premiss 3: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral
judgements about human beings are not adequate, then 
ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences.
Conclusion: Therefore, ethics is substantially independent of the natural 
sciences. (From intermediate conclusion and 3)
I acknowledged that this was an indirect argument but suggested that it offered the 
advantages of greater generality and avoiding the complications of human rationality. I 
also connected this argument back to the Central Claim.
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Finally, in the fourth element, I examined three authors who provide at least prima 
facie objections to my argument because they either implicitly or explicitly claim that the 
natural sciences justify moral judgements about human beings. These authors included the 
philosophers Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot. My final response to 
these authors is found in Chapter 7.
Now, with this foundation in place, I turn to the issue of the natural sciences and the 
normative assessment of living organisms.
46
Chapter 2: The natural sciences and the normative assessment 
of living organisms
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that the Central Claim:
Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because the
appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral
judgements about human beings
could be defended via the following argument:
Premiss 1: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate, 
then the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify 
moral judgements about human beings are not adequate;
Premiss 2: The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify
normative assessments of living organisms are not adequate;
Intermediate conclusion:
The appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral 
judgements about human beings are not adequate. (From 1 
and 2)
Premiss 3: If the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify moral
judgements about human beings are not adequate, then 
ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences.
Conclusion: Therefore, ethics is substantially independent of the natural 
sciences. (From intermediate conclusion and 3)
In the course of the discussion, it emerged that the linch-pin of the argument was the
second premiss because the other premises were either clearly true, or they followed from
the preceding argument.
Consequently, the remainder of the thesis consists of presenting the case for the 
proposition that the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify normative assessments 
of living organisms are not adequate. However, in order to understand my argument for 
this claim we first need to understand the normative assessment of living organisms and to 
characterize the appeals made to the natural sciences to justify them.
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The goals of this chapter therefore are twofold. The first is to provide an account of the 
normative assessment of living organisms. This is illustrated using the example of 
domesticated pigs taken from within the scientific literature. The second is to characterize 
the appeals used within the natural sciences to justify normative assessments.
2. An account of the normative assessment of living organisms
I begin my account of the normative assessment of living organisms with a broad
characterization of what assessment is, which I assume to be uncontroversial. I take it that 
assessments are reports of some kind of comparison with respect to a norm or norms. For 
instance, the normative assessment, “Porky the piglet is defective [because she is blind],” 
is a report of some kind of comparison between a pig and the norm that pigs shoulde be 
able to see.
This characterization of assessment has three elements which I shall now discuss. The 
first is norms. The second is a comparison with respect to these norms. And the third is the 
use of evaluative terms.
2.1 Norms
Norms refer to actual or hypothetical occurrences or states of affairs. For example, the 
norm in the normative assessment of Porky is being able to see.
Norms are either descriptive or evaluative. Broadly speaking, norms which are 
descriptive describe what typically occurs or presumably will occur. In other words, norms 
of this kind are statistical. They are based on particular statistical aggregations for some 
population over some timeframe. Often the population is defined by some abstraction—for
48
populations of living organisms most commonly this is the species. In contrast, norms 
which are evaluative assert what shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or will occur. In 
other words, norms which are evaluative maintain the Normative Distinction whereas 
norms which are descriptive do not. However, one complication arises where evaluative 
norms are based upon an appeal to typicality. In this case what shoulde occur is that which 
typically occurs, and therefore the descriptive norm and the evaluative norm coincide.
Yet in most instances, the main difference between norms which are descriptive and 
norms which are evaluative is that the latter are independent of what typically occurs. Take 
for example, the norm for sight for the type ‘piglet’. As things stand, the evaluative and the 
descriptive norm coincide. In other words, as things stand, things are as they shoulde be. 
However, if it became typical for piglets to be born blind piglets shouldd be blind. But, on 
most evaluative norms, it would still be the case that they shoulde be sighted—at least in 
the short term. (I doubt one would maintain that pigs shoulde be able to see if they have not 
seen for millions of years.)
Different accounts of norms can give rise to conflicting norms. That is, in any given 
situation, it is possible in the same situation to have conflicting claims about what shoulde 
happen. This occurs because there are differences in what is being appealed to in order to 
justify the claim about what shoulde occur. Take for example, the behaviour of 
domesticated sows that are confined to farrowing crates for giving birth. Sows so confined 
show various signs of distress which include chewing or gnawing upon the bars of the 
crate, and elevated levels of stress hormones in the blood (compared to sows that are not 
confined). A normative assessment based on an evaluative norm that appeals to what is 
typical would imply that the behaviour is ‘normal’ because it is typical. That is, it is 
atypical for sows not to show signs of behavioural and physiological stress, but typical for
them to do so in this context. In contrast, a normative assessment based on an evaluative 
norm that appeals to what is natural to ground and justify it would imply that the behaviour 
is ‘abnormal’, notwithstanding it is a ‘natural’ response to being confined to a farrowing 
crate. It would imply that the behaviour is ‘abnormal’ because domesticated sows farmed 
under natural or semi-natural conditions do not show these signs of behavioural and 
physiological stress when about to give birth.
2.2 A comparison with respect to norms
The heart of the normative assessment of living organisms is a comparison with respect to 
a norm or norms. The norms assert what shoulde occur; this is compared to what actually 
does and a report is given. For example, the normative assessment “Porky the piglet is 
defective [because she is blind],” reports the comparison between Porky and a norm for 
sight which Porky fails to fulfil. (The norm in this case asserts that piglets shoulde see in 
contrast to the fact that Porky the piglet does not.)
These comparisons are often at different but compatible levels of abstraction. For 
example, in the case of Porky, the comparison is between a token of a type (‘Porky’) with 
the norm for sight for the type (‘piglet’). Indeed typically the comparison is between a 
token of some type and a norm for that type. For instance, another very common 
comparison is between a token of some species and a norm for that species.
These comparisons are also embodied in the use of evaluative terms such as ‘good’, 
‘bad’, ‘functional’, ‘dysfunctional’, ‘malfunctional’, ‘defective’, ‘healthy’, ‘diseased’ etc. 
For example, we say Porky is defective because comparing her with the norm shows that 
what shoulde occur did not. Consequently, the use of these evaluative terms in discourse 
indicates implicit or explicit normative assessments.
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2.3 Evaluative terms
A plausible naturalistic account of evaluative terms and their use is suggested by Peter 
Geach in his paper ‘Good and Evil.’ In this paper Geach, argues that evaluative terms 
such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are always attributive adjectives.87 An attributive adjective is an 
adjective that is dependent upon its noun for its content. Take for example the adjective 
term ‘big’. The meaning of ‘big’ can be only determined in relation to the noun it is 
connected to. Compare for instance “A ‘big’ E. coli,” to “A ‘big’ giraffe,” and “A ‘small’ 
Blue whale” to “A ‘small’ rat.” What ‘big’ or ‘small’ means in a sentence can only be 
determined in relation to the objects that are described by the nouns.88 Otherwise, a simple 
argument would show that a ‘big’ E. coli was a big organism, and a ‘small’ Blue whale 
was a small organism, which is clearly false.
Attributive adjectives may be compared to predicative adjectives. A predicative 
adjective is an adjective that is independent of its noun for its content. Take for example, 
the adjective term ‘blue’. The meaning of ‘blue’ is independent of the noun that it is 
connected to. Compare for instance, “A ‘blue’ bird,” and “A ‘blue’ fish.” What ‘blue’ 
means in these sentences is independent of the object being described.
Geach puts the distinction in the following terms:
I shall say that in a phrase ‘an A B’ (‘A’ being an adjective and ‘B’ being 
a noun) ‘A’ is a (logically) predicative adjective if the predication ‘is an 
A B’ splits up logically into a pair of predications ‘is a B’ and ‘is A’;
on
otherwise I shall say that ‘A’ is a (logically) attributive adjective.
If this distinction is correct it implies that the evaluative terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’, 
depend upon the character of the object referred to by the noun , rather than being an
86 P. T. Geach, "Good and Evil," in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot (Oxford, 1967).
87 Geach, "Good and Evil," 64.
88 One implication which could be drawn from Geach’s argument is that the phrase “big thing” is 
meaningless. I agree. However, the fact that we typically understand what is referred to by the phrase ‘big 
thing’ is the implicit assumption that the thing in question is ‘big’ relative to the human scale.
89 Geach, "Good and Evil," 64.
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independent property. For example, the health of domesticated pigs is something that is 
relative and deeply connected to the character traits of domesticated pigs. Moreover, it is 
possible to extend this point to all evaluative terms.
The significant point that follows from this account of evaluative terms is that one 
cannot give an account of an evaluative term without having an account of the object that 
is referred to by the noun. So for example, in the normative assessment “Porky is a 
defective pig,” we cannot give an account of ‘defect’ without having an account of what a 
pig is. Or in the normative assessment “Porky is a good pig,” we cannot give an account of 
‘good’ without having an account of what a pig is.
This is significant because an account of what a pig is can be provided by the natural 
sciences, although they are not the only possible source.90 Among other practices, the 
natural sciences set out to describe objects in the world and the sciences of biology set out 
to describe organisms. Consequently, in principle there could be a scientific account of 
normative assessments of living organisms. Take for example, the normative assessment 
noted above, “Porky is a good pig.” The natural sciences can and do provide an account of 
what a pig is. ‘Good’ is clearly an attributive and an evaluative term, which can be given 
meaning in terms of the scientific account of what a pig is. Therefore, prima facie we have 
a tenable scientific account of normative assessments of living organisms.
So to fill out this account I shall now examine the normative assessment of 
domesticated pigs within the scientific literature. There are a number of reasons for this 
choice of subject and literature. For instance, I chose domesticated pigs as my exemplar
90 For instance, there could be a theological account of the pig type.
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because I believe they are representative of living organisms. Moreover, their 
domestication raises a number of interesting and significant issues.
3. The normative assessment of living organisms: the example of domesticated pigs
We can find examples of the normative assessment of living organisms within the
scientific literature on domesticated pigs’ character traits, health, and welfare. That is, I 
shall focus upon claims which assert what shoulde occur for domesticated pigs that arise 
within this literature.
3.1 Character trait norms
Domesticated pigs are pigs that have been developed by human beings for human purposes 
by the process of selective breeding from wild ancestors, who displayed some initial 
compatibility with human beings. When this started is not known with any precision, 
although there is archaeological evidence which suggests it began at least 9000 years ago.91
The wild boar, Sus scrofa, is the ancestor of almost all domesticated pigs. It originated 
in Europe and Asia. However, there are some exceptions. For example, there is the very 
specific local domestication of the Sulawesi Warty hog in Indonesia. In addition, Pond and 
Mersmann note that domesticated pigs also have partly descended from the east Asiatic
92banded pig, Sus vittatus.
The process of domestication has bought about numerous changes from the wild-type 
ancestor to such an extent that it is possible to deduce whether pig bones found in
91 Valerie Porter, Pigs: A handbook to the breeds o f the world (Robertsbridge, 1993), 13.
92 Wilson G. Pond and Harry J. Mersmann, "General Characteristics," in Biology of the Domestic Pig, ed. 
Wilson G. Pond and Harry J. Mersmann (Ithaca; London, 2001), 1.
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archaeological digs are from the wild-type or domesticated pigs.93 For example, there have 
been changes in: (1) the head—it tends to be smaller; (2) legs—they tend to be shorter; (3) 
body—it tends to be longer; (4) skull shape—a domesticated pig’s skull is shorter and 
broader than the long skull of its wild ancestor; (5) ears—domesticated pig ears may be 
floppy whereas wild pigs’ are erect; (6) tail—domesticated pigs have curly tails, whereas 
wild pigs’ tend to be straight; (7) coat—a wild boar has very coarse bristles and a definite 
crest whereas domesticated pigs have much finer, less dense bristles, almost to the point of 
nakedness in some cases; (8) colour—domesticated pigs show ‘non-wild’ colours.94
As noted, modern agricultural pigs are largely descended from the European wild boar
through a long process of domestication. Yet despite this long process, domesticated pigs
and their various breeds still share many of the characteristics of these pigs. For example,
the behaviour of domesticated pigs in semi-natural or wild environments is often very
similar to those of wild boar or feral pigs.95 Take for instance, nest building behaviour in
sows about to give birth. Curtis et al. claim that
Under natural or semi-natural conditions, both wild and domestic sows 
build large, complex nests from whatever suitable material is available in 
the surroundings ... In agricultural situations, sows use straw if it is 
provided or, in the absence of any suitable material, perform pawing, 
nosing, and oral behaviours directed at the floor, penning, and artificial 
manipulanda (Widowski and Curtis, 1990). ... When this behavior is 
prevented (e.g. by confinement in a farrowing crate without bedding), 
they show both behavioural and physiological indications of stress 
(Widowski and Curtis, 1990; Lawrence et al., 1994).96
93 Porter, Pigs: A handbook to the breeds o f the world, 14.
94 Pond and Mersmann, "General Characteristics," 14, Porter, Pigs: A handbook to the breeds of the world, 9.
95 Stanley E. Curtis, Sandra A. Edwards, and Harold W. Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," in Biology of 
the Domestic Pig, ed. Wilson G. Pond and Harry J. Mersmann (Ithaca; London, 2001), 41.
96 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," 57.
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However, these norms only apply where domesticated sows are free to act as they will, 
which is not typically the case for many, if not most domesticated sows.97 Rather, they are 
usually bound by the particularities of the farming system they are part of. So while it is 
true that given the opportunity, sows build a nest for farrowing, in many farming systems 
they are confined to farrowing crates instead.
Sexual behaviour is also similar. The elements of courtship are essentially the same 
between domesticated pigs and wild boar, although domesticated males show large
98individual differences and patterns compared to their wild brothers.
So ostensibly a domesticated pig is effectively a wild pig at heart.99 Indeed, they also 
share similarities with all other species of wild pig. For example, like their wild relatives, 
domesticated pigs are opportunistic omnivores, and will eat a wide range of food if given 
the opportunity, including food from animal origin such as carrion.100 (Their digestive 
systems are very similar to other opportunistic omnivores like human beings.101) Yet there 
are some differences between wild and domesticated pigs bought about by the process of 
domestication and specific adaptations to the agricultural environment domesticated pigs 
find themselves in.
97 Of course, there is also the assumption that there is material to build a nest a food in sufficient proximity 
for sows feed in a ‘group’.
98 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," 58.
991 use ‘wild pig’ here instead of ‘wild boar’ because it is easy to confuse the different sense of ‘wild boar’. 
‘Wild boar’ can mean either “a wild male pig of any species of pig,” or “a wild pig of either sex belonging to 
the species Sus scrofa. ( ‘Wild pig’ merely has the fault of being unspecific.) I should note that when I use 
‘wild pig’ subsequently I mean a wild pig of either sex belonging to the species Sus scrofa, rather than any 
wild species.
100 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology.", Porter, Pigs: A handbook to the breeds of the 
world, 4.. Naturally, this is not to say that different pig species do not have dietary preferences, or a pattern of 
eating dictated by the environment they are in.
101 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," 25, Porter, Pigs: A handbook to the breeds of 
the world, 4. Interestingly, at one point, early research on infant pigs was focused on the development and 
evaluation of human infant formulas! Pond and Mersmann, "General Characteristics," 25.
With respect to the former, domesticated pigs do not have the same seasonal breeding 
pattern as wild pigs. Wild pigs are seasonal breeders, usually conceiving in autumn or 
sometimes late spring—a pattern that is mainly determined by photoperiod.102 While 
domesticated pigs generally breed all through the year, although they can show seasonal 
infertility. And as noted above, domesticated pigs also differ from wild pigs in a number of 
bodily characteristics.
With respect to the latter, domesticated sows have adapted to individual feeding 
systems, while in the semi-wild or wild environment, they typically eat as a group. And as 
Curtis et al. also note, pigs are highly adaptable and show a remarkable capacity to adapt 
their behaviour to the agricultural setting, notwithstanding that behaviours evolved in the 
natural habitat may be incompatible with farming practices.103
Therefore, domesticated pigs are an intriguing mixture of wild pig, which has been 
selected, shaped and thus altered significantly for human ends. So it is not surprising that 
the evaluative norms for domesticated pigs’ character traits are a mixture of the wild-type 
from which domesticated pigs arose, and the consequences of the effects of domestication.
These character norms specify what shoulde occur and are embodied within the 
normative assessment of domesticated pigs. For instance, where individual domesticated 
pigs meet these norms they are positively evaluated. That is, if Porky in due course 
instantiated all these character norms we would call her a good pig. And, conversely, if
102 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," 57.
103 Curtis, Edwards, and Gonyou, "Ethology and Psychology," 51, 52. Their point raises a number of 
problems about respect to the relationship between being ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ and animal welfare, which 
will be explored in subsequent sections. E.g. great care needs to be taken in inferring animal welfare by 
comparing the behaviour of domesticated pigs with wild pigs. A typical behaviour in domesticated pigs 
considered ‘abnormal’ in wild pigs could either be ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ for domesticated pigs depending 
on whether the behaviour is a good adaptation, i.e. it does not cause suffering.
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individual domesticated pigs fail to meet these norms they are negatively evaluated. So if 
Porky in due course fails to instantiate some of these character norms we would call her a 
bad or defective pig.
3.2 Health norms
The norms for pig health can be gleaned from a number of sources in the scientific
literature. For example, the following are various normal or healthy physiological
parameters for domesticated pigs drawn from D. J. Taylor’s Pig Diseases:
Body temperature: 39°C (102°F)
Lower critical point 38.4 °C (101.2 °F)
Upper critical point 40 °C (103.5 °F)
Respiratory rate, resting 18 C: 20-30 per minute, more in young (up to 
50), less in old (to 13-15) in sows
Pulse (resting): 70-80 per minute, more in young (200-280, newborn).
Packed Cell Volume (PCV) 0.42 (0.37-0.46)
X1012
1/1
Red Blood Cells (rbc) 7.0 (6 .5-8.0) /I
White Blood Cells (wbc) 18.0 (10.0-23.0 X109 /I
Platelets 400 (250.0-500.0) xlO9 /I
Haemoglobin 140 (110-142) g/1
For blood levels of ions or plasma enzymes, see appropriate 
section. All blood parameters may change with age. These are adult 
figures. 104
Deviations from these physiological parameters are usually taken as an indication that 
something has gone awry.
Take for example, a scenario where Porky has a body temperature of 43°C. This, 
among other possibilities, is indicative of Porky being infected with a virus. (Fever is one 
response a pigs’ body makes to viral infection because higher body temperatures makes 
viral replication more difficult.) Porky could be infected with Aphtae epizooticae—the 
virus responsible for Foot and Mouth disease—since high fever is one of the signs of
104 D. J. Taylor, Pig Diseases, 6th ed. (Glasgow, 1995), 7.
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infection along with blisters in the mouth and excessive secretion of long stringy salvia.105 
She could also be infected with Swine Vesicular Disease (SVD) because the clinical signs 
are identical to Foot and Mouth Disease.106
The critical point to note about these physiological parameters is that they too specify 
what shoulde happen. Indeed, the physiological parameters of individual domesticated pigs 
are commonly and frequently compared to the physiological norms for domesticated pigs, 
and reports of the comparison given. For instance, if Porky has a body temperature of 
43°C, the likely normative assessment would be that she is diseased since she shoulde have 
a body temperature of 39°C, and the most likely explanation of the increased temperature 
is the presence of a viral disease in her body. She could also be assessed as being defective 
if there are failures in her body’s systems which explain why her temperature is 43°C 
instead of 39°C it shoulde be.
3.3 Welfare norms
Claims concerning what shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or may possibly occur 
concerning the welfare of domesticated pigs can also be gleaned from a number of sources 
of literature. For instance, the following norms for the welfare of domesticated pigs are 
drawn from the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), who are 
central source of norms for the welfare of domesticated pigs in the United Kingdom (UK). 
These norms are significant not only because they are based upon scientific knowledge and 
practice, but because they also have legal force in the UK. And while their normative
105 Food Department for Environment, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). "Disease Fact Sheet: Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD)." [Website]. (Last Updated: August 3, 2007). In: Department of the Food Environment and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/fmd/index.htm. 
Accessed: 13 August, 2007 2007.
106 Food Department for Environment, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). "Disease Fact Sheet: Swine Vesicular 
Disease (SVD)." [Website]. (Last Updated: August 3, 2007). In: Department of the Food Environment and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/svd/index.htm. 
Accessed: 17 August 2007.
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power is due in part to the force of law, the particularities of the norms encompassed by the
legislation are due to a normative framework. For example, the Code o f Recommendations
for the Welfare o f Farm Animals: Pigs declares,
The welfare of pigs is considered within a framework that was developed 
by the Farm Animal Welfare Council and known as the “Five 
Freedoms”. These form a logical basis for assessing animal welfare 
within any husbandry system, together with the actions necessary to 
safeguard animal welfare within the limitations of an efficient livestock 
industry.107
These Five Freedoms are:
1. FREEDOM FROM HUNGER AND THIRST by ready access to 
fresh water and a diet to maintain full health and vigour.
2. FREEDOM FROM DISCOMFORT - by providing an appropriate 
environment including shelter and a comfortable resting area.
3. FREEDOM FROM PAIN, INJURY OR DISEASE - by prevention 
or rapid diagnosis and treatment.
4. FREEDOM TO EXPRESS NORMAL BEHAVIOUR by
providing sufficient space, proper facilities and company of the animal's 
own kind.
5. FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND DISTRESS - by ensuring 
conditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering.108
Each of the Five Freedoms claims something shoulde occur in contrast to what does
actually occur. That is, specifically pigs shoulde be free from: (1) hunger and thirst; (2)
discomfort; (3) injury or disease; and (4) fear and distress. And they shoulde have the
freedom to express normal behaviour. But of course, domesticated pigs do not always
enjoy these freedoms. Unfortunately what sometimes occurs is that domesticated pigs
suffer from hunger, thirst, discomfort, pain, injury, disease, fear and distress. Furthermore
in some circumstances they do not have the freedom to express normal behaviour. For
example, as I noted above, in many farming systems, sows about to give birth are confined
107 "The Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Farm Animals: Pigs." [Website]. In: Department of 
the Food Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/farmed/pigs/pigcode.pdf. Accessed: 5 July 2004.
108 "The Five Freedoms." [Website]. In: Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC). Available at 
http://www.fawc.org.uk/fireedoms.htm. Accessed: 5 July 2004.
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to farrowing crates. In contrast, normal behaviour would be to build a nest—if normal is 
understood in terms of what is natural, or in terms of what the sow would do if given the 
opportunity.
The regulations concerning what ought to be done to maintain the Five Freedoms are 
very clear.109 For instance, there are regulations which specify norms for how domesticated 
pigs shoulde be handled. They specify that pigs shoulde be moved at their own pace and not 
struck in sensitive places.110 They also specify that electrical current shoulde not be applied 
for the purposes of immobilization. There are also norms for the contexts in which pigs are 
handled.111 For example, there is a regulation that the floors and walkways are well
maintained such that they provide a non-slip surface, and that they not be too steeply
112sloped because this can cause leg problems. More generally, there are regulations which 
specify norms for: (1) accommodation; (2) feeding and hydration, (3) body modification;
(4) regulating fertility; (5) giving birth; (6) treatment of piglets, weaners, sows, boars; and
(7) health.
The relationship between the Five Freedoms and the scientific literature on animal 
welfare is complex because they are intertwined. For example, while the Five Freedoms 
were drawn (to some extent) from the natural sciences and its literature, the Five Freedoms 
also inform them.113 However, the significant point raised by these norms is that they 
specify that certain things shoulde occur, and they are embedded within scientific 
discourse.
109 Interestingly, they begin with the virtues of the ‘Stockman’, which as they note, is the most significant 
influence on the welfare of pigs. See: "The Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Farm Animals: 
Pigs."
110"The Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Farm Animals: Pigs."
n l"The Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Farm Animals: Pigs."
112"The Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Farm Animals: Pigs."
113 The veterinary scientist Dr. John Webster drew up the Five Freedoms and were there original proponent. 
He was an original committee member of the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) and is presently 
Emeritus Professor of Animal Husbandry at the University of Bristol. See
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However, interestingly welfare norms are also used in moral judgements of human 
beings. For example, if a farmer failed to meet these norms for animal welfare he or she 
would be morally judged as being ‘bad’ or even in extreme cases ‘evil’. Indeed these 
welfare norms are typically applied in moral judgements of human beings rather than in 
normative assessments of living organisms. This is because the target of welfare norms are 
generally not domesticated pigs but human beings since they are responsible for the 
welfare of domesticated pigs. For example, we would not say that a domesticated pig is 
‘bad’ or ‘defective’ if he or she did not meet these norms but we might say that of human 
beings if they did not.
4. The justification of normative assessments by the natural sciences
As I mention earlier the normative assessment of living organisms involves a report of a
comparison between living organisms with a norm for living organisms. So for example, 
the normative assessment, “Porky the piglet is defective [because she is blind],” reports a 
comparison between a pig and a norm for sight, where the pig fails to meet the norm in 
question.
The power of these comparisons depends upon the reason that is given to justify the 
norm. So in the case of Porky the strength of the assessment comes from the reason that is 
given for why Porky shoulde be born with the ability to see. The nature of these reasons 
depends on the type of appeal that is being made to the natural sciences to justify the 
normative assessment. For example, one reason could be that it is typical for piglets to be 
born being able to see. Another could be that there is some plan or blueprint which 
specifies that Porky shoulde be born with the ability to see.
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Now if we examine the norms of character traits, health, and welfare above, we can 
discern a number of appeals which purport to objectively justify why something shoulde 
occur and thereby ground normative assessments of living organisms. With one exception, 
they are all appeals to some feature or aspect of the causal order. They include appeals to: 
(1) typicality; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) natural selection; (5) function; (6) 
ontogeny; (7) species; and (8) pain and suffering. However, I ought to note that my goal in 
the following sub-sections is to describe the appeals. It is not to criticize them. I reserve my 
criticisms to chapters 3-6.
4.1 The appeal to typicality
The appeal to typicality to justify normative assessments of living organisms is based upon 
the fact that some occurrences are typical and some are atypical. That is, what shoulde 
occur is that which typically occurs and that which shoulde not occur is that which occurs 
atypically. So for example, we are justified in claiming that Porky the piglet is defective 
because it is atypical that piglets are blind (or it is typical that they can see). In other 
words, Porky the piglet shoulde be able to see because it is typical for piglets to be able to 
see.
The appeal to typicality requires that one ascertain what is typical for the individual or 
group being normatively assessed. This is done by reference to some broader population or 
grouping to which the individual or group belongs. What is typical for them is some 
statistical abstraction from this broader population or grouping. In the case of Porky, the 
group is new-born members (piglets) of the species Porky belongs to (Sus scrofa).
I suggest that underlying this appeal is the intuition, sometimes explicitly expressed, 
that regularly or typically occurring outcomes signifies the operation of some cause or
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system of causes.114 For example, domesticated pigs will, with great regularity, be born 
with two ears, two eyes, a curly tail, and be covered with a bristly coat. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that there is an expectation that domesticated pigs specifically, and living 
organisms generally, will turn out a particular way, and there is a tendency to note the fact 
when they do not.
So when we see a group of pigs in a field that are in many respects the same, or very 
similar, we tend to assume that this is caused by something. And in this case, the intuition 
is entirely correct. The fact that these pigs are in many respects the same or very similar is 
due to human action (in conjunction with pig biology).115 The inference is then drawn 
(rightly or wrongly) that the effects of the causes shoulde occur.
However, the appeal to typicality is not to the underlying causal system responsible for 
typical outcomes. It is the fact of typicality which ostensibly justifies the normative 
assessments in this case. Of course, we could appeal to the various underlying causal 
systems responsible for typical outcomes to justify normative assessments. For example, in 
what follows, I consider the causal system responsible for development in the appeal to 
development. For Porky it is this causal system which is responsible for the fact that piglets 
typically are born with eyes. It is also the causal system responsible for whatever 
characteristics piglets happen to exhibit, and more generally it is the causal system 
responsible for whatever characteristics living organisms exhibit. Nevertheless, an appeal 
to this causal system would go beyond an appeal to typicality as such.
114 In invoking causes and effects I am not implicitly appealing to any particular account of causation and 
ontology for cause and effect. My point does not depend upon them.
115 This is especially pertinent in the case of breeds of domesticated pigs which vary greatly from the wild- 
type ancestor because without human action the breed would likely revert to some alternative set of similar 
characteristics.
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4.2 The appeal to history
A closely related appeal to justify the normative assessments of living organisms is the 
appeal to the history of the causal order. Similarly, I suggest that underlying this appeal is 
the intuition, sometimes explicitly expressed, that the regularity or typicality of the 
operation of some cause or system of causes over time is significant. For example, some 
living organisms have shown great constancy in their development over period of 
thousands and even millions of years. Living fossils are the classic example. For instance, 
the New Zealand Tuatara (a lizard) is unchanged since the time of the dinosaurs, which 
was at least 60-odd millions of years ago. Given such past regularity, it is a small leap to 
suggest that this consistency in causation is and ought to be privileged. That is, the 
inference is drawn (rightly or wrongly) that the regularity of effects over some period of 
time shoulde occur in contrast to what atypically occurs or may possibly occur.
For instance, at least part of the intuition that domesticated pigs such as Porky shoulde 
turn out a particular way is because for at least 9000 years, they have turned out this way, 
albeit modified to some degree by human action. So it ought not to be surprising that some 
have come to the view that what shoulde occur in contrast to what actually occurs is what 
has regularly occurred in the past.
The appeal is also utilized implicitly to some extent in the works of Foot, Arnhart, and 
Casebeer. For example, in Foot’s account of moral judgement and normative assessment, 
the central normative concept of life forms is a historical as well as a logical construct.116 
So for any individual x  belonging to life form X the character traits etc. of the life form X 
shoulde occur in x. However, what the character traits are for the particular life form X
1161 should note that his point is not clearly made in Natural Goodness. Rather it is clearly made in ‘The 
Representation of Life’ by Michael Thompson. See Thompson, "Virtue and Reasons," esp. pp. 271-279. Foot 
draws extensively upon Thompson and explicitly acknowledges this in her account of life forms. See Foot, 
Natural Goodness, 27-29.
depends on how the life form has developed over history. For instance, we cannot say 
which reproductive behaviours of individual domesticated pigs belonging to the life form 
Sus scrofa shoulde be, unless we know the history of the reproductive behaviours of the life 
form.
4.3 The appeal to what is 'natural’
A further appeal that seeks to explain why something shoulde occur is the appeal to what is 
natural. Like the appeal to typicality and history, it seems to be another appeal to the causal 
order. Specifically it is an appeal to the causal order absent causes enacted by human 
beings. For example, earlier I noted that ultimately the normative assertion that 
domesticated pigs shoulde be free to express ‘normal’ behaviour is based upon what is 
natural for the domesticated pig, where “what is natural,” is understood (roughly) as what 
domesticated pigs would do in circumstances outside human control.
Specifically, I discussed the case of the practice of confining sows to farrowing crates 
prior to giving birth. One reason that might be given for assessing this practice as bad is 
that it is not natural. That is, it is negatively assessed, among other reasons, because being 
confined to give birth is not what wild pigs and domesticated pigs living in wild 
environments do; or what they do given any choice in the matter. Indeed, what they do in 
the wild and given the opportunity is to build a complex nest.
Furthermore, the appeal to what is natural in this sense, underpins a good deal of the 
normative assessments and moral judgements issued by some members of the 
environmental movement. For example, some environmentalists normatively and morally 
criticize those who interfere with the ‘natural’ environment—the environment which 
(hitherto) has been (largely) free from human interference. Indeed, such interference is
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represented as one of the biggest environmental sins human beings, especially those within 
commercial companies or governments, can commit.
4.4 The appeal to natural selection
Evolution by natural selection is a central explanatory motif within the sciences of biology. 
It is important for a number of reasons, but a central one is that diverse biological 
phenomena are explained by the process. For instance, it is used to explain the appearance 
of design in the living world, human sexual behaviour and morality, and speciation.
Natural selection is ‘natural’ in the sense described above; that is, the ‘selection’ is free 
from human influence or interference. Indeed, natural selection is contrasted with artificial 
selection which is selection due to human influence or interference.
In the context of normative assessments, the appeal to natural selection is used to 
justify normative assessments by the facts that natural selection ‘chooses’ what shoulde 
occur.117 So what is distinctive about grounding normative claims with respect to natural 
selection is the kind of ‘choice’ that is made by nature. That is, the ‘choice’ is taken to 
establish a norm because it is natural.
Moreover, the fact that there are instances where what occurs differs from what shoulde 
occur is not a problem for this kind of appeal. This is because it is widely recognized that 
natural selection is imperfect. What I mean by this is that something having a higher fitness 
compared to variations or alternatives does not ensure that it will occur in contrast to the 
possible alternatives. What higher fitness means is that something has a higher chance of 
surviving to reproduce under natural selection. It does not mean that it will survive to
117 The ‘choice’ here is without intention.
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reproduce under natural selection. The fact of survival to reproduction may be due to other 
factors, such as luck.
And again this appeal is a kind of appeal to the causal order. Specifically, it is an 
appeal that builds upon the intuitions about typicality, history, and what is natural. To these 
it adds a kind of natural ‘choice’. Indeed, the remaining appeals are similar in that they 
build upon the previous appeals and add something to them.
The appeal to natural selection is part of Arnhart’s account of moral judgement of
human beings. In particular, he holds that the twenty natural desires, to which he appeals to
justify moral judgements, were developed and shaped by natural selection. For instance,
Despite the uncertainty in reconstructing the evolutionary history of 
human ancestors, there is evidence for believing that this pattern of 
twenty desires developed in the Paleolithic environment of our hunting-
gathering ancestors, the evolutionary environment in which human nature
118was shaped by natural selection.
In other words, natural selection at least partially established these particular twenty 
natural desires.
4.5 The appeal to functions
The appeal to functions seeks to explain why something shoulde occur in contrast to what 
does occur. For instance, it seems natural to say that Porky’s heart shoulde pump blood, in 
contrast to whatever else it does because this is what hearts are for. That is, pumping blood 
is the heart’s purpose. If Porky’s heart does not pump blood we would say Porky is 
defective, whereas, if her heart did not make certain kinds of noise, we would not, although 
perhaps we might say that it unusual.
118 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 30.
This kind of appeal to justify normative assessments is especially evident in the context 
of health. For instance, I have already pointed to the function of the heart in the 
domesticated pig. I could equally point to the functions of the liver, the functions of the 
pancreas, the functions of the kidney or a whole host of different organs at one level of 
organization. I could also point to the functions of particular cells at lower levels of 
organization, or functions of particular systems such as the endocrine system at a higher 
level of organization. In each case we can say, at the particular level of organization, what 
that entity is for and therefore what it shoulde do in contrast to what it does in fact do.
Moreover, a healthy pig consists of many different parts each performing specific 
actions at many different levels of organization towards some overall or overarching 
harmony (which we call health). This goal is such that dysfunction at any particular level 
of organization could mean disease for the pig as a whole.
Casebeer in particular appeals to functions to justify moral judgements of human 
beings. However, I will defer comment on how he makes use of this appeal to Chapter 7.
4.6 The appeal to development
The appeal to development is the appeal to what causes the development of an individual 
from its beginning to end. This appeal is especially evident in normative assessments of 
congenital defects. For instance, if Porky was born with no eyes, one ear, and two curly 
tails, she would be normatively assessed as being defective. The intuition is that piglets 
shoulde be bom with two eyes, two ears, and one curly tail and typically they are born with 
these characteristics. So presumably something has gone awry with the process of 
development in Porky’s case.
The basis of this appeal is a particular kind of account of the development of an 
individual from egg to adult. This holds that the process of development is preformed in 
some way. Specifically, presently it is claimed that the process of development is 
preformed in blueprints or programmes encoded in their DNA. Consequently, these kinds 
of account are known as preformationist accounts of ontogeny.
On such accounts of ontogeny, what shoulde occur is specified by the plan or 
programme encoded in the DNA of the organism. Obviously, in some cases, this plan can 
be frustrated. For instance, there could be interference due to some mutagen which affects 
the DNA itself, or some teratogen which interferes with the implementation of the plan.
4.7 The appeal to species
The appeal to species to justify the normative assessment of living organisms is to some 
kind of type to which the token belongs to, which explains why something with respect to 
the token shoulde occur. For instance, the normative assessment “Porky is a defective pig” 
appeals to the type ‘domesticated pig’ to explain why Porky is defective. That is, it is the 
fact that Porky belongs to the type ‘domesticated pig’ which explains why Porky shoulde 
be able to see when in fact she cannot.
Another way to characterize the appeal to species is to say it is (in other terms) an 
appeal to the individual’s essential nature. However, in fact, the two are not the same 
despite how the term ‘species’ is used in everyday talk. This is because the term ‘species’ 
can refer to different kinds and or aspects of a living organism’s character traits. Take, for 
example, our friend Porky. The essential nature of Porky could be characterized as having 
“two eyes, two ears, a snout, a bristly coat, and a curly tail.” And Porky’s species is Sus 
scrofa. Yet Sus scrofa does not necessarily refer to the class of creatures that have two 
eyes, two ears, a snout, a bristly coat, and a curly tail. Rather Sus scrofa could refer to a
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particular lineage of organisms that share a particular common ancestor, which, in fact, 
probably had substantially different characteristics compared to modern domesticated pigs.
However, often the appeal to species can be short-hand for another appeal which relies 
upon a further explanation for why something shoulde occur. For example, in the case of 
Porky, the appeal to the type ‘domesticated pig’ could be short-hand for the appeal to 
development—i.e. the causes of development. So the reason why Porky the domesticated 
pig shoulde have two eyes, two ears, and one curly tail is because these character traits are 
pre-programmed in domesticated pigs’ DNA.
Moreover, the appeal to species can encompass a number of very different notions.
This is because there are many different kinds of species concept including: (1) species as 
nominal entities; (2) species as real classes; (3) species as individuals; and (4) species as 
relations. I consider these in detail in Chapter 6 .
4.8 The appeal to pain and pleasure
The final appeal that I discuss that seeks to explain why something shoulde occur is the 
appeal to pain and pleasure. Specifically, the claim is either something shoulde occur 
because it promotes or brings about pleasure, or that it shoulde not occur because it 
promotes or brings about pain.
This appeal to justify normative assessments may be based on the idea that pleasure 
and pain constitute a kind of signalling system for what is truly desirable for living 
organisms. 119 Indeed, Arnhart indirectly draws on this point in Darwinian Natural Right,
119 This kind of point is made in: William F. Harms, Information & Meaning in Evolutionary Processes 
(Cambridge, 2004).
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1 Of)where he provides an account of the normative structure of animal movement. He claims 
that “To live every animal must act, either consciously or unconsciously, to achieve the 
goals set by its nature.”121 Broadly, biologically this goal is to survive to reproduce and 
generally speaking what is ‘painful’ is inimical to survival and what is ‘pleasurable’ is 
positive to survival.
No doubt this attempt to justify normative assessments is also informed by human 
experiences of pain and pleasure and empathy with fellow living organisms. All other 
things being equal, human beings prefer the experience of pleasure to the experience of 
pain. Moreover, they see this preference, albeit analogously, in other living organisms too. 
That is, all other things being equal, fellow living organisms prefer the experience of 
pleasure to the experience of pain. For instance, animals typically avoid exactly the same 
stimuli that cause pain in human beings. Moreover, human beings claim that pain shoulde 
not occur when it does and pleasure shoulde occur when it does not. So by observation and 
empathy they infer that this applies to fellow living organisms too, which in turn is used to 
justify various normative assessments. Indeed, normative assessments justified by this 
appeal tend to be statements which describe situations where pain occurs when it shoulde 
not, or where pleasure does not occur when it shoulde.
This appeal is particularly evident in the context of the normative assessment of living 
organisms’ welfare. For instance it apparently underpins every one of five freedoms for 
animals, which are in the process of being enshrined into U.K. law. In other words the 
reason why the five freedoms are espoused and enshrined in law is that if they are denied, 
animals suffer.
120 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 21-28.
121 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 21.
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It also differs somewhat from other appeals I consider in that it is not to some objective 
aspect or feature of the causal order such as its history. Rather it is to something which 
supervenes upon it. Still it seeks to objectively privilege particular occurrences 
(pleasurable states) over and against the alternatives (painful states).
5. Conclusion
The goals of this chapter were twofold. The first was to provide an account of normative 
assessments of living organisms. The second was to characterize how the natural sciences 
attempt to justify normative assessments of living organisms. This was in order to lay the 
foundation for my demonstration that the natural sciences are not adequate to objectively 
justify normative assessments of living organisms.
I characterized the normative assessment of living organisms as the report of a 
comparison between a living organisms (or living organisms) with a norm which claims 
that something shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or may occur. This was illustrated 
using the example of domesticated pigs.
The justifications of these normative assessments were by various appeals which gave 
reasons why the norm shoulde occur. I discussed appeals to: (1) typicality; (2) history; (3) 
what is natural; (4) natural selection; (5) functions; (6) development; (7) species; and (8) 
pleasure and pain.
I am going to argue that none of these appeals succeed. However, to be clear, I am not 
arguing that it is a mistake or wrong to use them to justify normative assessments. For 
instance, I do not claim that it is never permissible to say “X is wrong because it is
dysfunctional.” Rather I claim that it is not correct to suppose that claims of this kind can 
be wholly and unambiguously justified by a plea to the natural sciences. Specifically, I 
argue that the appeals are inadequate for at least one of four reasons. The first is that some 
versions of the appeals cannot be understood purely in terms of the natural sciences. The 
second is that some appeals embed unjustified assumptions which effectively beg the 
question concerning which normative assessments are justified. The third is that in some 
cases some appeals justify completely counter-intuitive normative assessments. The fourth 
and final reason is that they fail to sufficiently privilege particular occurrences over and 
against alternatives. It is the goal of the following chapters to demonstrate why this is the
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Chapter 3: Problems with the natural sciences justifying 
normative assessments of living organisms
1. Introduction
The previous chapter used the example of domestic pigs to explore the different ways in 
which it would be possible to appeal to the natural sciences to justify normative 
assessments. These included appeals to: (1) typicality; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) 
natural selection; (5) function; (6) ontogeny; (7) species and (8) pleasure and pain.
I argue that these appeals are inadequate. The purpose of this and subsequent chapters 
therefore is to provide arguments to support this claim. In particular, this chapter examines 
the appeals to: (1) the causal order; (3) history; (4) being natural; and (4) natural selection;
(5) pain and pleasure. I do not include the appeals to function, ontogeny, and species 
because, as we shall see, they appear to escape some of the objections made here. 
Moreover, their complexity warrants separate treatment. Consequently, I deal with them in 
chapters 4-6 respectively.
2. The failure of the natural sciences to justify adequately normative assessments 
concerning living organisms
2.1 The appeal to typicality
The appeal to typicality turns on the idea that there is some state of affairs that regularly or 
typically occurs. Usually this is in some broader population of tokens of some type. Take 
for instance our oft-used example of Porky the piglet. The idea is that Porky the piglet is 
defective precisely because she is blind while the ability to see is typical for all populations 
of piglets.
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The appeal to typicality is a natural and obvious one for those within the natural 
sciences to make. After all, as noted in Chapter 2, regularity of occurrences is (at least) 
indicative of the operation of some cause or system of causes, and it is an explicit goal of 
the natural sciences to elucidate them. So for instance, consistency in the characteristics of 
organisms within a particular lineage suggests there is some underpinning cause or system 
of causes (which explains the consistency and why they ought to be consistent).
Therefore, it is not surprising there is an expectation that when something regularly 
occurs that it shoulde occur. Nor is it surprising that when the expectation is fulfilled living 
organisms are assessed as being good (or some other similar positive normative term), or 
that when it is frustrated living organisms are assessed as being defective (or some other 
negative normative term).
However, the appeal to typicality has a number of serious problems. The first is that it 
relies upon some choice of population, which needs to be justified. This is because what is 
typical for an individual or group is derived from some broader population to which they 
belong. The reason the choice needs to be justified is because the individual or group may 
belong to many different populations whose characteristics may differ considerably. For 
instance, what is typical for Porky is derived from some broader population of piglets. Yet 
the characteristics of different populations of piglets may vary considerably. For example, 
it may be typical in some populations that piglets are born blind. Or that they are variously 
brown, grey, spotted, or pink etc. So clearly the choice of population is critical and requires 
justification.
So how might one justify the choice of population over and against possible 
alternatives? Subjective justifications will not do because these easily lead to
contradictions. In other words, justifications which rely solely upon some non-objective 
aspect or element of a subject, such as their will, will not do, since these easily lead to 
irresolvable disputes. For example, subject A chooses a population of piglets which 
typically are blind, and subject B chooses a population of piglets which typically can see. 
Yet subjectively speaking both choices are equally justified. Yet an objective choice 
requires some single privileged way to choose populations, but clearly there is none. That 
is, an objective justification of the choice of population requires that there be one way to 
carve nature at the joints, but clearly there are many ways to do so. (This is a point I shall 
take up again in detail in Chapter 6 .)
A parallel problem is that the appeal to typicality relies upon the choice and 
justification of some timeframe. This is necessary because what is typical for some 
population changes over time, especially over evolutionary time. For example, let us define 
a population as every the member of the lineage to which Grant D. Vallance belongs. What 
is typical for this population depends greatly upon the choice and justification of 
timeframe. Compare for instance, what is typical for this population over the last 10 000 
years with what is typical over its entire history. In the latter scenario, Grant D. Vallance is 
very untypical. (This is a problem I come back to in the next section.)
Indeed, any parameter of a population which changes over time raises issues for the 
appeal to typicality. This is because to determine what is typical requires some implicit or 
explicit specification of the parameter, which in turn requires justification. Otherwise, the 
specification is open to the charge of being arbitrary. Or if it is chosen without objective 
justification the appeal to typicality is open to the accusation that it begs the question 
concerning what shoulde occur.
76
The second problem facing the appeal to typicality is that it relies upon some measure 
of typicality. Yet the choice of measure also needs to be justified because there are 
different possible measures of typicality and they can vary significantly. For instance, for 
some characteristic of some population, the median, mode, mean, and standard distribution 
could all be employed as a measure of what is typical.
Let us say we have a population P  consisting of individual members Pn whose 
characteristics can be aggregated via a number between 1 and 10. P  in this case is [Pi, P2, 
P3, P4, P5, P& P7, Ps, P9, P10, P ii\  where there characteristics are respectively [1, 2 , 2 , 3, 4, 
6 , 6 , 6, 8 , 8, 9]. So what is typical for PI  The median is 6 , which means Pe, Pi, and Ps are 
typical. The average is 5, which means no member strictly speaking is typical. The mode is 
6, so again Pe, P 7, and Ps are typical. The standard deviation is 2.76 (3sf), and if we assume 
that what is typical falls within one standard deviation then P4, P5, Pe, P i,  and Ps are 
typical. On all measures Pe, Pi,  and Ps are typical, yet on one measure P4 and P5 are also 
typical. Obviously, the question to address is which measure of typicality one ought to use 
and how to justify the choice of measure.
An obvious issue with the appeal to typicality is that it leads to contradictions 
concerning what shoulde occur. Take Porky again. If it became typical that piglets be born 
blind then according to this appeal, piglets (and Porky) shoulde be born blind. Yet if it 
became typical (once again) that piglets be born being able to see then according to this 
appeal, piglets (and Porky) shoulde be born being able to see. The appeal in this case 
equally justifies the claim that X  shoulde occur and that not-Y shoulde occur.
Of course the natural retort is to observe that the norms which appeal to regularity or 
typicality are time sensitive. That is, if it became typical that piglets be born blind at t\ then
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only at t\ shoulde they be born blind. And if it became typical at £2 then only at £2 shoulde 
they be born being able to see. Or more generally, whatever is typical at £ shoulde occur. So 
while the appeal in this case equally justifies the claim that X  shoulde occur and the claim 
that not-X shoulde occur; they are at different times so there is no contradiction. Yet 
because this retort embeds a choice of timeframe—some particular instant—it raises 
problems concerning the justification of the choice of timeframe noted above.
However, this retort does not save this appeal from the charge that it justifies normative 
assessments which are strongly counter-intuitive, which raises the third problem with the 
appeal. For example, let us assume t\ and £2 are two generations of piglets where t2 is the 
generation following t\. At t\ it is typical for piglets to be born blind because of some 
pandemic disease, whereas at £2 it is typical for piglets to be born with the ability to see 
because the pandemic has died out. Appealing to typicality to justify normative 
assessments would commit one to holding at £2 that Porky shoulde be born blind.
Moreover, it would also commit one to holding that Bacon the piglet (who was born being 
able to see at t\) shoulde be born blind. And if we normatively assessed Bacon we would 
say appealing to typicality that she is defective.
This point is especially pertinent in the context of moral judgements concerning human 
beings. For instance, if we held that what regularly occurs shoulde occur then it follows 
that in the past, slavery shoulde have occurred. It also follows that inequality between men 
and women shoulde occur. And in some contexts, that genocide shoulde occur too. Now 
these are all nonsensical normative conclusions to draw.
However, notwithstanding this point, we do seem to hold that regularities in some 
circumstances justify norms, such as the norms that apply to organisms’ development. For
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instance, the development of piglets typically occurs in a certain way and the minority of 
piglets who develop in an atypical way are negatively evaluated.
The issue of course is finding a tenable means of ascertaining when regularities in the 
causal order ought to be regarded as normative (or not) and how the normative status of 
regularities may change over time. To take the example above, the problem is finding a 
tenable means of ascertaining the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to 
claim that pigs shoulde be born with one eye, rather than two.
One possible move would be to go beyond typicality per se as the justification for 
normative assessments. Instead we might appeal to the causal system responsible for what 
typically occurs. In other words, it would not be that which is typical which justifies what 
shoulde occur, but the causal system which explains why particular outcomes are typical.
In the case of Porky we might appeal to the causal system responsible for her development. 
However, this kind of appeal is no longer an appeal to typicality, although I will consider it 
in Chapter 5, where I examine the appeal to development.
2.2 The appeal to history
The appeal to history is based on the idea that because lineages of living organisms have 
regularly displayed particular characteristics through time, they shoulde display these 
characteristics. So if individuals within the lineage differ from what has occurred over 
some period in the past, they are ‘defective’ because they shoulde be the same. And 
conversely, they are ‘good’ (or some other similar normative term) where they are the 
same.
Indeed, there seems to be something special about the use of the past in contrast to the 
present or possible future in justifying normative assessments concerning living organisms.
Perhaps it is the possible ‘weight’ of expectation that some histories provide which gives 
rise to this intuition. For instance, some lineages of living organisms have the same form 
they did millions of years ago, and this gives credence to expectation that they shoulde be 
the way they are. At a minimum, the form clearly has stood the test of time.
However, I acknowledge the point that one could argue that the appeals to typicality 
and history are different facets of the same kind of appeal, which differ only in that appeal 
to history focuses solely upon the past. Consequently, what has been argued above applies 
here too. Nevertheless, I distinguish these appeals because the appeal to typicality is often 
framed in terms of history rather than in terms of what is typical.
Lineages of living organisms have an extensive history of some four billion years. In 
that time characteristics of some of these lineages have shown considerable change over 
time, and in different locations and populations. For example, the characteristics of the 
lineage which includes all Homo sapiens have changed over four billion years from being 
simple single-cell organisms to a complex of billions of cells of a peculiar form. 
Consequently, like the appeal to typicality, the choice of timeframe and population is 
critical because they considerably affect what the norms are. Take for example, the 
normative assessment that “Domesticated pregnant sows about to give birth shoulde be 
allowed to build a nest and they shoulde have the requisite materials to do so.” The appeal
to history to justify this assessment implicitly invokes a norm specifying how some
122population of sows (say the wild-type species) behaved prior to birth in the past.
However, every domesticated pig has a lineage which goes back right to the origin of life 
on earth. This lineage encompasses archaebacteria, crude multi-cellular organisms,
122 A normative assessment is justified when the norm in question is justified by the appeal. In short, this 
warrants the claim that the norm should occur.
invertebrates, vertebrates, primitive mammals, and finally pigs. So if the history of this 
lineage is going to be used to justify the normative assessment of domesticated pigs, a 
period of its history needs to be chosen. Obviously, the choice of timeframe is going to 
make profound differences to the norm that results. And importantly, without justification, 
it is difficult to escape the charge that the norm, and thus the assessment, is arbitrary.
There are three obvious choices of timeframe for the lineage of domesticated pigs or 
any other lineages of living organisms which are intuitively justifiable. The first is to use 
the whole of history of the lineage. But on this, essentially most contemporary complex 
multi-cellular organisms are going to be defective because for the vast majority of every 
lineage has been composed of single-celled and crude multi-celled organisms. Take the 
case of the way in which domesticated sows give birth. If we appeal to the whole history of 
the lineage of domesticated pigs to justify our assessment of how domesticated pigs 
shoulde give birth, then the behaviour of all domestic sows will turn out to be defective. 
This is because on this timeframe how domesticated pigs shoulde give birth is by binary 
fission rather than by the means we see today. Clearly, this is highly counter-intuitive.
The second option is to go back in time to the point where the lineage diverged to 
produce the organisms akin to the ones being assessed. However, this choice is circular. It 
is circular because in order to identify this point, we need to appeal to the qualities and 
characteristics of contemporary organisms of the lineage—either some exemplar, or some 
statistical construct of some population. This is problematic because it makes unwarranted 
assumptions concerning what shoulde occur in favour of contemporary qualities and 
characteristics. But why ought (relatively) recent history pre-dominate? Why ought 
(recently) recent history be regarded as the norm and be regarded as normal? Why not
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some other period? Furthermore, this move assumes without independent justification that 
either the exemplar or the statistical construct is normative.
The third is some recent timeframe, but even here there are difficulties given the 
evolution of farrowing practices since pigs have been domesticated. For example, the 
appeal to history would not support the normative assessment above, if ‘recent’ 
encompassed the period when the practice of confining sows into farrowing crates 
predominated in the production of domesticated pigs in the world. On the other hand, even 
during this period, the appeal to history would support the normative assessment above if 
the population was limited to domesticated pigs that were produced organically. Moreover, 
on the most recent history of pig production in the world, the prevalence of confining pigs 
to farrowing crates is declining. So for example, yesterday, in England, the appeal to [most 
recent] history would once again support the above normative assessment.
Now on top of the problems about justifying a particular historical timeframe there are 
also problems about justifying a particular population since these vary, sometimes 
considerably, at any given point in time. The obvious way to justify the choice of 
population is to use the species concept to delineate it. However, this does not address the 
problem. As we shall see in Chapter 6, there are both many different species concepts and 
many different species concepts employed within the natural sciences which delineate 
different populations. Consequently, any choice of species concept to do this job would 
need to be justified too.
While more could be said at this point, I shall desist. This is because more will be said 
in Chapter 4. This focuses on functions as a way to justify normative assessments 
concerning living organisms, and at least some accounts of functions which could be
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employed to justify normative assessments concerning living organisms rely upon the 
history of organisms and their parts.
2.3 The appeal to what is natural
As noted, the appeal to what is natural to justify normative assessments concerning living 
organisms is especially evident in the context of animal welfare assessments. That is, such 
appeals are clearly seen in assessments concerning how human beings ought to treat other 
living organisms in their care.123 For instance, in the previous chapter, I discussed at length 
the example of the normative assessment of confining domesticated sows about to give 
birth to farrowing crates.
By and large, the normative assessment of this practice within the welfare literature is 
negative. It is based on appeals to what is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ for domesticated sows, 
where what is normal is what is natural, and what is ‘natural’ is what domesticated sows 
would do if given the opportunity to choose for themselves, and or what the wild-type does 
outside human interference. In essence the appeal is based on the idea that what is natural 
shoulde occur and what is artificial shoulde not occur.
However, there are a number of problems with this appeal. The first is that the 
distinction between natural (in this sense) and not natural is difficult to sustain within the 
natural sciences.124 What occurs or what will occur is the sum of all and every effect and 
this includes the effects of human actions. In other words, from the perspective of the 
causal order, there is no interesting distinction between human causes and other causes, 
except with respect to the fact they are performed by human beings. For example, the
123 Apparently, the irony of making this appeal in this context is lost on those who employ it.
124 Neither is it particularly naturalistic.
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significant difference between natural selection and artificial selection is what or who does 
the selecting, but the remainder of the process, in essence, is exactly the same.
This is not to say that subjects, such as human beings, cannot distinguish between what 
is natural and not natural in this sense. But it is to say that this distinction is arbitrary from 
the perspective of the causal order. Consequently, the natural sciences can describe where 
this distinction is made by human beings, but they can hardly be said to justify it. There is 
no causal law so far discovered that privileges what is natural over what is not natural in 
this sense. For instance, Newton’s second law, Force = mass x acceleration, does not 
depend on whether mass is natural or not natural, or whether the acceleration provided is 
from ‘natural’ or not ‘natural’ sources.
The second problem follows from the first. This is the problem of privileging the 
natural over the non-natural. Clearly, there are no direct objective means to justify such 
privileging because effects are insensitive to whether the cause or causes are natural or 
non-natural. That is, if we compare two effects which are the same, where the first is due to 
a natural cause and the second is due to a non-natural cause, we could not from the 
character of the effect ascertain whether it was caused naturally or non-naturally. For 
example, if we compared two pigs from different lineages that have essentially the same 
character traits, where the traits of the first were caused by natural selection, and the traits 
of the second were caused by artificial selection, we would not be able to distinguish from 
the character traits of the pigs alone, which was naturally and which was artificially 
caused. So we could not tell which pig shoulde occur on this basis.
However, we could claim that while there are no direct (first-order) means of 
objectively justifying the natural over the non-natural, there may be some indirect (second
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order) means of objectively justifying the natural over the non-natural. The obvious move 
would be to say that natural causes are conducive to an organism’s good or its flourishing 
whereas artificial causes are not. Yet there is no such relationship. Moreover, if it were 
true, the appeal would justify counter-intuitive normative assessments. For example, one 
would have to negatively evaluate all animal husbandry which is critical to domesticated 
organisms flourishing because it is artificial.
Indeed, the difficulties of using what is natural to justify normative assessments 
concerning living organisms is thrown into stark relief by the case of domesticated living 
organisms like domesticated pigs. Domestic animals were and are specifically developed 
by the influence of Homo sapiens. Both the organisms themselves and the environments 
they inhabit have been and are deliberately been shaped to fit the purposes of Homo 
sapiens. Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle what is ‘natural’ from what is not 
‘natural’.
Furthermore, the idea that the wild-type can serve as the norm for domesticated 
organisms is problematic. Indeed, the idea that there are natural character traits for 
domesticated organisms, in the sense the term ‘natural’ has been employed, is almost 
nonsensical. By definition, domesticated organisms are not natural in this sense, and there 
is no way in which they are naturally supposed to be, notwithstanding the similarities 
between domesticated pigs and their wild-types.
The obvious point is that all domesticated organisms have been caused by human 
actions. These have determined their characteristics via artificial selection, by both 
choosing which organisms to breed and by altering their environment—the context in 
which they live. Admittedly, there are characteristics of all domesticated organisms which
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have largely been unaltered by artificial selection. But if organisms are wholes rather than 
merely a sum of individual components, and they seem to be, then separating out the 
‘natural’ elements from the ‘artificial’ elements is extremely difficult. This is because 
elements derive their character from both the constitution of the elements themselves and 
the context in which they are placed. So pace Porter, domesticated pigs are not simply wild 
boar at heart, even though they are similar and related.125
Take for example the fact that wild-boar, the wild-type of most domesticated pigs, are 
seasonal breeders, whereas domesticated pigs breed all year around. I take it that it would 
be hard to plausibly say that domesticated sows shoulde breed once a year. Or conversely, 
it would be counter-intuitive to say that domesticated pigs that breed all through the year 
were abnormal. Breeding throughout the year seems to be definitive of domesticated pigs 
as they are presently constituted, and arguably, they would not be domesticated pigs if they 
did breed seasonally like wild boar. Furthermore, if domesticated pigs did not breed all 
through the year, they would almost certainly be regarded as abnormal, and probably ill. 
One would suppose that if either domesticated sows or boars on a farm suddenly showed 
no inclination to mate, the vet would be called in to identify the cause, which if identified, 
would be thought of as being pathological.
One response to this point would be to claim that the scope for the appeal to what is 
natural is limited to a particular population and or timeframe. So the claim would be that 
what shoulde occur is what is natural for the wild-type Sus scrofa in the recent past. And 
what shoulde occur (notwithstanding prior human interference) for domesticated Sus scrofa 
is what is natural for them in the recent past—where what is natural is what they would do 
absent human interference. However, this response is open to the foregoing objections to
125 See Chapter 2.
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the appeals to regularity and to history. This is because such limitations seem wholly 
arbitrary.
An appeal to what is natural is also made in another context, where what is natural is 
coupled to the sorting power of competition between living organisms—that is, natural 
selection, and it is to this I now turn.
2,4 The appeal to natural selection
The appeal to natural selection to justify normative assessments concerning living 
organisms is significant for a number of reasons. First, natural selection is the key 
component of the theory of evolution, which is the central explanatory motif within the 
sciences of biology. Consequently, given the role of this theory in the explanation of 
biological phenomena, one would expect that natural selection would play some, if not 
insignificant part, in justifying normative assessments concerning living organisms. The 
second is that it also is an important component of some accounts of functions which are 
compatible with the natural sciences and which are also used as a way to justify normative 
assessments concerning living organisms. And finally, obviously, the theory provides an 
objective way to distinguish between what shoulde occur and what does occur.
Simply, what shoulde occur in this case is that which has the greatest fitness under 
natural selection in contrast to the alternatives. So for Porky, Porky shoulde be born being 
able to see because this state of affairs has greater fitness in contrast to being blind. 
However, natural selection is imperfect. Natural selection does not completely determine 
survival since sometimes this is dependent on other factors such as luck. Moreover 
sometimes survival is independent of natural selection because natural selection requires 
variations and competition to operate and sometimes there is none. So the fittest only 
typically survive and those with less fitness typically do not. This imperfection helps
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explain the difference we observe in practice between what shoulde occur and what 
actually does.
However, I argue that this appeal also fails to justify normative assessments concerning 
living organisms. It fails for a number of reasons. First, the appeal to natural selection fails 
because it inherits some of the problems of some of the previous appeals. This is because it 
has various features in common with them. For example, the appeal to natural selection 
also privileges what is natural. Yet, as I showed in the appeal to what is natural, there are 
significant problems in objectively privileging natural over artificial causes from the 
perspective of the natural sciences. Likewise, there are also significant problems in 
objectively privileging natural choices over human choices from this perspective. Indeed, 
natural selection cannot be privileged over artificial selection apart from some subjective 
preference.
The appeal to natural selection also draws to some extent upon privileging typical 
outcomes as in the appeal to typicality. This is because the fittest only typically survive and 
those with less fitness typically do not. However, in this case the privileging of typical 
outcomes is not based upon typicality per se but on an appeal to a causal system which 
explains why particular outcomes are typical. Consequently, it essentially escapes the 
objections raised to the appeal to typicality.
Nevertheless a parallel point can be made that the appeal to natural selection justifies 
normative assessments which are strongly counter-intuitive. The problem is that the appeal 
to natural selection assumes that survival to reproduction is the ultimate good for living 
organisms. Yet this is disputable at the level of the individual. For example, from the 
perspective of a male Black Widow spider, it is counter-intuitive to claim that he qua
individual with an interest in living shoulde mate when this leads to his death. In other 
words, it is odd to claim that a male Black Widow spider is defective if he avoids mating 
and his probable demise at the fangs of his mate. But according to the appeal to natural 
selection he shoulde mate because reproduction and the continuance of the lineage is the 
ultimate good notwithstanding this is likely to terminate his existence.
Of course, the evaluation is not counter-intuitive if we are considering the survival of 
the species. But to this point I would reply that an argument needs to be made why this 
communal perspective ought to be privileged over the individual. Furthermore, this reply 
becomes more compelling in the case of the moral judgement of human beings where it is 
clear that the communal considerations are not over-riding.
The appeal to natural selection may also be a kind of appeal to history if the appeal is 
to what has been selected. (In this case what shoulde occur in the future is that which has 
been selected for in the past.) Consequently, it also inherits most of the problems of the 
appeal to history such as the problem of justifying the particular timeframe of natural 
selection’s operation. The choice of timeframe is important because the operation of 
natural selection has different consequences at different times. The appeal to past natural 
selection also has the problem of justifying why the past is normative rather than the 
present or the future.
Of course it need not be a kind of historical appeal—it could also be a kind of appeal to 
the future—to what will be selected. However, this is problematic because of the 
indeterminacy of natural selection and consequently what shoulde occur is unclear and 
effectively makes normative assessments untenable because there are no clear norms.
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2.5 The appeal to pain and pleasure
As I noted in the previous chapter, the appeal to the experience of pain and pleasure is 
commonly used to justify normative assessments in the context of animal welfare. 
According to this appeal, what shoulde occur is that which leads to the greatest experience 
of pleasure for the greatest number of individuals over some timeframe. And what shoulde 
not occur is that which leads to the experience of pain for the greatest number of 
individuals over some timeframe. This is in contrast to other possible actions with differing 
consequences for the experience of pain and pleasure for these individuals.
Moreover, I ought to emphasize that the appeal to pleasure and avoidance of pain is not 
plausibly an appeal to them as ultimate ends. Rather, the appeal to pleasure and 
avoidance of pain is an appeal to what pleasure and pain reliably signal with respect to the 
good for living organisms.127 This is because if these were the ultimate end then they ought 
to be single-mindedly pursued. But the single-minded pursuit of the experience of pleasure 
and the avoidance of the experience of pain is clearly bad for living organisms. That is, 
such pursuit causes them harm. Take for instance the respective lives of drug addicts and 
lepers. Drug addicts achieve a maximal experience of pleasure, but they apparently ruin or 
destroy their lives. And lepers do not suffer the experience of bodily pain because their 
nerves have been deadened due to infection by Mycobacterium leprae. But they then 
damage their bodies because they lack the signal (pain) which indicates bodily damage.
I admit that generally the experiences of pleasure and pain have been reasonably 
reliable and objective signals with respect to the good or goods for living organisms. Yet
126 Pace unsophisticated hedonistic utilitarians, plausible arguments against pleasure and pain being ultimate 
ends were made thousands of years ago by the ancient Greeks. For instance, Aristotle plausibly argues 
against it in Nicomachean Ethics. See: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin trans., 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1999), 1095al5-1095b23.
127 If living organisms did not generally obey signals provided by pleasure and pain, they would soon cease to 
exist.
the appeal to pleasure and pain does not adequately justify normative assessments for a 
number of reasons. The first is that the experience of pleasure as a good or indicator of 
good, or pain as a harm or indicator of harm, is equivocal. On one hand, the experience of 
pleasure can be a good—or indicate a good, and the experience of pain can be a harm or 
indicate harm. For example, the experience of pleasure one gets from a good meal can 
indicate good nutritional status. And the experience of pain as hunger pangs can indicate 
bad nutritional status. But on the other hand, the experience of pain can also be a good—or 
indicate a good, and the experience of pleasure can be a harm—or indicate a harm. For 
instance, the experience of pain one gets when crossing a blackberry patch signals the body 
being injured and safeguarding bodily integrity is a good. And the experience of pleasure 
can be a harm, especially where the pursuit of the pleasure occurs to the exclusion of all 
other activities. Consequently, one cannot blithely say one shoulde experience pleasure and 
shoulde not experience pain.
The second reason is because there are perceptual variations in experiences of pleasure 
and pain. That is, for the same stimuli, there are variations in how and whether they are 
experienced as pleasure or pain depending on the character and context of the subject and 
their capacity for nuanced experience. This is important because such variability makes 
appealing to the experience of pleasure or pain to justify normative assessments erratic and 
potentially contradictory. For example, let us take two subjects A, and B, who experience 
the same stimuli S as a consequence of an action T, yet A experiences S as pleasure, and B 
experiences S as pain. One plausible scenario is both A and B being bitten during 
lovemaking. In this case, appealing to the experience of pleasure or pain would justify the 
normative assessment that A shoulde be bitten, and B shoulde not be bitten, which would 
justify contradictory assessments with respect to doing T.
On the other hand, one could say A and B shoulde do what is pleasurable for them on 
this occasion. So A shoulde S, and B shoulde not S with respect to doing T. This seems 
plausible in this example even though the contraction is not resolved. However, there are 
problems with this move. Specifically, the move would lead to justifying as good actions 
that intuitively are not good. For instance, it would justify murder in the case of A, if A 
experienced pleasure on the occasion of unjustified killing. Then there is the fact it would 
make the assessment of T over any timeframe difficult. At t\ it could be positively 
normatively assessed but at ?2 it could be negatively normatively assessed, and so on. 
Consequently, in order to normatively assess T over any timeframe one would also have to 
justify the choice of agent (or agents) and the timeframe since different agents and 
timeframes could give very different results.
Moreover, the contradiction could be resolved. For instance, rather than looking at say 
A’s experience of pleasure now, one could look at what is typically pleasurable for A. But 
while the contradiction is resolved there are problems with this kind of appeal justifying 
the normative assessment of living organisms because of problems about ascertaining what 
shoulde occur. For example, as A gets older what is typically pleasurable for A may well 
change. The problem is then justifying which timeframe ought to be normative. One could 
argue for the most recent timeframe but then transitions are going to be difficult. That is 
during transitions, it will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain what A ought to do 
when what is typical for A is in equipoise.
One could also look at what is pleasurable for creatures like A. But this has serious 
problems too. The most obvious is justifying the type classification for A when there are 
multiple possible types A may be a token of. The most obvious one is the species but as we 
shall see in Chapter 6 there are deep problems in justifying which particular conception of
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species to use, especially since there are multiple incompatible scientific conceptions of 
species.
Perhaps the final way to resolve the contradiction is to look at what A has been selected 
to take pleasure in. However, this way has problems too. Take the scenario for example 
where an organism takes pleasure in something that means its life is greatly foreshortened 
because the something it takes pleasure in means that it has a far greater chance of being 
eaten by predators. Furthermore, if the behaviour becomes prevalent within the species, the 
species would rapidly become extinct. From the perspective of the individual, the life, 
though brief, is happy. From the perspective of the species, the behaviour leads to species 
death. While one could argue for a communal view over an individualistic one, I do not 
believe that the individualistic or communal view can be adequately justified over and 
against the other.
So absent some different over-riding appeal or appeals, which need to be objectively 
justified, we are left with a problematic pluralism. This is because the appeal to pain and 
pleasure alone cannot address the contradictions that arise, such as those noted above. And 
while there are consistent and coherent sets of normative assessments justified by the 
appeal to pain and pleasure, there are no means within the natural sciences to justify the 
choice of any particular consistent and coherent set over and against the others in terms of 
this appeal.
The third reason is that if we adopted the appeal to pleasure and pain to justify 
normative assessments we would come up with some rather counter-intuitive normative 
assessments. For example, we would be committed to saying that Porky is doing well when 
she is doped up insensate to pain feeling high whilst being fattened for slaughter.
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I take it that the above evidence together demonstrates why the appeal to pain and 
pleasure alone is not adequate to justify normative assessments of living organisms. Each 
piece builds a picture which illustrates that the appeal to pain and pleasure is insufficient.
In essence, the problem is that the appeal allows for the justification of contradictory and 
counter-intuitive normative assessments.
3. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate why five different appeals to the natural 
sciences to justify normative assessments of living organisms are inadequate. These were 
the appeals to typicality, history, what is natural, natural selection, and pain and suffering.
The appeal to typicality to justify normative assessments fails because it fails to 
adequately sustain the difference between what shoulde occur and the alternatives, or it 
justifies counter-intuitive normative assessments.
The appeal to history fails because the choice of timeframe and population necessary to 
sustain the norms cannot be objectively justified. Discussion was abbreviated because the 
point will be taken up in Chapter 4 where history is an essential component of the appeal to 
functions.
The appeal to what is natural fails because there is no objective way to privilege natural 
over artificial causes. Indeed, the whole distinction is somewhat misguided from the 
perspective of the causal order since this does not distinguish between natural and artificial 
causes. For example, in the case of applying force, the causal order does not distinguish
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between what or who applies it. Of course, this does not preclude subjectively privileging 
natural over artificial causes.
The appeal to natural selection fails because it inherits both the objections to the appeal 
to history and to the appeal to what is natural.
Finally, the appeal to pain and pleasure fails because it permits the justification of 
counter intuitive normative assessments. That is they do not sustain the difference between 
what shoulde occur and what actually does occur.
However, prima facie the appeals to function, individual development, and species 
could sustain this distinction. For instance, the appeal that something shoulde have a certain 
capacity because that is its function is highly intuitive. For example, a knife shoulde cut 
well because the function of a knife is to cut. Secondly, all other things being equal, 
individual organisms develop similarly to their parents. This is caused by something and 
presumably it could provide a justification for claiming why they shoulde develop similarly 
to their parents. And finally it might seem evident that living organisms can be classified 
and therefore be assessed according to the species to which they belong. Yet, I deny that 
these appeals do the job and in respective chapters I shall show why this is the case.
Chapter 4: The failure of functions to justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms
1. Introduction
Human beings claim that the parts, traits, and behaviour of living organisms have 
functions—a claim that is intuitive, ancient and persistent. Broadly, such claims assert that 
living organisms and their parts have particular purposes, goals or ends—that there is 
something that they are/or. Take for example, the claim “The function of hearts in living 
organisms is to pump blood.” This asserts that pumping blood is what hearts are for, it is 
what they shoulde do (and do well) in contrast to the other things that they may do (and do 
well) such as indicate health status.
Functional claims are generally normative. That is, in most discourses, functional 
claims make claims about what shoulde occur. In other words, functional claims about 
living organisms are employed as norms for the normative assessment of living organisms. 
For instance, an organism with a heart that does not pump blood well is typically evaluated 
as being defective, whereas an organism with a heart which indicates health status poorly 
is not.1
Further, appeals to function are used to justify normative assessments of living 
organisms. For example, if Porky the pig has a heart that does not pump blood well, one 
justification for assessing Porky as being defective is that her heart pumps blood poorly. Of
1 However, the generalizability of defect in an element of an entity to defect in the entity itself can break 
down, especially where the capacity which the element underpins is not an essential part of the entity. Take 
for example the tail of a domesticated sheep. Arguably, whatever the tail does, it is not essential to the sheep, 
since we do not say that a sheep without a tail is defective. Indeed, domesticated sheep’s tails are routinely 
removed in many places— generally for the benefit of the sheep because it helps prevent fly-strike. This 
supports my contention that the natural sciences are not sufficient because clearly human interests play a role.
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course, the pertinent point is that if the natural sciences ground this claim, then it follows 
that the natural sciences do justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
However, I deny that they do. Specifically, I argue that appeals to functions to justify 
the normative assessment of living organisms are vulnerable to one or more fatal 
objections. These are as follows:
Objection #1: The implicit or explicit ontology of the natural sciences is 
incompatible with the concept of function being appealed 
to. Consequently, one cannot appeal to such notions of 
the concept on pain of ontological incoherence.
Objection #2: The concept of function being appealed to is not
normative. Therefore, one cannot appeal to such concepts 
to justify normative assessments of living organisms.2
Objection #3: There are many different concepts of function, but no 
single concept of function can be objectively justified 
over and against the alternatives. Consequently, there are 
many different even contradictory normative assessments 
which are justified by an appeal to the concept of 
function.
Objection #4: For some concepts of function there are various
parameters which require some specification but no 
specification can be objectively justified over and against 
alternatives. So there are many different and even
2 There are two senses of term ‘normative’. The first may be understood as simply as a comparison with 
respect to a norm. The second may be understood as a comparison with respect to a norm that shoulde occur. 
In the former case the norm is descriptive and in the latter case the norm is evaluative. The focus of the thesis 
is upon the second sense of the term. However, here, tlje objection is simply that the appeal to functions does 
not work because the concept of functions does not produce norms so there can be no comparison.
contradictory normative assessments which are equally 
justified by an appeal to such concepts of function.
Objection #5: Some concepts of function normatively assess present 
change as being defective in opposition to intuitions to 
the contrary.
Objection #6: Some concepts of function are unable to justify 
prospective normative claims, which make up a 
significant proportion of all normative claims, without 
unjustifiably privileging the past over the future.
Together these objections amount to the claim that presently at least there is no tenable 
appeal to functions which adequately justifies the normative assessment of living 
organisms.3
2. Appealing to the concept of function
Appealing to an entity’s function to justify normative assessments of that entity is deeply 
intuitive. Moreover, such an appeal seemingly escapes the objections made in the previous 
chapter. In particular, prima facie, appealing to functions escapes the objections raised to 
appeals to: (1) pain and suffering; (2) regularity; (3) history; (4) what is natural; and (5) 
natural selection. This is because appealing to functions ostensibly is a very different kind 
of appeal. That is, in essence it is an appeal to what something is for—its goal, end, or 
purpose.
3 This is a limitation of my thesis. There may be some account of function that is compatible with a proposed 
ontology of the natural sciences that is normative and provides a single set of determinate and coherent 
normative evaluations which has yet to be developed.
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This said, I take if the appeal to functions is to be successful, the concept must fulfil at 
least five criteria. These are:
Criterion #1: The implicit or explicit ontology of the natural sciences
must be compatible with the nature of the concept of 
function being appealed to.
Criterion #2: The concept of function being appealed to must be
normative.
Criterion #3: The concept of function being appealed to must be
justified over and against alternatives.
Criterion #4: The values for any parameters of the concept of function
being appealed to, which helps to determine it, must be 
justified over and against possible alternative values.
Criterion #5: The concept of function being appealed to ought to
plausibly normatively assess contemporary change.
Criterion #6: The concept of function being appealed to ought to cope
with prospective normative claims which make up a 
significant proportion of all normative claims.
Obviously, these criteria are the obverse of my objections. So in effect my objection to 
appeals to the concept of function justifying the normative assessment of living organisms 
is that they do not meet all these criteria. Indeed, I agree that criteria #1 and #2 are met by 
some accounts of the concept of function. But I argue that they do not meet criteria #3, #4, 
#5, and #6.
However, I first need to survey all the various accounts of the concept of function in 
order to show that no account fulfils all the criteria. Therefore, it is to this task I now turn.
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3. Accounts of the concept of function
The following accounts of the concept of function are drawn from the philosophical 
literature. This is for two reasons. The first is that it would be difficult to include every 
version of the concept that has ever featured in discussions of living organisms. Such 
accounts are numerous and subject to great variations in interpretation and re­
interpretation. The second reason is that it has been philosophers rather than anyone else 
who have been motivated to provide explicit accounts of the concept.
The different accounts of the concept of function in the philosophical literature may be 
classified into one of four kinds. It is a very rough and ready classification, and some 
accounts arguably could be placed in different divisions because they are hybrids and share 
one or more of the essential elements of my proposed divisions. Nevertheless it ought to 
suffice.
The first kind of account I discuss I call value-centred or teleological accounts. They 
are called this because the accounts are united by an appeal to values and or teleology. 
However, they largely stand outside the mainstream philosophical literature on the concept 
of function. This is because the mainstream philosophical literature is dominated by 
accounts deeply influenced by the natural sciences, and value and or teleological 
considerations have long been anathema to the natural sciences. In particular, I discuss 
Mark Bedau’s work, which effectively provides a value-based teleological account of the 
concept of function.4 Yet, as I shall explain, the question whether his account is
4 . This is because while the relevant work does not explicitly discuss functions, he is interpreted as providing 
and account of the concept. See Christopher Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," in Functions: New Essays in
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incompatible with the natural sciences is not clear cut as some would make it. Of course, if 
Bedau’s account or value-based accounts were compatible, then they would escape the first 
objection. But as I shall explain presently, as it stands, there is a fundamental gap in 
Bedau’s account and value-based accounts in general, which means that appeals to such 
accounts to justify normative assessments presently do not succeed.
The second kind of account I call capacity accounts since they conceive functions as 
causal contributions to some broader or more general capacity. Specifically, on this kind of 
account, what constitutes a function (F) is based on some causal contribution of entities, or 
element(s) of entities (E), respectively to some broader capacity of a system S under 
analysis.
However, generally, capacity accounts do not provide a concept of function which is 
normative. Therefore they are generally subject to my second objection. Of course, there 
are exceptions, which I shall discuss. In particular I discuss the account of the concept of 
function provided by Christopher Boorse.
The third kind of account I call a propensity account of the concept of function. In 
other words, on such accounts, the explanation is based upon the future propensity of trait 
T to contribute to the fitness of descendents of O by producing effect E, and hence the 
propensity of T to be selected for over alternative traits. In particular, I discuss Bigelow 
and Pargetter, who present a propensity account.5
the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, ed. Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (Oxford, 
2002), 67-68.
5 Arguably, Bigelow and Pargetter’s account is not an aetiological account because propensities are not 
causes, but a disposition to particular outcome within the causal order. I include them in the aetiological 
section because they share many features in common with aetiological accounts.
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The fourth kind of account I call aetiological accounts of the concept of function. On 
this kind of account, what constitutes a function is based on some kind of explanation of 
why the function is present in the entity. So the function F  of trait T, which produces an 
effect of type E, in some entity A, is an explanation of why the trait T is there in a token of 
A.6 Or more specifically for functions in biology, the function F  of trait T in an organism is 
an explanation of why the trait T is there in the token organism.7
In comparison, propensity accounts of function bear many similarities to aetiological 
accounts. They differ in what designates a trait T function is its propensity to contribute to 
fitness, rather than the contribution which explains why under natural selection the trait T 
is present.
I discuss two examples of aetiological accounts of the concept of function, which 
represent the two main kinds of aetiological theory. The first is from Karen Neander. She 
is a representative of the ancient-history account of the concept of function. The second 
example is from Peter Godfrey Smith. He is a representative of the recent-history account 
of the concept of functions.
So given this introduction to the four kinds of account of the concept of function it is 
time to discuss them in more detail.
3.1 Value-based/Teleological Accounts
There is a close connection between the concept of function and teleology, although there 
is considerable disagreement concerning the precise nature of the relationship between
6 The schema is adapted from Buller. See: David J. Buller, "Etiological Theories of Function: A 
Geographical Survey," Biology and Philosophy 13 (1998).
7 The organism is the typical level at which functions are attributed in the biology. Of course, potentially, 
there are other levels too.
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them. This is illustrated in the disagreement over the nature of the relationship between 
teleological and functional explanations.8 For instance, on one hand, Andre Ariew asks us 
to
Consider Woodfield’s influential remark that teleological explanations 
are part of the domain of purposive behaviour while functional 
explanations are part of the larger domain of system analysis (Woodfield 
1976).9
This clearly articulates the view that they may be distinguished. But then Ariew
immediately notes that
The distinction [between functional and teleological explanations] has no 
clear support, however, in the writings of Aristotle from which the 
modern concept of ‘functional explanation’ takes root. According to 
Aristotle’s schema, functional explorations are a subset of teleological 
ones. [Italics in original]10
The crux of the disagreement is over whether functional explanations really can be
separated from teleological explanations, which fell into disrepute for a number of reasons.
First, they over-proliferated such that virtually every event or object was vested with some
cosmic function or inner directed force. Second, an implication of such teleological
explanations was a form of ‘reverse causation’ where the purpose or goal in effect caused
itself to be. Finally, they seemed incompatible with the new materialistic, mechanistic
sciences of the Enlightenment. Indeed, part of the project of the Enlightenment and the
new kind of natural science it proposed, was a sustained effort to purge science of
functional/teleological explanations and other Aristotelian influences, notwithstanding that
such explanations had clear utility, especially in the sciences of biology.11
8 Andre Ariew, "Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments," in Functions: New Essays in 
the Philosophy o f Psychology and Biology, ed. Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (Oxford, 
2002), 8.
9 Ariew, "Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments," 8.
10 Ariew, "Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments," 8.
11 Andre Ariew and Mark Perlman, "Introduction," in Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Psychology and Biology, ed. Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (Oxford, 2002), 1.
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Consequently, if teleological and functional explanations are inseparable, then this 
explains, at least in part, why value-based or teleological concepts of function are thought 
to be incompatible with the natural sciences, and therefore subject to my first objection. 
That is, if the ontology of the natural sciences is incompatible with value- 
based/teleological accounts of function, then one cannot use such accounts in appeals to 
the natural sciences to justify normative assessments of living organisms.
However, I do not believe there is any a priori reason to suggest that value-based/ 
teleological accounts of the concept of function are incompatible with the natural sciences. 
Consequently, this is not a criticism I make of them. Nevertheless, I believe that currently 
appeals to such accounts of the concept of function do not justify the normative assessment 
of living organisms. I argue this is because there is a necessary part of such accounts which 
is presently missing. So while these accounts could potentially work, until we have details 
of the missing part, we cannot say whether they do work (or not).
C o n t e m p o r a r y  T e l e o l o g y : M a r k  B e d a u
The leading value-centred account of the concept of function comes from Mark Bedau, and 
is developed by him in a number of papers written between 1990 and 1993.12 The 
motivation for his account comes from dissatisfaction with two kinds of attempt to 
“naturalize teleology,” via either cybernetics or natural selection, which can be seen in 
accounts of the concept of function by authors such as Nagel and Millikan respectively.13 
Specifically, he was dissatisfied with the commonly held belief (at the time of writing and 
now) that a biological teleology consistent with naturalism is not normative.14
12 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 67.
13 Mark A. Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 647.
14 Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," 647.
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Indeed, one of the aims of Bedau’s project is to undermine the attempts to ‘narrowly’
conceive naturalism—that is, to conceive it in terms of naturalism-cum-descriptivism,
which is explicitly not normative.15 In other words, he attempts to challenge notions of
naturalism which are purely descriptive and make no recourse to values. He says,
Contemporary analyses of teleological explanation generally attempt to 
“sanitize” it, usually by trying to assimilate it to some uncontroversial 
descriptive form of explanation. This trend is misguided. Teleological 
explanations are controversial, especially when applied in biology, 
because value plays an essential role in them. If a reference to value is 
largely what makes teleological explanations problematic, then it seems 
only natural to try to vindicate the use of teleological explanations by 
eliminating or at least neutralizing this offensive reference to value. This 
has been the predominant trend in recent writings on teleology, in which 
teleology is usually given some purely descriptive form of causal 
analysis. Over against this, my project here is to defend a causal analysis 
that is value-centred.16
The bulk of Bedau’s positive account of a value-centred teleology is contained in his 
paper ‘Where is the Good in Teleology?’17 He admits at the outset that many will be 
unconvinced by his defence of a value-based teleology, but notwithstanding this 
scepticism, he begins his position with an account of teleological statements. Bedau calls 
them in order to statements, and he claims the following forms are equivalent: (1) A Bs in 
order to C; or (2) A Bsfor the sake ofCing because they can be given a similar analysis.18 
He then makes the case that value plays some ineliminable role in the analysis of teleology 
and goes on to examine the role that value has. In doing so he claims that it is necessary to 
distinguish three grades of teleology. These grades differ in the extent to which the 
attribution of a function implies the attribution of value.19
15 Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," 647.
16 Mark A. Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 
781.
17 Bedau himself notes notes this in: Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," 647, Footnote #5.
18 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 782.
19 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 787.
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Bedau calls the first grade teleology the good-consequences approach to value, which 
he notes most contemporary critics focus upon.20 The form of this approach is:
[Gl] A Bs in order to C i f fA Bs and A ’s Bing contributes to Cing and 
Cing is good for A.21
The basic idea underpinning this approach is that things—natural or artificial—that 
contribute to ‘good’ consequences occur in order to bring about these ‘good’ 
consequences.22 However, he remarks there is an obvious problem with the good 
consequences approach. To illustrate the problem he uses the example of Ralph the 
swimmer. Swimming 500-1000m keeps Ralph fit, which is clearly a good for him, so he 
meets the condition above. But as it happens, Ralph does not swim this distance in order to 
maintain fitness and health. Rather he swims because he likes the sensation of swimming 
since he finds it pleasurable.
The point is that the action is not done for the sake of the good, but for something else. 
Moreover, the point does not depend on agency. For instance, he notes that the human 
heart makes a beating sound when pumping which is useful in medical diagnosis, yet the 
heart does not pump in order to facilitate medical diagnosis. Rather it pumps in order to 
circulate blood and thereby oxygenate the tissues of the body in order to support various 
metabolic processes.
Bedau observes there are at least two different kinds of explanatory role good 
consequences can play which are useful to distinguish and which also provide the two 
remaining grades of teleology. On the first, the good consequences explain what occurs, 
although this explanation does not depend on their being good: this provides the second 
grade of teleology. It has the following form:
20 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 787.
21 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 787.
22 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 787.
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[G2] A Bs in order to C iff [A Bs because A’s Bing contributes to Cing] 
and Cing is good.23
In this case, the explanatory ‘because’ has a narrow scope, which merely requires that the 
consequences happen to be good.24 However, this does not rule out accidental or incidental 
benefits. For example, this formulation does not rule out the accidental benefit of avoiding 
sunburn for sensitive animals that live in burrows in order to avoid day-time predators.
One could say that such animals hide in a burrow in order to escape predators [such 
animals hide because hiding contributes to escaping from predators] and escaping from 
predators is good. Yet one could also that such animals hide in burrows also contributes to 
them avoiding sunburn and avoiding sunburn is good (because sunburn is painful and skin 
damage can lead to skin-cancer). But the animals do not hide in burrows in order to escape 
sunburn. To rule out accidental or incidental benefits requires that the goodness of the 
consequences plays some role in explaining why A does B. This gives the third and final 
grade of teleology. This has the following form:
[G3] A Bs in order to C iff A  Bs because [A’s Bing contributes to Cing 
and Cing is good.]25
As Bedau notes this "... requires that the good consequences and their goodness both 
figure in the explanation; that is neither the consequence(s) nor the benefit provided can be 
accidental.” He is also clear that these grades of teleology do not permit a weaker 
dispositional or capacity-based interpretation. He says specifically for instance that “... the 
statement that Cing is good for A does not mean merely that Cing tends to cause A to 
obtain or persist, or that Cing is instrumental to the maintenance of some disposition of 
capacity of A.” [Italics in original]27 Indeed, Bedau remarks that if it did, it would open his
23 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 789.
24 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 789.
25 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 790.
26 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 790.
27 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 791.
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account up to problematic counterexamples.28 The counterexample he has in mind
concerns a stick floating down a stream which brushes against a rock and becomes pinned
against it by the backwash it creates. (He discusses it earlier in “Where is the Good in
Teleology” where he raises it as an objection to etiological approaches to functions,
specifically Larry Wright’s version.29) It is a counterexample because the backwash causes
the stick to obtain or persist behind the rock yet intuitively this is not a system which has
functions. Specifically, he says
Failure to respect this constraint would reopen the door to the stick-on- 
the-rock counterexample, for the stick creates the backwash because 
doing so contributes to keeping itself pinned on the rocked and because 
remaining pinned is instrumental to the maintenance of the stick's 
disposition to create the backwash. Thus, although Cing might be merely 
an instrumental good for A, it must nevertheless be a means to some 
genuine good for A. Creating a backwash is not a genuine good for the 
stick. In fact, it would seem that sticks, like stones and specks of dust, are 
simply not the kind of thing for which anything could be good (or bad);
30they do not have interests that can be promoted (or thwarted).
In any case, I believe that the main problem with Bedau’s account is that he does not 
propose a theory of value.31 The absence of an account of value means there is a 
mysterious black-box at the heart of the account, which one has to trust works for it to be 
tenable. Until we have such a theory of value, one cannot evaluate appeals to function 
which use the concept of function which he has articulated.
Consequently, if we are going to appeal to the notion of function that he has described, 
we will need a theory of value. Specifically, what is required is a theory of value that is: (1) 
compatible with the natural sciences as they are conceived32; (2) determines what values
28 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 792.
29 Bedau’s ‘etiological’ approaches to functions are essentially the same as the ‘aetiological’ approaches to 
functions I discuss later. The main difference is that I discuss more narrowly conceived versions. See: Bedau, 
"Where's the Good in Teleology," 785-786.
30 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 792.
31 Bedau, "Where's the Good in Teleology," 789.
32 Some conceptions of the natural sciences rule out values having any part in science, which would preclude 
believers in such conceptions of science from appealing to Bedau or Bedau-style accounts.
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are; (3) establishes which is and is not a value; and (4) explains how values are 
instantiated—i.e. why certain states of affairs are valuable. For instance, it must be able to 
say what ‘good’ is and why, establish that ‘good’ is a value, and explain for example why a 
life without pain is good. Yet fulfilling these requirements in terms of the natural sciences 
would involve at least one of the appeals already discussed (or to be discussed) which 
would open up such an account to my objections.
Moreover, Bedau himself is sceptical of a naturalistic account of functions where
naturalism is the doctrine that . everything real is at least in principle within the scope of
a purely scientific account of the world.”33 For example, he says that
Elsewhere [in ‘Goal Directed Systems and the Good’34] I have argued 
that the cybernetic approach to naturalizing biological teleology fails 
because of its inability to account for an evaluative component in 
teleology. Here [in ‘Can Teleology Be Naturalized’] I shall sketch a 
parallel argument concerning the attempt to naturalize teleology by 
appeal to natural selection.35
So clearly Bedau does not think that one could appeal to the natural sciences to justify the
normative assessment of living organisms using his account.
Consequently, given these problems I am inclined to leave value-based accounts of 
functions to one side as a means for the natural sciences to adequately justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms.
3.2 Capacity Accounts
Broadly, capacity accounts hold that what constitutes a function (F) is based on some 
causal contribution of entities (E), to some broader capacity of a system S. On such 
accounts any causal contribution to a broader capacity of the system under analysis is a
33 Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," 647.
34 Mark A. Bedau, "Goal Directed Systems and the Good," Monist 75 (1992).
35 Bedau, "Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?," 647-648.
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function. For example, under this account of the concept function, the function of hearts is 
whatever contribution the heart makes to some broader capacity in the system under 
analysis. So the function of the heart is to pump blood because this is a causal contribution 
the heart makes to the circulatory system. But equally on this account, the function of the 
heart is to indicate health because this is a causal contribution hearts make to the broader 
capacity for indicating health. Or hypothetically, on this account, the function of the heart 
could be to promote social cohesion, where the sacrifice of still-beating hearts makes a 
causal contribution to the social cohesion of the system.
Furthermore, functional attribution is further complicated in at least two ways. The first 
is that there may be a variety of possible analyses of the broader capacities of the system in 
question. This may depend on a number of things, including the type of system in question, 
and how the system itself is specified. For instance, an organism’s body is capable of many 
different analyses, even within the domain of the sciences of biology. For instance, there 
are molecular analyses which are very different to ecological analyses.
The second complication is that even within a single kind of analysis there may be 
multiple broader capacities to which the capacity C in question may contribute. For 
example, another broader capacity of this system S, the heart, is cellular communication. 
Systems of multi-cellular organisms, such as human beings, require coordination between 
cells via some form of inter-cellular communication. And in this system there are a variety 
of means of inter-cellular communication such as through nerve impulses or various 
chemical messengers like hormones (which the heart facilitates). So the function of the 
human heart with respect to cellular communication is the distribution of various chemical 
messengers, because this is what “the pumping of blood” does to support inter-cellular 
communication.
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The situation is even worse in the case of entities with multiple functions where these 
complications are magnified. For instance, the liver has storage functions (storing iron, 
copper, vitamin B 12, and glucose in the form of glycogen), regulatory functions (it helps 
regulate blood sugar levels by releasing glycogen when the blood gets too low is glucose), 
detoxification functions (such as detoxifying alcohol), synthesis functions (such as 
synthesizing glucose from amino acids, lactate, and glycerol, and synthesizing bile, 
cholesterol and blood clotting factors).
So the attribution of functions according to the capacity account is relative to: (1) the 
system under consideration; (2) the systemic capacity to be explained; and (3) the kind of 
analysis employed. Clearly this is a very permissive account of functions. The problem 
with this permissiveness is that it is problematic to ascertain what shoulde occur in contrast 
to what does or could occur. For example, if we accept that whatever contribution C an 
entity E makes to some broader system S is its function and it shoulde occur, then we 
would be committed to holding that rain-clouds shoulde irrigate Farmer Brown’s crops 
because rain makes a contribution to a system for growing crops.37 We would also be 
committed to holding that the rain-cloud shoulde also drop its rain on the catchment for a 
river (as a contribution to the river’s ecosystem), and so on. So what shoulde occur in the 
case of rain-clouds where the contributions they could make are mutually exclusive? For 
instance, if the rain-cloud could either water Farmer Brown’s field or contribute its rain to 
a river’s ecosystem?
36 The points are derived from Davies. See Paul Sheldon Davies, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the 
Nature of Functions (London, 2003), 25. The point is also made in Cummins. See: Robert Cummins, 
"Functional Analysis," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): esp. pp. 762-764.
37 The example is drawn from Andrew Woodfield. See: Andrew Woodfield, Teleology (Cambridge, 1976), 
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The main response to this problem has been to look for a way to put some restrictions 
on the attribution of functions. This has been done via a number of different strategies. The 
first is to limit the* kind of contribution an entity makes which counts as a function. The 
predominant way this has been done is to limit the contribution which explains the 
presence of an entity. For example, in living organisms this is largely the contribution 
which has been selected by natural selection. In other words, it is the contribution that 
makes the predominant input to fitness. (This is the strategy adopted by many aetiological 
accounts of function which I shall discuss later on in the chapter.) The second strategy is to 
appeal to the analytical schemas and explanatory interests of particular scientific 
disciplines. This move is made by Valery Gray Hardcastle.38 The third and final strategy is 
to limit functional attribution only to those systems that are organized hierarchically. This 
strategy is adopted by Paul Sheldon Davies.39
So does this strategy of delimiting functional attribution succeed in terms of adequately 
justifying what shoulde occur? I argue that it does not because despite such constraints 
there are still ambiguities or conflicts over what shoulde occur. In the case of the 
aetiological approach, I’ll defer my argument that it does not succeed to later on in this 
chapter. In the case of Hardcastle’s approach I argue that it hardly delimits functional 
attribution to any significant extent, thus the problem remains. This is because: (1) the 
analytical schemas and explanatory interests of particular scientific disciplines internally 
can be extremely diverse; and (2) the same phenomena can rightly be studied by a variety 
of scientific disciplines. The consequence is that within scientific disciplines functional 
attribution may be constrained (depending on the nature of the discipline), but given the 
variety of different scientific disciplines, overall functional attribution is still very diverse.
38 See Valerie Gray Hardcastle, "On the Normativity of Functions," in Functions: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, ed. Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (Oxford, 
2002), 150-153.
39 See Davies, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions, esp. Chapter 4 pp. 73-106.
Take for example the study of human nature. This phenomenon can be studied by both 
biochemistry and psychology and these disciplines have very different analytical schemas 
and explanatory interests. (Indeed, psychology internally embraces a wide variety of 
analytical schemas ranging from molecules to concepts like the id and ego.) 
Consequentially, functional attribution is still very broad.40 And finally, in the case of 
Davies’ approach it is not clear whether it could constrain functional attribution 
sufficiently. Certainly, it constrains functional attribution, but whether this means that it 
eliminates the ambiguities or conflicts over what shoulde occur is not obvious. My view is 
that it does not especially where an element participates in multiple sub-systems. In 
particular, ascertaining what shoulde occur becomes problematic where changes in the 
function of an element in a particular sub-system conflict with the function of the element 
in another subsystem. Take the liver for example. It is responsible (among other things) for 
the production of bile to aid digestion and the production of clotting factors for the blood. I 
take it that it is not clear on this account of function what shoulde occur if the liver started 
producing more efficient bile (say due to a mutation) but that this more efficient bile 
interfered with the production of the clotting factors. Within the digestion system a 
function of the liver on this account clearly is producing bile to aid digestion since it makes 
that kind of contribution. And within the clotting system a function of the liver clearly is 
producing clotting factors.
40 My argument fails if scientific disciplines are reducible. That is, if psychology is reducible to biology, 
biology is reducible to chemistry, and chemistry is reducible to physics. The apparent diversity in functional 
attribution is thereby illusory because the attribution of function is ultimately due to the analytical schemas 
and explanatory interests of physics/mathematics. However, I believe that they are not reducible and I follow 
Dupre’s argument for why not. See: Dupre, The Disorder of Things.
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In such a case it is unclear what shoulde occur unless one can objectively privilege one of 
the two contributions the element makes to its respective sub-system over the other. Now 
the sub-systems of digestion and blood-clotting are equally important since in organisms 
which have them, significant malfunction is lethal. So we cannot objectively privilege 
either contribution the liver makes to each sub-system.41
Another response to the problem of permissiveness of functional attribution is to 
embrace it. That is, it is to insist that whatever contribution C and entity E  makes to some 
broader system S shoulde occur. The obvious problem with this response is that it does not 
address the issue. Consequently, we are left with either ambiguities or conflicts over what 
shoulde occur, especially where a particular element in a system makes multiple 
contributions to different sub-systems and these conflict, such as in the case of the liver.
Indeed, some capacity theorists explicitly deny that the failure of an entity or element
of an entity to make a causal contribution to some broader capacity of the system should be
regarded as being dysfunctional. Davies is one example. He remarks that,
Much in the systematic capacity approach is fundamentally sound.
Nevertheless, the theory has come under criticism for being promiscuous 
in the functions it attributes and for its inability to account for the 
possibility of malfunctions. I shall argue, however, that the theory can be 
developed in ways that diminish the force of both objections. The charge 
of promiscuity can be blocked by making explicit the kinds of systems to 
which the theory properly applies. And as concerns malfunctions, we 
should agree that the theory cannot for the occurrence of systematic 
malfunctions, but we also should insist that this is a virtue, not a vice.
The attribution of malfunctions to natural nonengineered traits is, on my 
view, at odds with our naturalistic approach to inquiry generally and with 
the theory of evolution by natural selection specifically.42
My point then is that such accounts then are not normative in the sense I am interested in,
and thus cannot be used to justify normative claims. In addition, a common perception of
41 In fact, Sheldon Davies would not employ this strategy to justify what shoulde occur because the argument 
of Norms o f Nature is that functions are not normative
42 Davies, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature o f Functions, 29.
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capacity accounts is that they do not set out to account for functional norms. For instance,
Valerie Grey Hardcastle observes that,
To take the most famous example of a pragmatic approach, Robert 
Cummins (1975) claims that the function of T in O is E if T is a 
component of O and E contributes causally to the O’s capacity to 
whatever it is that O does. In this case, what counts as the function 
depends on how we understand the larger system. ... Champions of the 
etiological notion of function turn up their noses at pragmatic 
approaches, however, for the price of generality is normativity, or so the 
etiology advocates claim.43
Furthermore, in the locus classicus for capacity accounts, Cummins’ 1975 paper
‘Functional Analysis’, Cummins does not consider functional norms in his account (in
contrast to the other accounts he discusses in the paper).44
However, I ought to stress that this is not to say that one cannot have a capacity 
account of function which sets out to explain functional norms, although proponents of 
such accounts are divided on the point. Hardcastle for instance argues that capacity 
accounts (what she calls pragmatic approaches) do sustain norms—although this is relative 
to the scientific discipline which investigates phenomena to which functions are attributed. 
On the other hand Davies argues that capacity accounts do not.
One notable example of a capacity account which sets out to account for functional 
norms is provided by Christopher Boorse. While he would not classify his account as a 
capacity account, it shares many features with other capacity accounts, which is why I 
include it in this section.45 (He classifies it as a General Goal Contribution (GCC)
43 Hardcastle, "On the Normativity of Functions," 145-146.
44 Cummins, "Functional Analysis."
45 The general goal contribution (GCC) account he advocates holds that functions are causal contributions to 
goals. If one takes goals as being a broader part of a system S, such as a living organism, one can see the 
similarities between capacity accounts and GGC accounts. My own view therefore is that GGC accounts are 
a particular kind of capacity account.
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account.46) His account differs from other capacity accounts in that it provides greater 
limits upon the attribution of function. So prima facie, it could distinguish to a sufficient 
degree between what shoulde occur from what occurs or may occur, which if true would 
mean his account accommodates norms and thus escapes the second objection. 
Nevertheless, for reasons I shall discuss in the next section, his account is vulnerable to the 
third objection. It is also vulnerable to other objections, which will be drawn out in Chapter 
6 .
N o r m a t iv e  c a p a c it y  a c c o u n t s  o f  f u n c t io n : Ch r is t o p h e r  B o o r s e
On Boorse’s general goal-contribution (GGC) account, functions are simply causal
contributions to goals.47 So functions on his account may be attributed to both artefacts and
to living organisms. Moreover, in the case of living organisms he motivates his account by
appealing to the fact that that goal-directed behaviour is ubiquitous among living things.48
His notion of goals relies on some cybernetic account of goal-directedness using ideas
from systems theory.49 Concerning this he says,
That account [of goalsj derives mainly from Rosenblueth, Wiener, and 
Bigelow (1943), but was elaborated by Sommerhoff (1950, 1959),
Braithwait (1953), and Beckner (1959) before its first use in a GGC 
analysis of functions by Nagel (1961). According to the Sommerhoff—
Nagel view, a system S is ‘directively organized’, or ‘goal-directed’, 
towards a result G when, through some range of environmental variation, 
the system is disposed to vary its behavior in whatever way is required to 
maintain G as a result.50
While many of these elements of goal-directness are also features of some artefacts,
Boorse suggests there are two notable key differences between living organisms and
50
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions,'
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions,'
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions,'
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions,'
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions,'
63.
63, 70.
68. Interestingly his account also includes artefacts too.
69.
69.
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artefacts.51 The first is that the behaviour of organisms is ultimately directed towards 
survival, until reproduction. The second difference is that goal-directness is a feature of 
different multiple layers of organization in the organizational hierarchy.52 This is especially 
evident in living organisms. Of course, it is true that ever-developing technology means 
that these key differences between artefacts and living organisms are being eroded. Yet 
even if ultimately both were equally complex, I doubt Boorse would see this as being an 
objection to his account, since he does not seem concerned with distinguishing between 
functions in living organisms and functions in artefacts. He is quite comfortable in 
attributing functions to artefacts. In any case, if an artefact was extremely complex and 
orientated towards survival to reproduction, then the distinction between living organisms 
and artefacts would blur.
One of the main characteristics of his account, which differentiates it from other
capacity accounts, is that the contribution is limited to the contribution to goals rather than
to any contribution to any broader capacity of the system. Consequently, in comparison to
other capacity accounts, Boorse’s GGC-account is not so promiscuous since it precludes
objects without goals as having functions. Thus a good deal of the promiscuity surrounding
the attribution of function is eliminated.53 For example, Boorse’s GGC-account would not
allow for any of the intuitively implausible attributions of function that are raised by
opponents of capacity accounts. For instance, opponents of capacity accounts point out that
on capacity accounts mists' rocks, clouds, streams and dirt somewhat implausibly have
functions. Indeed, Boorse himself notes that capacity accounts are,
... now seen to have a serious problem of overbreadth. For one thing, it 
generates functions in non-biological sciences where teleological 
language is absent. It implies that the function of mists is to make
51 He gives examples of cruise-missiles, servomechanisms, and thermostatically controlled furnaces. See 
Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 69.
52 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 69-70.
53 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 73.
rainbows (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987: 184), the function of rocks in a 
river is to widen the river delta (Kitcher 1993: 390), ‘the function of 
clouds [is] to make rain with which to fill the streams and rivers’
(Millikan 1989a: 294), and the function of dirt stuck in a pipe is to 
regulate the water flow (Griffiths 1993: 411).54
But mists, rocks, clouds, and dirt etc. do not have goals. This is because any response to
external stimuli they make is not to any goal. For instance, clouds do not act for any goal
(pace Aristotle), in contrast to organisms, which act for self-preservation.
However, despite such a restriction his GGC-account is still quite promiscuous 
regarding the attribution of function since causal contributions to goals can be very broadly 
construed. For instance, it permits the attribution of functions to causal contributions to 
goals which occur once and by accident. Indeed, Boorse uses the example of a telephone 
summoning him before a truck crashes into his parlour or a bee sting that brings him to a 
doctor who spots that he has a curable melanoma.55 In these cases, according to his 
account, the function of the telephone is defence against wayward trucks and the function 
of bee stings cancer diagnosis since survival is a goal. Furthermore, he says that “There is 
no reason for me to deny, that for me on this occasion, the beesting [sic] served that 
function.”56
However, he deflects this problem by drawing upon a distinction between weak and 
strong function statements. A weak function statement is weak precisely because it can be 
performed once and only by accident.57 For instance,
For a system S directed to goal G at time t,
X  performs the function Z in the G-ing of S at t if and only if at t,
c o
the Z-ing of A is a causal contribution to G.
54 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 65. Boorse uses the term ‘causal-role analysis of functions’ whereas I 
use capacity accounts of function.
55 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
56 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
57 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
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In contrast, strong function statements are statements such as, 'The function o fX  is Z’, or
'A function o fX  is Z’, or ‘X has the function Z \ The difference between them is how often
or consistently the function gets performed.59 He says,
' A trait X’s contribution to a goal, then, if made sufficiently often, 
becomes the function of X, or X’s function, if it is X’s only regular 
contribution and is a function of X, or among X’s functions, otherwise.60
So when a weak function is performed ‘sufficiently often’ it then becomes a strong
function. The ‘sufficiently often’ is then cashed out in terms of typicality or normality,
especially, what is typical or normal for the species which the individual with the trait X
belongs.61 According to Boorse, strong function statements are the kind of function
statements that writers usually analyze, with which he wishes to pitch his own GGC
f\0account of functions against. So he deflects the problem of promiscuity by only 
considering his account in terms of strong function statements since that is what everyone 
else does too.
Moreover, strong function statements are of interest because they are normative. That 
is, they make claims concerning what shoulde occur in contrast to what does occur. Usually
fii'Xthis is in terms of some kind of token-type relationship. For instance, Boorse says,
One does see occasional medical references to what is normal for an 
individual. But the standard medical concept of normal function, surely, 
is implicitly species-relative:
The [or a\ normal function o fX  is Z in species S,
where S is Homo sapiens for ordinary medicine or animal species for 
vetinary medicine. I have argued at length that medically normal function 
of any token item (for example, a single human heart) is analyzable as an
58 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 70.
59 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
60 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 72.
61 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 72. He admits the boundary between weak and strong function 
statements is quite vague. See: Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
62 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71.
63 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 72.
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output within a statistically typical range of contributions to survival and 
reproduction b tokens of that type in an age group of a sex of a species ...
So qualified, my view is that theoretical medial normality of the 
organism means statistically species-non-subnormal biological function 
of all its parts and processes [Italics and indentation in original].64
So in essence, on Boorse’s account, what shoulde occur in contrast to what actually does
occur for living organisms is the typical/normal contribution to survival and reproduction
for the species to which the living organism belongs.
I take it there are two problems with his account of function. The first is that it relies
upon an appeal to typicality. For instance he says,
“Like other authors, I will simply accept that, when cardiac diagnosis by 
heartbeat has become genuinely species-typical, for long enough, heart 
sounds will be a normal function of the heart in the human species.”
[Italics added for emphasis]65
(Nowhere is “long enough” defined.) Yet he seems reluctant to admit that this imprecision
is a fault because ‘typical’ and ‘normal’ are, he suggests, vague concepts.66 This is correct.
But as we have seen, such a lack of precision is a problem for justifying normative
assessments of living organisms. This is because without sufficient precision the normative
assessment of living organisms is not adequately justified. In other words, unless this
issue is addressed, his account falls foul of my fourth objection. While the account is
normative, it does not adequately justify normative assessments of living organisms.
Consequently, we cannot appeal to Boorse’s account to adequately justify the normative
assessment of living organisms.
64 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 72.
65 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 87-88.
66 Boorse, "A Rebuttal on Functions," 71-72.
67 One could make the case that Boorse is being deliberately vague because the vagueness is appropriate 
(drawing on Aristotle’s point in Nichomachean Ethics 1094M0-15 that we ought to only expect the precision 
apt for the subject matter). My response is that if it is true that such vagueness is correct then the project of 
normative ethics of ascertaining what we ought to do is therefore very limited because it is vague.
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Of course, the imprecision could be addressed. One could tightly specify the various 
parameters involved in ascertaining what is normal or typical. However, this raises the 
second problem, namely justifying the specification within the ambit and resources of the 
natural sciences. Of course, one could subjectively justify them, but such justification 
arguably stands outside the natural sciences. Or one could objectively justify them, but the 
problem is how. I contend that the possible means for doing so within the ambit and 
resources of the natural sciences are considered in this work and that they all fail for the 
reasons noted. Consequently, I argue there is no objective justification for any particular
z ro
parameter for what is normal over and against alternatives.
Take the choice of the type for example. When we say that an individual X is normal or 
abnormal, we are treating X as a token of some type Y, at some level of abstraction. 
Moreover, X is normal or abnormal with respect to the type Y. For example, when we say 
Porky the pig is a normal pig, we are treating Porky as a token of the type Sus scrofa and 
are claiming that Porky is normal with respect to the type Sus scrofa. However, the type 
Sus scrofa is not the only possible type to which Porky may belong. Porky may belong to 
the type Mammal, or Domesticated Animal and so on. Boorse uses species. My point is 
that this choice requires justification over and against alternatives. This is because the 
judgement that any token is normal or abnormal significantly depends on the choice of 
type. Porky qua Type A may be normal but qua Type B may be abnormal. Moreover, the 
fact that Porky belongs to the type species is not sufficient because it is not the only type 
Porky may belong to.
68 Clearly, essentially this is a restatement of my third objection to the natural sciences appealing to functions 
to justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
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Furthermore, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the choice of the type species 
can be justified over and against other possible types. However, here is an analogous 
problem to the one above. Namely, there are multiple different and incompatible 
conceptions of the type species, and the choice of species conception also requires 
justification over and against alternatives.69 Of course, the obvious reply to the above 
example is to say that one ought to choose the scientific conception of species because we 
are dealing with appeals made to the natural sciences. However, as we shall see in Chapter 
6, this riposte does not suffice either for similar reasons.
There are also other parameters involved in ascertaining what is normal and similar 
problems arise. For example there is the measure of normality for the trait or individual in 
question which involves some particular kind of statistical aggregation. This might include 
the average, a particular number of standard deviations, the mode, or the median etc. of the 
population in question. Again the problem is justifying which measure of typicality to 
employ because different measures give different answers. Thus on one measure a token of 
some type could be ‘normal’, attracting positive normative assessment, but on another 
measure they could be ‘abnormal’, attracting a negative normative assessment. Of course 
this ought to be a familiar point: I also made it in Chapter 3.
In summary, an appeal to a Boorsian account of functions to justify normative 
assessments is a kind of appeal to typicality. Consequently, my objections to Boorse’s 
account are those raised to the appeal to typicality, which was reiterated above. In essence, 
this is my fourth general objection. That is, for some concepts of function there are various 
parameters, which in this account define what is typical and thus species typical
I
69 Clearly, essentially this is a restatement of my fourth objection to the natural sciences appealing to 
functions to justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
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contributions to goals. These require specification, but no specification can be objectively 
justified over and against alternatives. Consequently there are many different and even 
contradictory normative assessments which are equally justified by an appeal to species 
typical contributions to goals. Moreover, I also contend that this objection also applies to 
remaining accounts of function, which I shall now discuss.
3.3 Propensity accounts: Bigelow and Pargetter
Bigelow and Pargetter begin their account of the concept of function with the claim that 
the description of function for some biological character characterizes an existing item 
through reference to some future event or state(s) of affairs.70 For instance, the function of 
the stomach at time t is to break down food at time t \  where t ’ is later than t.
They correctly note that this future-oriented characterization has been difficult to
assimilate in the scientific view of the world.71 Certainly, such teleological explanations
have long been rejected by science because, for instance, the implication of reverse
causation, where the future explains present events of state(s) of affairs. As they note,
... when we describe the function of something in the present, we make 
reference to a future event or effect which, in some cases, will never 
occur. Hence, prima facie we, cannot be describing any genuine, current 
property of the character.
Even when a character does perform its supposed function, the future 
events that result from it cannot play any significant “scientific” role in 
explaining the nature and existence of the character. The character has 
come into existence, and has properties that it does have, as a result of 
prior causes. It would still have existed, with just the current properties it 
does have, even if it had not been followed by the events that constitute 
the exercise of its alleged function. Hence its existence and properties do 
not depend on the exercising of its functions. So it is hard to see what 
explanatory role functions could have.72 [Emphasis in original.]
70 John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, "Functions," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 181.
71 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 181.
72 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 181-182.
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Yet despite this point being evident, some form of ‘teleological’ explanation has 
remained entrenched in explanations of the biological world.73
So Bigelow and Pargetter propose a propensity account. They hold that aetiological 
accounts (typically conceived) are the main alternatives to their account.74 The essential 
difference between the two kinds of account is that on aetiological accounts, the presence 
of a certain trait is taken to be explained by its past contributions to fitness, whereas on
i
their account, it is explained by the trait’s propensity or disposition to contribute to fitness
I
in the future. They suggest that ultimately what explains the success of past contributions
1
to fitness is the propensity or disposition in the past to contribute to fitness in the future.
If we imagine (or find in the vast biological record) a case in which a 
character is sustained by a chance sequence of accidents, rather than a 
standing propensity, then it would not be appropriate to describe the 
character as having a function. This can happen when a character is 
linked with another character that does bestow a propensity and where 
variations in the character just have not occurred to allow selection 
against the inoperative character. It can also happen by sheer chance ...
Consequently, what confers the status of a function is not the sheer 
fact of survival-due-to-a-character, but rather, survival due to the 
propensities the character bestows upon a creature.
The etiological theory describes a character now as surviving a 
function, when it did confer propensities that improved the chances of 
survival. We suggest that it is appropriate, in such a case, to say that the 
character has been serving that function all along. Even before it had 
contributed (in an appropriate way) to survival, it had conferred a 
survival enhancing propensity on the creature. And to confer such a 
propensity, we suggest is what constitutes a function.75 [Emphasis in 
original.]
The problem with propensities or dispositions is that it is difficult to ascertain what 
they are, except retrospectively. For example, we can only know that trait T in organism O 
has the propensity or disposition (P) to contribute to the fitness of O via an effect of type E 
at t\ by looking at what the trait T has done to contribute to the fitness of O at ^  In short,
73 Typically, such explanations are cashed out in functional terms, where accounts of the concept of function 
attempt to avoid such issues as future causation.
74 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 187.
75 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 191-192.
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there are epistemological difficulties in ascertaining the function of a trait T based upon the
H f\propensity or disposition to contribute to fitness in the future.
Of course we could assume that the propensities or dispositions (P) of trait T in 
organism 0  is the same as the contributions of trait T to fitness is presently. But this raises 
another problem. One would need to assume that the operation of the causal order is 
exactly the same in the future as it has been in the past. However, this begs the question 
concerning the operation of the causal order because it assumes that the causal order will 
operate as it has done, when it may well not do so since the causal order is contingent. 
Consequently, this assumption is not a reliable one. (The problem here is not particular to 
Bigelow and Pargetter but to any kind of account that relies upon propensities and 
dispositions.) The significance of the assumption is, as I shall show, in the problems this 
raises for justifying the normative assessments of living organisms.
On the other hand, as Bigelow and Pargetter note, this kind of move within the sciences
of biology is not without precedent: it occurs in the evolutionary concept of fitness.77
Fitness is not defined retrospectively. It is, roughly, a dispositional 
property of an individual (or species) in an environment, which bestows 
on that individual (or species) a certain survival potential or reproductive 
advantage. It is a subjunctive property: it specifies what will happen or is 
likely to happen in the right circumstances, just as fragility is specified in 
terms of breaking or being likely to break in the right circumstances. And 
such a subjunctive property supervenes upon the morphological 
characters of the individual (or species). Hence there is no circularity 
involved in casting fitness as an explanatory role in the Darwinian theory 
of evolution.
However, while I take it this provides a response to the issue of defining a property 
retrospectively; it does not remove the epistemological difficulties in ascertaining what the 
function of a trait is.
76 This is a point which also applies to using Boorse’s account of the concept of function to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms.
77 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 189.
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Bigelow and Pargetter suggest that four features of propensity theory ought to be made 
explicit:78
1. The account is relative to a specific environment;79
2. Functions are truly dispositional in nature. In particular, they are specified 
subjunctively: they would give a survival-enhancing propensity to a creature in an 
appropriate manner, in the creature’s natural environment. This is true even if the
OQ
creature does not survive or is never in its natural environment;
3. The notion of “survival-enhancing propensity” is defined in formal terms using the
R1probability calculus.
4. The propensity theory can be extended beyond biological functions to the functions 
of artefacts.82
I highlight them because the first one raises a matter of interest. The account is relative 
to a particular environment because the propensities or dispositions of a trait T cannot be 
ascertained unless the context is specified. Consequently, the account falls down if a 
particular environment is not specified. The reason for this is that the operation of any 
entity occurs in some context, and this context is an essential element of its operation. A 
different context can meant the entity operates differently. For instance, the operation of 
enzymes in a cell is sensitive to the pH of the cell. In these cases, the enzyme operates 
differently at different pHs. So the propensity or disposition of the enzymes’ operation in 
the cell in the future cannot be known unless the pH is specified. Moreover, all attributions
78 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 192.
79 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 192.
80 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 193.
81 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 193-194.
82 Bigelow and Pargetter, "Functions," 194.
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of function are effectively prefaced with “assuming environment X.” For example, in this 
case, the function of enzyme X is assuming some pH.
This move is of interest because in effect, it is the same as question-begging the 
operation of the causal order noted above. That is, the attribution of function assumes a 
particular environment when in fact this may not, and over time certainly will not remain 
be the case.
The fact that this is the familiar problem of induction does not absolve such appeals 
from the consequential problems with justifying normative assessments. Neither does 
adding a condition to such appeals which assume such constancy. This is because the move 
also involves the same question-begging operation of the causal order noted above and 
essentially the appeal to such function concepts effectively becomes a kind of appeal to 
history. Therefore, this move to address a potential weakness in propensity accounts raises 
further problems for justifying the normative evaluation of living organisms.
I believe one big flaw in using appeals to propensity accounts to justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms is that it is difficult to ascertain what the propensities to 
contribute to fitness entail, even in retrospect. This is critical because these propensities to 
fitness effectively specify what shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or may occur. And 
if one cannot sufficiently ascertain what shoulde occur then the Normative Distinction 
cannot be adequately sustained.
The problem is an epistemological one. Prospectively the propensities to contribute to 
fitness are unknown unless one assumes that the operation of the causal order remains the 
same. But, it is possible, even likely, over time that the operation of the causal order will
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differ in a significant way. This point raises a further difficulty. Namely, the same trait 
could have very different propensities to contribute to fitness depending on the choice of 
future timeframe. Consequently, the future timeframe needs to be defined. This is because 
the propensity to contribute to fitness could, and over long timeframes, is likely to change 
significantly. It could become harmful, change and become beneficial, and then alter again 
and again. The problem of course is justifying the choice of timeframe.
Of course, one could hedge the operation of the causal order with ceteris paribus 
assumptions. That is one could say, “All other things being equal trait X has Y propensity 
to contribute to fitness thus, X has the function of Y.” But this move effectively begs the 
question on the propensities to contribute to fitness. This is because the operation of the 
causal order could be different and we are assuming that it will not be. The problem with 
this move is that it also effectively begs the question concerning what shoulde occur. This 
is because on this kind of appeal to functions, it is Y propensity to contribute to fitness 
which determines the function of X, and thus what shoulde occur.
Furthermore, retrospectively, one cannot ascertain what the propensities to contribute 
to fitness are or were. This is because it is well known that what occurs or has occurred is 
not solely the outcome of natural selection and differential fitness, even absent human 
interference.
One might respond to this line of argument by saying that all the specification of an 
environment E does is relativize the function to a particular environment E. That is, if the 
environment remains constant then trait T has function F, but if the environment E
83 D. M Walsh has an account which relativizes functions to an environment, although it is an aetiological 
account. He holds that the function of a trait is its contribution to fitness in a particular environment. See: 
Denis M. Walsh, "Fitness and Function," British Journal fo r  the Philosophy of Science M  (1996).
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changes, then trait Thas function F* relative to the new environment E \ 84 The point is that 
apparently there is no need to assume a particular environment because we can say that in 
environment A, B, C etc. (assuming the dispositions of trait T to contribute to fitness are 
different) then trait T has the functions K, J, and L and so X, Y, and Z shoulde occur (on the 
basis of these functions).
This also relativizes the normative claim. So if we claim that Z shoulde occur in 
contrast to X  and Y because Z has the function L, then Z shoulde only occur in environment 
C. In environment A, Z shoulde not occur. Rather, X  shoulde occur because K  is the 
function in this context. This appears to be an advantage because normative claims do 
seem to be relative to the environment or context. For example, it would be somewhat 
counterintuitive to claim that species of blind cockroaches that live their lives in caves (in 
complete darkness) are defective, when sight would be of no use or benefit. Indeed, on a 
propensity account, their eyes would not have a function because sight in this environment 
has no propensity to contribute to fitness, which neatly accords with my intuitive 
normative assessment of cave dwelling cockroaches.
However, there is a problem with this move. Namely, it undercuts the Normative 
Distinction. Specifically, it narrows the contrast between what shoulde occur and what may 
occur. This is because the environment circumscribes (and in part specifies) what may 
occur. So in a fully specified or defined environment there no difference between what 
shoulde occur and what may occur because the causal system is effectively fully 
determined. That is, in a fully specified environment what should happen is what will
84 However, I should note that in some cases the trait T may not have a function F in the new environment E ’ 
because in the new environment E ’ the trait Fhas no propensity to contribute to fitness which would explain 
its presence.
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happen. Consequently, the Distinction dissolves to the extent the environment is defined or 
specified.85
Moreover, the claim that there is no need to assume a particular environment in both 
propensity and capacity accounts does not stand up to scrutiny. Consequently, my previous 
objections stand. This is because functions are constituted relative to a particular 
environment or system on these accounts. That is, a trait T only has a function J, K, L, in 
particular environments A, B,C. So if you take away the particular environment a trait T is 
in and you take away the function a particular trait Thas. So for instance, for trait T to have 
function L environment C needs to occur because the propensity to contribute to fitness is 
relative to environment C. In a different environment, such as A and B, trait T will have a 
different function, such as X, and Y. For example, the eyes of a cockroach only have the 
propensity to contribute to fitness where there are variations in light. They do not have a 
propensity to contribute to fitness in complete darkness.
Yet, on the face of it, one could still argue that appeals to propensity accounts could 
still justify normative assessments. This is because apparently, the Normative Distinction 
is maintained in two significant ways. The first is that the propensity to contribute to 
fitness could be at the level of some type abstraction (such as species) such that a token 
could malfunction in not doing what tokens of that type typically do in a particular 
environment. What shoulde occur is what is typical of tokens of the type despite the fact 
some tokens of the type do not. In response to this I say that this brings us back to the 
objections I made to Boorse’s account of functions. Namely, that we cannot objectively 
justify the particular choices necessary to define what is typical of the type. For example,
851 accept that there is no need to fully define or specify the environment in the ascertaining functions on a 
propensity account.
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we would need to choose and objectively justify some population and timeframe. I 
maintain that this cannot be done.
The second way the Normative Distinction is maintained is by the fact that in the case 
of propensity theories at least, we are talking about the propensity of an element in a 
particular environment to make a contribution to fitness. Consequently, even in a particular 
environment, it is not certain that the element in question will make the requisite
o z
contribution to fitness. Thus there can be a difference between what shoulde occur and 
what occurs. While it is true that the function is effectively determinate in a particular 
environment, the key point is that in such an appeal to functions there needs to be a 
possible difference between the norm defined by the function and what occurs. And this is 
certainly the case where the norm defined by the function is a propensity to make a certain 
contribution to fitness.
However, this is at the cost of making normative claims rather anaemic. That is, one 
cannot say with any certainty of what shoulde occur, rather what propensity shoulde occur. 
This seems to be at odds with normative language.
3.4 Aetiological Accounts
Aetiological accounts of the concept of function are based on some kind of explanation of 
why the trait is present in the entity. In other words, the function F  of trait T, which 
produces an effect of type E, in some entity A, is determined via some kind of explanation 
of why the trait T is there in a token of A.87 Or more specifically for functions in biology, 
the function F of trait T in an organism is determined by some kind of explanation of why
86 This point holds insofar as the environment is specified. In a fully specified environment it does not 
because the causal system is determined and there is no difference between what shoulde occur and what 
occurs.
87 The schema is adapted from Buller. See: Buller, "Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical 
Survey."
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the trait T  is there in the token organism.88 They are interesting for my purposes because 
they are compatible with the natural sciences and can produce a normative conception of 
function. Thus they generally escape my first two objections.
For the majority of aetiological accounts, the explanation of why the trait T is there in 
organism O is based upon the past contribution(s) to fitness, to organism O, of the trait T 
with effect of type E, where tokens with trait T were selected for (over alternatives) 
because of T s  contribution to the fitness of O’s ancestors.89 Examples of such accounts 
include the work of Millikan and Neander.901 ought to note, though that some aetiological 
accounts have a weaker requirement.91 Specifically, they do not require the trait T to be 
selected for. That is, the trait in question does not need to be selected for in competition 
with alternatives. Instead, all that is required of the trait T is it makes a general contribution 
to fitness and therefore to the fact that organism O survived to reproduce. Examples of 
such accounts include the work of Buller and Price.92 However, this weaker requirement is 
generally not the biggest difference between such accounts. Rather, the most common 
difference between accounts is over the timeframe for the contribution(s) to fitness, 
independent of whether the contribution was selected for, or merely some causal 
contribution to the success of the reproduction of trait Tin O’s lineage. There are two 
schools of thought. The first holds that the timeframe is the period designated by the 
original contribution to fitness, whereas the second holds that it is designated by a recent
88 The organism is the typical level at which functions are attributed in the biology. Of course, potentially, 
there are other levels too.
89 The schema is adapted from Buller. See: Buller, "Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical 
Survey," 506-507.
90 See: Ruth G. Millikan, "In Defense of Proper Functions," Philosophy of Science 56 (1989), Ruth G. 
Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (London: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984), 
Karen Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 
58 (1991), Karen Neander, "Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning," Philosophical Studies 70 (1995).
91 This distinction is based on Buller’s distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of aetiological 
theory. See: Buller, "Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey."
92 See: Buller, "Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey.", Carolyn Price, Functions in Mind 
(Oxford, 2001).
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contribution to fitness, if any. Where there is no ‘recent’ contribution to fitness in this 
timeframe, it is deemed that the token has no function. The former are generally called the 
ancient-history accounts, and the latter are generally called recent-history accounts. 
Respective examples of such accounts are provided by Neander and Godfrey-Smith.93
A n c ie n t  h is t o r y  a c c o u n t s : K a r e n  N e a n d e r
My characterisation of Neander’s account of function is derived from three papers: ‘The 
Teleological Notion of Function’, ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst 
Defence’, and ‘Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning’.94 Neander’s account of functions is 
explicitly indebted to the work of Larry Wright and Ruth Millikan.95 Consequently, I 
believe Neander’s account can be usefully contrasted with both theorists in order to help 
explicate it.
The core of her account of functions, in her own words, is summarized in the 
following:
Def: Some effect (Z) is the proper function of some trait (X) in 
organism (O) iff the genotype responsible for X was selected 
for doing Z because doing Z was adaptive for O’s 
ancestors.96
So, on this definition, the proper function of a kangaroo’s pouch is to 
protect her joeys because this is the effect of ancestral pouches that was 
adaptive and that caused the underlying genotype to be selected.
As noted, Neander’s view is indebted to Wright’s account.97 Her account is like 
Wright’s in that her explanans (in the definition) describes why the trait with the function
93 Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28 (1994), Karen Neander, "The 
Teleological Notion of 'Function'," in Function, Selection, and Design, ed. David J. Buller (New York, 
1991).
94 Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence.", Neander, "Misrepresenting 
& Malfunctioning.", Neander, "The Teleological Notion of'Function'."
95 Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence," 168.
96 Neander, "Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning," 111.
97 Neander explicitly makes this point in Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's 
Defence," 168: Footnote #2.
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is there. It is there because the effect (Z) of the trait was adaptive for organism (O’s) 
ancestors. So for a pig’s heart, the pumping effect of the heart is there because the 
genotype responsible for the heart pumping was adaptive for the pig’s ancestors. Where 
her account obviously differs and is a development of Wright’s account is that Neander 
cashes out the ‘because’, ‘reason’, ‘why’ or ‘consequence’ of Wright’s explanans (in his 
account of function) in terms of evolution by natural selection. As it stands, Wright’s 
explanans in his analysis of functional ascription is agnostic about what could fulfil the 
‘because’, ‘reason’, ‘why’, or ‘consequence’ etc. While Wright’s account of functions 
could include evolution by natural selection as the ‘because’ etc., it does not require it.98
Neander’s account is also very similar to Millikan’s account of functions.99 However, 
despite the fact that Millikan’s account is earlier than Neander’s, I discuss the latter. I do so 
for a number of reasons. The first is the accounts were developed independently and for 
quite different purposes. As Griffiths notes, Neander’s intent is to explicate the notion of 
functions for biology, whereas Millikan’s aim in her account is to serve a project in the 
philosophy of language.100 This makes Neander’s account more directly applicable to the 
natural sciences.
The second is that Neander’s account is one of conceptual analysis of how the concept 
of function is used in scientific contexts, whereas Millikan’s definitely is not.101 Indeed, 
Neander attempts to defend conceptual analysis in the context of functions, and also to
98 There is nothing in the definition that excludes it.
99 Neander also explicitly makes this point in Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual 
Analyst's Defence," 168: Footnote #2.
100 Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal fo r the Philosophy of 
Science 44(1993): 147-148.
101 See Ruth G. Millikan, "Biofunctions: Two Paradigms," in Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of  
Psychology and Biology, ed. Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (Oxford, 2002), Millikan, 
"In Defense of Proper Functions.", Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.
134
102defuse and undermine Millikan’s objections to it. This means that it highly unlikely that 
appeals to functions to justify the normative assessment of living organisms are appealing 
to Millikan’s notion of function. Whereas if Neander is successful in her aim of conceptual 
analysis, then it is likely that appeals to function within the natural sciences are consonant 
with her account.
However, her account of how the concept of function is used in scientific contexts is 
limited. This is because her conceptual analysis of function clearly does not cover, or is not 
applicable to every branch of the natural sciences—particularly to every branch of the 
sciences of biology which she focuses upon. For instance, the use of the concept of 
function in biochemistry is at best only partially consonant with her aetiological account. 
Take for example, the claim that the function of Factor VII in human beings is to bind with 
tissue factors released by damaged tissues to form a complex to initiate the process of
1 f t tblood coagulation. Biochemistry texts and experience suggest that use of the concept of 
function in biochemistry is generally more consistent with capacity accounts.104 That when 
biochemists speak of the function of Factor VII, they are speaking of the causal 
contribution it makes to some broader capacity, rather than historical contributions to the 
fitness of the organism. To be sure, some usages of function in this context are consistent 
with the function being the past causal contribution to fitness, but certainly not the 
majority.
The third and perhaps the most important reason is that it is not clear whether 
Millikan’s notion of function is normative, or normative in the sense that I am interested
102 Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence," 169.
103 Donald Voet, Judith G. Voet, and Charlotte W. Pratt, Fundamentals of Biochemistry (New York; 
Chichester, 1999), 318-319.
104 See Voet, Voet, and Pratt, Fundamentals of Biochemistry, 318-319.
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in.105 In contrast, Neander’s notion is clearly normative.106 Obviously, if Millikan’s 
concept of function is not normative, then any appeal to it falls foul of my second
107objection.
However, Neander’s and Millikan’s accounts are otherwise very similar. Compare
Neander’s summary of her account above with the following summary from Millikan:
A proper function of such an organ or behavior is, roughly, a function 
that its ancestors have performed that has helped account for proliferation 
of genes responsible for it, hence helped account for its own existence.108
The two summaries are essentially equivalent. Basically, they share two characteristics.
First, they both claim that ultimately proper functions are prescribed and determined by the
action of natural selection. In a nutshell, it is the causal contribution to fitness of trait T that
designates the function F of T. The point is to distinguish between what an element is for
and what it happens to do.109 The second characteristic they share is that both accounts take
the view that the proper function of an element is determined by the last period in which
natural selection positively acted—selected for—the relevant effects of the element. This
interpretation is supported by the way in which both theorists treat vestiges.110
Neander’s account is committed to holding that vestigial organs, such as the human 
appendix, still have the function of digesting cellulose. This is because digesting cellulose 
(presumably) was the effect of ancestral appendices that was adaptive and caused the 
underlying genotype to be selected for.
105 Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.
106 Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence.", Neander, "Misrepresenting 
& Malfunctioning.", Neander, "The Teleological Notion of'Function'."
107 Ruth G. Millikan, "In Defense of Proper Functions," in White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for  
Alice (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993), Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, 
Ruth G. Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays fo r Alice (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993).
108 Millikan, "In Defense of Proper Functions," 14.
109 This is point is made by others. For instance by Griffiths in Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and 
Proper Functions," in Function, Selection, and Design, ed. David J. Buller (New York, 1999), 145.
110 However, Griffiths makes the point that Millikan’s account only provides a minimal gesture to dealing 
with the issue of vestiges. See Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," 148.
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The problem with this is that it is counter-intuitive, and this is why I believe ancient- 
history accounts are inferior to the other kinds of aetiological account. Typically we would 
say that human appendices do not have functions, rather than saying they have functions 
that they no longer perform. This is particularly damaging to Neander because she is 
committed to a conceptual-analytical account of functions.111 The fact that her account 
gives a counter-intuitive description or analysis of the human appendix means that her 
account does not entirely accord with how the concept is used in everyday discourse. 
Moreover, it does not accord with how the concept is used in scientific discourse either, 
which is also the explicit focus of Neander’s account.
However, not all historical theorists are of the ancient history variety. The objection 
raised above is only applicable to ancient history accounts of functions. It is not applicable 
to recent history or propensity accounts of functions. For example, if we take our case of 
the human appendix, under a recent history account of functions it does not have a 
function. This is because the appendix is not making any causal contribution to fitness 
within the ‘recent’ timeframe and thus does not have a function in this sense.112 
Consequently, it is to a recent-history account of functions I now turn.
R e c e n t  h is t o r y  a c c o u n t s : G o d f r e y -Sm it h
The best known recent-history account comes from Peter Godfrey-Smith. His account of 
the concept of functions generally is very similar to Neander’s account. It too relies upon 
the history of the contributions to the fitness of the organism for ascribing and determining
111 Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defence."
112 As I have noted in my discussion of Boorse’s GGC account; there are considerable issues in demarcating 
what is the ‘recent’ and what is the ‘ancient’ timeframe.
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the function of the element in question. Where it differs from Neander’s account is that 
instead of relying upon the timeframe where the element was first actively selected for 
(which explains its presence), it relies upon the timeframe where the element was last 
maintained by natural selection for the ascription and determination of the element’s 
function.113
Godfrey-Smith summarises his account in the following definition:
Biological functions are dispositions or effects a trait has which explain 
the recent maintenance of the trait under natural selection. This is the 
“modern history” approach to functions. The approach is historical 
because to ascribe a function is to make a claim about the past, but the 
relevant past is the recent past; modern history rather than ancient.114
However, his account is not intended as the account of functions. He admits and indeed 
advocates that there are room for other analyses of functions in biology such as the 
capacity accounts of function already described.115 Rather the point of his paper is to 
analyze what he takes to be an existing concept of ‘function’, which plays a particular 
theoretical role within biology.116 The method is via a kind of conceptual analysis.117 
Moreover, he also explicitly acknowledges that his recent history view is a development of 
both Wright’s and Millikan’s work, although it stands independently of their accounts.118
Godfrey-Smith takes his leave from Wright because of the breadth of Wright’s criteria 
for attributing a function to an element or item. Instead, Godfrey-Smith adopts what he 
calls an intermediate third position between these views on the attribution of functional 
status. This stipulates that: (1) the functionally characterized element must be part of and 
reside within a broader or larger biological system; and (2) the explanation of the
113 The ‘maintenance’ here does not have to be ‘active’: if natural selection is indifferent or it is merely 
maintained rather than having an overall negative effect upon fitness, then this still counts as ‘maintaining’ 
the function.
114 Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," 344.
115 His argument for this view is contained in Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Functions: Consensus Without Unity," 
in Function, Selection, and Design, ed. David J. Buller (New York, 1999).
116 Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," 344.
1,7 Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," 344.
118 Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," 345.
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functionally characterized element must be in terms of a positive contribution to the fitness 
of the larger system.119
So Godfrey-Smith’s account embodies features from both aetiological and capacity 
accounts, and thus it could rightly be called a ‘combination’ account. Nevertheless, I 
include Godfrey-Smith in the aetiological camp rather than in the capacity account because 
he makes a direct and interesting contrast to the ancient-history aetiological accounts of 
theorists such as Neander.
The significance of course is that recent-history accounts of function largely escape the 
objections made to other kinds of accounts. For starters, the attribution of functions is far 
more in line with intuition. Unlike ancient-history accounts, for instance, recent-history 
accounts claim that present human appendices are non-functional rather than being 
dysfunctional. Neither are recent-history accounts as susceptible to the practical problems 
in ascertaining why the trait was selected and how it contributed to fitness. And as we shall 
see, unlike propensity accounts, they do not beg any questions concerning the operation of 
the causal order.
So arguably, Godfrey-Smith’s account of functions and recent-history accounts of 
function in general are better accounts of the concept compared to their ancient-history 
rivals and to other kinds of account. That is, apparently they provide a more accurate 
account or explanation of something’s function—what that something is for. However, it is 
not clear that they do any better in justifying the normative assessment of living organisms.
119 Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," 349.
Ultimately, any appeal to an aetiological concept of function relies on history to justify 
normative claims. In other words, if X  is the function of Y, in organism Z, then X  shoulde 
occur in Z because X  is the past—ancient or recent—contribution to fitness that explains its 
presence in Z. Consequently, both ancient-history and recent-history accounts are equally 
vulnerable to the objections raised to appeals to history to justify the normative assessment 
of living organisms.120 Indeed, one problem here has to do with justifying the particular 
choice of timeframe that the ‘ancient’ and ‘recent’ history refer to necessary to justify 
normative assessments. Of course, a good case has been made in recent-history accounts 
for a ‘recent’ timeframe rather than an ‘ancient’ timeframe, but the problem apparently 
remains.
One response would be to claim that it usually makes no difference to how we define 
the timeframe because we usually get the same answer irrespective of the chosen period. 
That is, under any reasonable interpretation of ‘recent’ timeframe we get the same answer 
to what the function and functional norm is. The pumping heart is the obvious example. 
Under any plausible recent timeframe, the function of the heart—that which explains the 
presence of the heart under natural selection—is to pump blood. Moreover, in those cases 
where this is not the case, and the choice of timeframe does make a difference about what 
function to ascribe, our intuitions are equally fuzzy about what function to ascribe and 
what therefore shoulde occur. Clearly, there is something to this, which this example 
demonstrates. Indeed, I concede the point. However, while correct, ultimately, I argue that 
appeals to recent history accounts still fail to adequately justify normative assessments.
The main reason is because there is an unjustified privileging of the past over the future.
120 As noted in Chapter 3, the appeal to history is a particular kind of appeal to typicality— i.e. past typicality.
Take the following example. Let us assume that intelligent alien biologists visited 
Earth millions of years ago who were interested in ascertaining the function of particular 
elements of living organisms using the aetiological account of functions. Upon examining 
the jawbones of some organisms they concluded that they had the function of supporting 
their internal structure since this was their most recent contribution to fitness which 
explains their presence. Moreover, on any reasonable past timeframe, population etc. they 
have this function. Consequently, if they appealed to function, assuming this of function, 
they would be committed to claiming that these bones shoulde support the internal structure 
of these organisms. They would also be committed to maintaining that such organisms 
would be defective if these bones did not support the structure of the jaw.
However, we know in 2008 that at some point in the aliens’ future that these bones take 
on another role: they become co-opted by the auditory system of these organisms’ 
descendents and are used to transmit and amplify sound waves from the environment. So 
what ought we say concerning what shoulde occur with respect to these bones at the time 
the aliens’ visit Earth in the light of present knowledge? In particular, what ought we say 
when the changes begin manifesting, particularly when the function of supporting their 
internal structure is diminished, and the function of transmitting amplifying sound waves is 
only beginning and imperfect. Ought we say that these organisms are defective? The 
appeals to recent history accounts of function would (at the time the aliens visit) justify the 
status quo and condemn changes, because according to this account, the function of the 
bones is to support the structure of the organisms. Appeals to function would claim that 
such organisms are defective and would do so for a least a couple of generations—until the 
explanation of the bone’s presence included the new function. Yet from the perspective of 
the present, it is not clear that any initial condemnation is warranted. The evolution of a 
better and more efficient auditory system has its obvious advantages. Of course this is the
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wisdom of hindsight. However, such occurrences do raise doubts over any normative 
assessment justified by an appeal to functions on the basis of recent history: positive or 
negative the assessment may well be premature and mistaken (in the long view).
The problem in general is that such appeals to function are essentially an appeal to 
history and assume that the present and the future shoulde be the same as the past. This 
implies that change in the future shoulde not occur and thus condemns innovation as being 
defective. Or more charitably, it implies that change shoulde only occur once it has been 
sustained for long enough, otherwise it shoulde not.121 However, justifying this assumption 
is problematic. Initially condemning all change as being defective seems wrongheaded and 
it implicitly makes an unjustified claim concerning what shoulde occur.
There other weaknesses with the appeal to recent history accounts for justifying 
normative assessments too. Recent history accounts are committed to maintaining that we 
are only justified in making such assessments after sufficient time has passed.122 That is, 
we can only tell whether the changes in the bones of the jaw are defective or not after the 
passage of a certain amount of time. However, this means that appeals to recent history 
accounts to justify normative assessments are retrospective. Yet all normative claims— 
claims concerning what shoulde occur can be prospective. That is they can all refer to some 
possible future state of affairs. Arguably, this is a weakness of the appeal since all these 
prospective normative claims also require justification. Take for example the claim that 
“Domesticated sows about to farrow shoulde be able to build a nest.” Retrospectively, the 
claim can be justified by an appeal to recent history functions because such behaviour has
121 Of course how long ‘long enough’ is, is a moot point.
122 The difficulty is that it in the present it is often difficult to tell whether an innovation is good or bad for the 
entity now, in the near future, or the far future. Again how long one must wait until we make an assessment is 
a difficult question to answer. In this case, with the benefit of hindsight, we would have to wait millions of 
years.
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a function, which is frustrated in the case of modern industrial farming systems.123 Yet the 
claim is prospective. Those who make it intend that it ought to apply in the future and not 
just to the relatively immediate future.
Recent history theorists could reply by saying that we do not know what behaviour 
shoulde occur in the future because we do not know what contribution the behaviour makes 
which explains its presence. If this is the case, we cannot justify the claim that 
“Domesticated sows about to farrow shoulde be able to build a nest” by an appeal to recent 
history accounts of function. But such claims are common. Consequently, if recent history 
theorists make such a reply their theory is irrelevant as an appeal to justify prospective 
normative claims. Of course, the appeal to recent history could justify such claims if it 
assumed that the future will be the same as the past. That is, in all possible futures 
pumping blood is what explains why the heart is there under natural selection. But this 
assumption cannot be plausibly sustained, particularly over evolutionary timescales.
Recent history accounts, like all historical aetiological accounts, do not attribute 
functions to new innovations. This is because some period of time needs to pass in order to 
distinguish between functions and happy accidents which confer some benefit. For 
instance, we would not say that the function of a Bible in a breast pocket is to stop bullets 
even when a Bible in a breast pocket has stopped a bullet and saved a soldier’s life. On the 
other hand, there are cases where intuitively a rapid (or immediate) change would confer a 
new function. For example, imagine that the requisite changes in ancestor mammals’ jaw 
bones occurred in the subsequent generation such that they changed immediately to 
improve the efficiency of transmitting and amplifying sound waves rather than supporting 
its internal structure. According to the aetiological account of functions the bones shoulde
123 That is, there is an explanation which describes why this behaviour exists under natural selection.
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still support the internal structure of the organisms because this was the most recent 
contribution to fitness which explains its presence. Yet, intuitively at least, it seems wrong 
to say that the new generation of organisms are defective because the bones no longer fulfil 
their function as per aetiological accounts. And intuitively, it also seems wrong to say that 
the bones are malfunctioning as they would be on aetiological accounts, especially when 
they make an arguably greater contribution to fitness via an enhanced auditory system.
Of course, some number of future generations a recent history theorist could claim that 
transmitting and amplifying sound waves is the function of the bones because this explains 
why the bones are present. But in response to this I would reply that it is unclear how many 
extra generations are required to distinguish between functions and happy accidents—one, 
two, three, or more? And this point in turn raises the question why this period rather than 
that without being accused of being arbitrary in different cases. It may well be the case that 
the answer to this question is fuzzy. But the recent history theorist owes us an explanation 
of why it should be this (fuzzy) number of generations rather than some other (fuzzy) 
number.
Furthermore in every case where some entity changes its function there is going to be a 
point of equipoise in the different contributions to fitness which explains its presence. That 
is, in our example, there is going to be a point where the bones make equal contributions to 
fitness supporting the structure of the organisms and to their auditory system. In this 
situation, it is unclear what shoulde on the basis of aetiological accounts of function. This is 
because ultimately there are two different contributions to fitness which could explain their 
presence in the organisms.124 I suppose in cases where the contributions are
124 One could argue that given what we know of the future in this case that the bones in question ultimately 
loose the function of supporting the internal structure of the organisms because eventually they do not 
support their internal structure and they make no contribution (positive or negative) to fitness.
complementary, at the point of equipoise one could maintain that they both shoulde occur. 
Although, I take it that immediately prior and beyond this point of equipoise, the question 
of what shoulde occur remains unclear.125 However, in many cases, such as our example, 
the contributions are mutually exclusive. That is, one of them can only be made at the 
expense of the other: the better the bones become at one function—transmitting and 
amplifying sound waves—the worse they become at performing the other—supporting the 
structure of organisms (and vice versa). But in this case these normative claims are in 
tension with each other because one can only make its contribution at the expense of the 
other. In other words, maintaining that the bones shoulde support the structure of these 
organisms implies that they shoulde not transmit and amplify sound waves since both 
cannot occur.
Clearly, these points do not apply to entities which do not change and evolve through 
time. However, living organisms and elements of living organisms do change and evolve 
over time. Change is an intrinsic element to life.
4. Conclusion
This chapter argues that appeals within the natural sciences to the concept of function do 
not justify the normative assessment of living organisms. They fail to do so because such 
appeals are vulnerable to one or more fatal objections. There were six I raised. The first 
was that the explicit ontology of the natural sciences is incompatible with the nature of the 
concept of the function being appealed to. (Consequently, those within the natural sciences
1251 am not convinced that a simple majority justifies the function to attribute. In the example, at one point in 
the history, the majority explanation for the presence of the bones was that they supported the structure of the 
organisms, but the future trajectory of the explanations was transmitting and amplifying sound waves. (I.e. 
from generation to generation the proportion of explanations for the presence of the bones changed towards 
the latter explanation.) In this case, it seems plausible to me to say that the attribution of function according 
to the recent history account based on a majority contribution should be doubted because the majority is 
going to change.
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cannot appeal to such notions on pain of ontological incoherence.) The second was that the 
concept of function is not normative. (So those within the natural sciences can hardly 
appeal to such notions of the concept on pain of ontological incoherence.) The third was 
that there are many different concepts of function, but no single concept of function can be 
objectively justified over and against the alternatives. (Consequently, there are many 
different even contradictory normative assessments which are justified by an appeal to the 
concept of function.) The fourth one was that for some concepts of function there are 
various parameters which require some specification, but no specification can be 
objectively justified over and against alternatives. (So, like the third objection, again there 
are many different and even contradictory normative assessments which are equally 
justified by an appeal to such concepts of function.) The fifth one was that some concepts 
of function normatively assess present change as being defective in opposition to intuitions 
to the contrary. And finally the sixth objection was that some concepts of function are 
unable to justify prospective normative claims without unjustifiably privileging the past 
over the future.
Philosophical accounts of the concept of function can be roughly classified into four 
kinds, although the boundaries between them can be blurred. These are: (1) value centred 
or teleological accounts; (2) capacity accounts; (3) propensity accounts; and (4) historical 
accounts, which come in ancient history and recent history variants.
I argued that these different kinds of function are vulnerable to various problems which 
mean they are unsuited to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. For 
example, value centred and teleological accounts of the concept are generally vulnerable to 
the first objection since it is generally held that they are ontologically incompatible with 
the natural sciences. This said I was not convinced that this is necessarily the case. Indeed,
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I suggested that arguably the best contemporary example of a value centred or teleological 
account by Mark Bedau may be compatible. Nevertheless it still fails because it lacks a 
necessary account of value and therefore fails to reassure us that it does escape the first 
objection.
Capacity accounts are generally vulnerable to the second objection because generally 
they do not provide a normative conception of function. Hence, in general, capacity 
accounts do not sustain the Normative Distinction—a point demonstrated by the fact they 
generally cannot and do not account for dysfunctions. That is, failure to make any 
contribution to a broader system capacity is not deemed to be dysfunctional. However, 
there is at least one notable exception, Christopher Boorse’s General Goal Contribution 
(GCC) account. Yet given the specifics of his account—notably his use of normal 
functions which drew upon an appeal to typicality—his account as an appeal to justify 
normative assessments of living organisms fails for the same reasons as the appeal to 
typicality. Moreover, his use of species-typical contributions to goals, particularly to 
survival and reproduction, to ground normativity leaves many parameters unspecified and 
importantly unjustified. Unless some justification can be found for choosing one set of
specifications over another, it will not be possible to appeal to Boorse’s notion of a
1 0 6function to ground normative assessments. In short, Boorse’s account also suffers from 
the fourth objection.
Propensity accounts are also vulnerable to the second objection. This is because 
propensities to contribute to fitness are vague and thus they do not so sharply sustain the
126 Boorse rightly claims that what is typical is vague. However, what is typical has various parameters with a 
range of values which need to be closely specified and the choices of value justified if appeals to typicality 
are to be adequate to justify normative assessments. For instance, In Boorse’s case, he makes use of the term 
species without specifying which concept of species he is using, let alone justifying it over and against the 
tenable alternatives. In other cases, the specification of the range of values is implicit but not justified.
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Normative Distinction. That is, what shoulde occur is not so sharply defined, especially in 
contrast to recent-history and ancient-history accounts of function. This is an 
epistemological problem. That is, it is difficult to know what the propensities a trait has to 
contribute to fitness unless one makes unjustified assumptions about how the causal order 
will operate. But this raises the problem of effectively begging the question concerning 
what shoulde occur because what shoulde occur is then effectively specified by these 
assumptions. Moreover, if the (natural) assumption is that the causal order will operate in 
the future as it has in the past then essentially one is making an appeal to history, which 
has problems as we have seen.
Finally, we come to aetiological accounts. They are effectively immune from the first 
and second objections. (The third objection applies to the appeal to function per se.) 
Ancient history accounts have problems with timeframe selection, albeit at different 
relative periods in the past. Of course, a good case has been made for recent-history 
accounts over ancient history accounts. However, recent-history accounts are vulnerable to 
the fifth and sixth objections. That is, in some cases, they assess contemporary change 
(which contrasts to the past) as being defective contrary to intuitions to the contrary. They 
are also unable to justify prospective normative claims without unjustifiably privileging the 
past over the future. In other words, they also suffer from the objections to the appeal to 
history because both kinds of aetiological account draw upon an appeal to history to 
ground their account of functions.
Furthermore, the appeal to functions does not escape the third objection even excluding 
accounts of function which are ontologically incompatible with the natural sciences and are 
not normative. Of those remaining clearly, there are different accounts of the concept and 
arguably none can be categorically justified over and against the alternatives. The crux of
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the matter is that there is an irreducible pluralism which makes justifying particular 
normative assessments over and against possible alternatives untenable. Indeed, in some 
cases we would be left with an appeal to functions equally justifying that X shoulde occur 
and not X shoulde occur, which is a fatal contradiction. Indeed, the only way the appeal to 
functions could escape this objection is if there is one true account of the concept of 
functions. But this looks implausible.
We could perhaps argue that we should adopt the account of function that makes the 
best fist of sustaining the Normative Distinction. On these grounds, arguably the best is 
some recent history account of the concept. Such accounts sustain the Normative 
Distinction better than the alternatives. However, as we have seen the latter fails in the end 
because it suffers from the objections to the appeal to history. Consequently, if I am 
correct, then the appeal to the natural sciences to justify normative assessments of living 
organisms via an appeal to functions is not tenable.
So now we have two appeals which could justify the normative assessment of living 
organisms remaining on the table. These are the appeals to development (ontogeny) and 
the appeals to species (phylogeny). So it is to these remaining appeals I now turn.
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Chapter 5: Why the appeal to ontogeny fails to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms.
1. Introduction
The claim this chapter seeks to defend is that we cannot justify the normative assessment 
of living organisms by an appeal to ontogeny. Ontogeny is the process of individual living 
organisms’ development from origin to maturity.1 It occurs with great regularity. Indeed, 
there are living organisms which have developed in the same way for millions of years.
To some extent, it is this striking stability over time which underlies the intuition that 
this appeal justifies the normative assessment of living organisms. That is, the fact that 
living organisms have developed consistently which at least partially underlies the claim 
that they shoulde. For instance, the claim that the New Zealand tuatara shoulde develop as it 
does is, at least in part given some credence by the fact it has developed the same way for 
some 200 million years.2
Yet the appeal to development is not an implicit and indirect appeal to regularity per 
se, or to history. Rather it attempts to justify normative assessments via the causal system 
responsible for development. In other words, the claim is that this system specifies what 
shoulde occur rather than what regularly occurs or has regularly occurred. For instance, the 
appeal attempts to justify the normative assessment “Porky the piglet shoulde be born with 
two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail” by the fact this is what the developmental system 
specifies (in advance of it occurring). In contrast, the appeals to regularity and history
1 It is often contrasted with phylogeny, which is the development of a group. Typically the group is 
conceived as a species. I shall deal with the appeal to phylogeny in the next chapter.
2 Tuataras resemble lizards but technically they belong to a different taxonomic order. Indeed, they are the 
only remaining member of the order Sphenodontia, which tuataras excepting, died out some 60 million years 
ago.
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attempt to justify this normative assessment because piglets are regularly born with these 
characteristics or have been born with them for thousands of years.
Consequently, the appeal to development escapes the objections I raised to these 
appeals in chapters 3 and 4. To reiterate, I objected to the appeal to typicality because it 
either fatally weakens the Normative Distinction, or begs the question concerning what 
shoulde occur. And I objected to the appeal to history because this requires a choice of 
timeframe and population which either is circular or cannot be objectively justified. The 
appeal to ontogeny escapes this objection because it does not utilize time or population in 
its conception. The fact that ontogeny is consistent through long periods of time for certain 
populations such as species is orthogonal to the appeal.
Furthermore, the predominant account of ontogeny in the natural sciences describes 
how the causal system ostensibly is able to specify what shoulde occur. It asserts that there 
are instructions for development in advance of it occurring in the way that blueprints 
specify the form of a building. Specifically, it claims that these instructions are represented 
in the DNA/RNA of organisms and executed by cells. So what shoulde occur is what the 
instructions specify in advance of development, and actual development is what does 
occur. Thus the Normative Distinction is maintained. Clearly, the difference between what 
shoulde occur and what occurs can be distinguished, as illustrated by congenital 
malformations caused by morphogens like Thalidomide.
So it appears that my thesis that the natural sciences do not justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms is in deep trouble. However, I argue that such appearances 
are mistaken. Specifically I pursue four lines of argument which make the case that we 
cannot appeal to ontogeny to justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
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The first line of argument rests on the claim that accepting the standard account of 
development as a justification for normative assessments leads to the justification of some 
strongly counter-intuitive normative assessments. While it is possible to accept these, it is 
at the cost of either foregoing our intuitions about normative assessments of living 
organisms, or altering the nature of the appeal to ontogeny, such that it is vulnerable to 
objections made earlier.
The second line of argument claims that the nature of the instructions preformed in the 
DNA/RNA of living organisms are not sufficient to determine what shoulde occur. 
Consequently, we cannot appeal to these instructions to sustain the Normative Distinction. 
While we could assume some form of standard background causal context in which 
DNA/RNA would specify what shoulde occur, such an assumption is not warranted 
because it begs important questions. Furthermore, it would also involve privileging 
genomic contributions to the causal system of development over other kinds of 
contributions operating in development, which brings me to my third line of argument.
This rests on the claim that there is no adequate justification for privileging one kind of 
contribution to the developmental causal system over and against other kinds of 
contribution operating in development. Such privileging is necessary if the appeal to 
development is to adequately justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
The fourth and final line of argument is a radical one. It claims that the idea there are 
preformed instructions for development contained in DNA or RNA is wrong, 
notwithstanding its considerable scientific utility and fecundity. If successful, it means that 
the natural sciences cannot appeal to ontogeny to justify normative assessments because it
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is the alleged preformed elements which sustain the Normative Distinction. Yet I ought to 
stress that the case against the natural sciences appealing to ontogeny to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms does not depend upon this line of argument, so 
even if it fails my thesis is preserved.
However, before I begin these arguments I believe it is worthwhile to provide an 
overview of how development has been and is explained in the natural sciences. The 
appeal to development is based on the causal system responsible for development 
described by and explained within the natural sciences. So knowing something of the 
scientific explanation of development is essential for understanding what the appeal 
entails.
2. Scientific accounts of development
The explanation of development within the science of biology occurs within the discipline 
of developmental biology. To explain it I shall draw upon Scott F. Gilbert’s classic 
Developmental Biology.
Gilbert notes that the two fundamental questions of developmental biology are: (1) how 
does the egg give rise to the adult, and (2) how does the adult (ultimately) reproduce 
itself?3 It is the first of these questions that is pertinent to the appeal to development to 
justify the normative assessment of living organisms. If the way in which the egg gives rise 
to the adult specifies how development shoulde occur before it does, then there is a 
plausible way to sustain the Normative Distinction and thus justify normative assessments.
3 Scott F. Gilbert, Developm ental Biology, 6th ed. (Sunderland, Massachusetts, 2000).
There are two kinds of explanation in the scientific literature on development which 
seek to address this first question. The first is based on some form of preformation and is 
called a ‘preformationist explanation’. Classically, preformationist explanations held that 
development was merely the expansion of the already fully formed organism. In contrast, 
preformationist explanations offered today claim that development is preformed in the 
instructions, plans, or blueprints contained sequences of nucleic acids (DNA or RNA). The 
second is based on epigenesis and is called an ‘epigenetic explanation.’ Epigenetic 
explanations claim that development is the assembly of the organism from various 
components. The components are also assembled in other epigenetic processes, and this 
recursion ultimately goes down to raw materials. So epigenesis is much more than 
expansion. Where preformation and epigenesis differ is over whether the adult organism is 
already completely present (in some sense) in the fertilized egg; or if they are formed de 
novo in each generation within the process of development.
The history of the explanation of development within the natural sciences can be seen 
as an argument between the two kinds of explanation. Broadly, there have been two phases 
of debate. The first was over which kind of explanation was true: that is, whether 
epigenesis or preformation was true. The second, which is still continuing today, is over 
the extent to which each kind of explanation is true. That is, the current debate is largely 
over the extent to which development is epigenetic or preformed.
This said, recently it has been argued that development can be explained entirely by 
epigenesis. For instance, the philosopher of biology Susan Oyama argues for this view, 
along with others in the Developmental Systems Theory (DST) movement.4 However, 
notwithstanding such arguments, the consensus explanation of development is that there
4 As far as I know, for obvious reasons, there is no one advocating the opposite view.
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are preformed instructions which are made concrete by epigenesis. For instance, Gilbert 
remarks,
In this hypothesis, wherein epigenetic development is directed by 
preformed instructions, we are not far from the view held by modern 
biologists that most of the instructions for forming the organism are 
already present in the egg.5
Interestingly, the debate between epigenesis and preformation in the explanation of 
development is also connected to the debates concerning the explanation of human nature 
where genes and nature are pitted against the environment and nurture. For instance, the 
idea that development is explained by preformed instructions in genes neatly parallels the 
claim that human traits are explained by instructions in genes, which exist at the beginning 
of human development. And the idea that development is explained by epigenetic 
assembly is close to the idea that human traits are explained by the environment.
Moreover, the modem consensus explanation of development mirrors the modern 
consensus explanation of human nature. The modern consensus explanation of 
development holds that it is explained by both epigenesis and preformation. Likewise, 
human nature is explained by genes and the environment, nature and nurture. Finally, the 
significant issue for both explanations is ascertaining the extent to which genes and nature 
on one hand, and the environment and nurture on the other, explain development and 
human nature.
The connection is important because ultimately some significant moral claims depend 
upon whether or to what extent human nature is explained by genes/nature and 
environment/nurture. This is because it is thought that moral agents are morally 
responsible to some extent for the latter but not for the former, although with technological 
advances moral agents are becoming responsible for both. Specifically, in the case of
5 Scott F. Gilbert, Developm ental B iology , 7th ed. (Sunderland, Massachusetts, 2003), 8.
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human beings qua moral agents, they are not responsible for the environment in which 
they grew up in, but they are responsible to some extent for the environments they inhabit 
as adults.
2.1 A brief history of the debate between epigenesis and preformation
Gilbert claims that debate between epigenesis and preformation began in the seventeenth
century.
With Malpighi [1628-1694] begins one of the great debates in 
embryology—the controversy over whether organs of the embryo are 
formed de novo (“from scratch”) at each generation or whether the 
organs are already present, but in miniature form, within the egg (or 
sperm). The first view is called epigenesis, and it was supported by 
Aristotle and Harvey. The second view is called preformation, and it 
was reinvigorated with support from Malpighi.[Bold in original]6
Malpighi challenged epigenesis on the basis of his microscopic account of chick
development showing that the un-incubated chick egg already had a great deal of structure.
Support for preformation then came from a variety of sources. First, it had the backing 
of the contemporary worldview, including the sciences, religion, and philosophy.
Secondly, it was a simpler view since all development consists of in preformation is 
growth—or unrolling—rather than creation and formation. Neither did it require the 
hypothesis of some extra and mysterious force for development as epigenesis did. Third, it 
accorded with the belief at the time that species were eternal and constant. Consequently, 
by the mid-eighteenth century preformationism was dominant.
However, the case for epigenesis was rejuvenated by the German embryologist Kaspar 
Freidrich Wolff. Wolff showed by carefully observing chick embryos that particular 
embryonic parts were developed from tissues that had no counterpart in the adult organism. 
For instance, the heart and blood vessels could be seen to develop afresh in every
6 Gilbert, D evelopm ental Biology , 6.
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generation, whereas according to preformationist theory they had to be present from the 
beginning of development. Of course, the new epigenesis proposed by Wolff was not 
without its problems. To explain how an organism is created afresh in each generation he 
hypothesized an unknown force—the vis essentialis (or essential force)—to organize 
embryonic development.7
Reconciliation between the views was attempted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant
o
and the biologist Johann Fredrich Blumenbach. However, ultimately with the 
development of new experimental techniques in developmental biology it became 
increasingly clear that preformationism in its original guise was untenable. These new 
techniques enabled the documentation and description of the epigenesis of various 
structures. For example, it was ultimately demonstrated through a number of techniques 
that the different cells of the dividing egg had different fates—that is they became different 
structures and tissues. It was also demonstrated that cells migrated in development. Both 
phenomena are inconsistent with traditional preformationism.
Gilbert highlights three investigators (contemporaries and friends) who were 
particularly influential in the rebuttal of preformation and the restablishment of epigenesis. 
These were Christian Pander, Karl Ernst von Baer, and Heinrich Rathke.
7 The need for such a hypothesis comes from the view that Matter requires organization into Form. This is 
view is supported by the fact that rocks do not organize themselves into houses. The hypothesis would have 
been problematic for a number of reasons. For instance, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there 
was a rejection of teleological explanations in biology and clearly prima facie W olffs hypothesis could be 
interpreted as making an appeal to teleology. Furthermore, in positing an unknown force, Wolff effectively 
make the equivalent move some Creationists do today saying (about Creation) “God did it somehow— end of 
story.”
8 Gilbert, Developmental Biology, 6-7.
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Pander studied the chick embryo and discovered the three germ layers of triploblastic 
organisms: the ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm. He showed that the layers did not 
form their organs independently, which supports epigenesis but not preformation.
Rathke looked at the development of frogs, salamanders, fish, birds, and mammals and 
showed that the development of vertebrates were similar. In particular he demonstrated 
that vertebrate pharyngeal arches became the gill apparatus in fish, but became mammalian 
jaws and ears (among other things), which again is consistent with epigenesis but not 
preformation.
Von Baer extended Rathke’s work, and discovered the notochord and the mammalian 
egg. He is also known for four inter-related generalizations surrounding embryonic 
development that have since been called von Baer’s Laws. These are: (1) the general 
feature of a large group of animals appear earlier in development than do the specialized 
features of a smaller group; (2) less general characters are developed from the more 
general, until finally the most specialized appear; (3) the embryo of a given species, instead 
of passing through the adult stages of lower animals, departs more and more from them; 
and (4) therefore the early embryo of a higher animal is never like a lower animal, but only 
like its early embryo. The significance of these generalizations is that again they are 
consistent with epigenesis but inconsistent with traditional preformationism. Consequently, 
the view that living organisms themselves were preformed was thoroughly discredited. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of preformationism was not (and is not) totally exorcised from 
the explanation of development in the natural sciences.
Obviously, given the evidence, the doctrine of preformationism needed to change, and 
what changed was what it asserted to be preformed. So instead of claiming that adult living
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organisms themselves are preformed, preformationism now claims that the instructions, 
plans, or blueprints for adult living organisms are preformed in the genomes of embryonic 
living organisms. Adult organisms are preformed in the sense that they are ostensibly 
represented in the DNA of the fertilized egg prior to the adult form being instantiated. The 
claim is that it is instantiated by the information contained in the DNA of the fertilized egg 
being ‘translated’ or ‘read’ through the various epigenetic processes of development. 
Moreover, it is a claim that is supported by contemporary genetic discourse and it escapes 
the objections raised to old preformationism.
As noted above, the pertinent point is that the modern view of development proposes 
that the development of living organisms is partly preformed in the information contained 
in various sequences of nucleic acid of the zygote. It is pertinent because such 
preformation can be used to sustain the Normative Distinction. In particular, the preformed 
instructions could specify what shoulde occur in development and these specifications may 
rightly be contrasted with what occurs or may occur. Take for instance, the normative 
assessment “Porky the piglet is defective” (because she is bom with one eye, one ear, and 
no curly tail). She is normatively defective on the modern account of development 
precisely because she differs significantly from the instructions for her form (at that point 
in development) contained in her zygote. She shoulde have been born with two eyes, two 
ears, and a curly tail because these traits were preformed in the instructions in the zygote. 
Yet for some reason, the specified outcome was thwarted and she was born with one eye, 
one ear and no curly tail.
So if the contemporary view of development described by Gilbert is true, then my 
thesis that the natural sciences do not justify the normative assessment of living organisms 
seems to be in trouble. This is because apparently we could appeal to the idea that the
Normative Distinction can be grounded in facts about an organism’s genome. However, I 
believe there are at least four lines of argument which show otherwise, and it is to these I 
now turn.
3. Objections
3.1 Counter-intuitive normative assessments
My first objection is that accepting the standard account of development from the natural 
sciences has the consequence of justifying strongly counter-intuitive normative 
assessments. The kind of scenarios I have in mind are ones where the preformed 
instructions specify deviant norms we would not intuitively accept. In such cases 
epigenetic development follows the preformed instructions perfectly. So for instance, if the 
preformed instructions specify that Porky the piglet shoulde be born with one eye, one ear, 
and no curly tail, the appeal to development implies that this shoulde occur. But this is 
counter-intuitive. According to the norms of pig development Porky shoulde be bom with 
two eyes, two ears and a curly tail.
Furthermore, cases where preformed instructions specify something deviant from the 
norm for the species are not unusual. Most genetic diseases which affect development do 
so. Take Downs Syndrome for example. The syndrome is caused by the preformed 
instructions in the extra partial or complete copy of chromosome 21. So if preformed 
instructions specify what shoulde occur then according to this appeal Downs Syndrome 
shoulde occur.
Indeed, deviations from what is typical for the species are part-and-parcel of individual 
development. This is because change is a consistent feature of genomes. Indeed, genome 
copying introduces changes since it is imperfect and mistakes get through despite there
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being many different error correcting mechanisms. Moreover, in some circumstances these 
error-correcting systems are deliberately down-regulated.9 Another example is transposons. 
These are sections of the genome which move around the genome and can disrupt genomic 
functioning. (These transposable elements (transposons) code for enzymes that can 
haphazardly insert themselves into the genome.10) Then there are numerous external causes 
of genome change such as external chemical agents. These can either directly or indirectly 
alter the genome by altering base pairs or interfering with repair mechanisms. Another 
example is retroviruses which can act like transposons by inserting themselves in the host 
organisms’ genome and disrupt genomic functioning too. Consequently, there are cases, 
albeit rare ones, where the preformed instructions in the genome specify a process of 
development which is atypical or abnormal. Down’s Syndrome is one example. In this case 
there are three copies of chromosome 21 instead of two because of an error in cell-division 
which was not corrected.
Then there is also the effect of human agency to consider. For instance, genetic 
engineering alters organisms’ genomes and as a result the consequent preformed 
instructions specify something deviant from what has historically or typically occurred in 
that species. A genetically engineered cow may be able to excrete valuable proteins in her 
milk, but intuitively such a capability is not normal for the domesticated sow. Or a 
genetically engineered pig may in the future be able to produce organs which are suitable 
for transplanting into human beings, but again intuitively this is not normal for a 
domesticated pig.
9 "End of Evolution," New Scientist 174 (18 May 2002, 2002).
10 Voet, Voet, and Pratt, Fundamentals o f Biochemistry, 806.
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So how might one respond to such cases and preserve the appeal to development? 
There are a number of possibilities. One would be to deny our intuition concerning 
normative assessments. For instance, we might insist that Porky the piglet is not defective 
if she is born with one eye, one ear, and no curly tail if the preformed instructions specify 
these characteristics. Or we might insist that she is defective if she is born with two eyes, 
two ears, and a curly tail when the preformed instructions specify otherwise. In other 
words, one possibility would be to accept these counter-intuitive implications. However, as 
noted in the introduction, this would be an odd move to make since we are seeking to 
justify a set of normative assessments by an appeal to development, not to radically alter 
them.
Another possibility is to argue that something goes wrong when genomes alter. For 
instance, if the genome replication system fails to accurately replicate the genome such that 
a difference in development is specified.11 However, this is a difficult argument to sustain.
Genome change is an essential element of evolution. Indeed, on some accounts of
evolution genome change is evolution. For instance, as Griffiths and Gray note,
Open almost any biology textbook and you will find the following 
definition: Evolution is change in gene frequency. This definition reflects 
the conventional view of natural selection and the conventional view of 
heredity. Natural selection occurs because individuals vary, some of 
these variations are linked to differences in fitness, and some of those 
variants are heritable (Lewontin 1970). Because variants that are not 
heritable cannot play a role in natural selection, and because the 
mechanism is presumed to be genetic, evolution is defined as change in 
gene frequencies.12
11 Inaccurate replication of the genome does not necessarily bring about differences because of the 
redundancy built into the genetic code. For instance, if the DNA sequence triplet CCC was changed to CCA, 
and this error was not fixed, proline would still be produced if the triplet was translated.
12 Paul E. Griffiths and Russell D. Gray, "Darwinism and Developmental Systems," in Cycles of 
Contingency, ed. Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001), 
195. In text citation: Richard C. Lewontin, "The Units of Selection," Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 1 (1970).
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So if one is committed to the view that something goes wrong when genomes alter, one is 
also committed to the view that something goes wrong when organisms evolve, which is 
nonsensical.
Genomic change is necessary for organisms to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Arguably, this is a fundamental good for the organism and the species it belongs to. 
Moreover, to some extent the rate of genome change in the cells of organisms is under the 
cell’s control.13 For instance, in certain situations, such as cellular stress, the fidelity of 
error-correcting mechanisms is altered by the cell such that more errors are permitted in 
order to enable the genome to adapt.14
Furthermore, evidently we accept that genome change is good in some circumstances, 
such as where the change is adaptive. Indeed the evaluation of genome changes, on some 
basis, can change over time, especially evolutionary time. So while some genome change 
can be evaluated, on some basis, as being good (or bad) at time t\, at ^  (in the future) it can 
be evaluated as being bad (or good). For example, we might evaluate a genome change is 
being dysfunctional now (on some account of function), but in the future we might 
evaluate it as beingfunctional (or vice versa). It could even be the case that various 
genome changes are evaluated as being dysfunctional at tu functional at *2, and 
dysfunctional at £3.
However, much more plausible is the claim that genome change may be a source of 
abnormality. However, this implicitly brings into play an extra set of norms. Significantly, 
these are independent of what the genome specifies. They need to be in order to
131 am not using deliberately here in any intentional sense.
14 See for example "End of Evolution."
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differentiate which differences in development specified by the genome are abnormal and 
which are normal. Yet notice this moves us beyond the appeal to development to some 
other kind of appeal such as the appeal to typicality.
So we might be able to preserve the appeal to development by normatively evaluating 
genome changes and making some kind of assessment of whether they shoulde or shoulde 
not occur. For instance, we could distinguish between genome changes that are adaptive, 
functional, or good in contrast to genome changes that are maladaptive, dysfunctional or 
bad for the organisms. In such a case we could say that where the preformed instructions 
specify something maladaptive, dysfunctional or bad, these shoulde not occur, and where 
they specify something adaptive, functional or good that these shoulde occur.
But as noted above, the problem with this move is it changes what is being appealed to, 
to justify the normative assessments of living organisms. That is, we are no longer 
appealing to development—what the genome species—to justify normative assessments. 
Take for example our normative assessment of Porky. If she is born with one eye, one ear, 
and no curly tail we would assess her as being defective. But if we justify this assessment 
by saying she is defective because these characteristics are dysfunctional (in comparison to 
having two eyes and ears and a curly tail), we are no longer appealing to development. 
Consequently, changes in what is being appealed to mean that other objections come into 
play. For instance, if the justification for the claim that Porky is defective because having 
one eye, ear, and no curly tail is dysfunctional in some sense (in comparison to having two 
eyes, ears, and a curly tail), then all the objections to the appeal to functions discussed in 
chapter 4 apply. Furthermore, this move, and similar moves, seem to assume some notion 
of the organism’s good or flourishing which is implicit and unexplained.
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The same point applies to claims that the preformed instructions shoulde specify what 
is typical for the species at present or historically. In this case the causal system is not 
doing all the normative work; it is appeals to regularity per se or history, which I have 
already discussed, and the appeal to species, which I shall discuss in Chapter 6. And again 
my objections to these appeals come into play. Indeed the point applies to any second- 
order evaluation of development. Whatever drives the evaluation becomes the appeal 
which is used to justify it.
3.2 Insufficient preformation to justify normative assessments
My second objection to the appeal to development is that what is preformed is not
sufficient to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. That is, what is held to
be preformed in the genome alone does not fully and sufficiently specify what shoulde
occur.
To see why, take any living organism at the beginning of its developmental cycle and 
extract its genome. For pigs this would involve extracting the DNA from the zygote. Then 
sequence this genome precisely and represent it in some universal form such as in binary. 
Send it into space where hopefully eventually some advanced alien intelligence discovers 
it. Now if the representation of the pig genome provides instructions then the advanced 
alien intelligence ought to be able to reconstruct the pig. However, they could not, because 
they would need to know something of the system in which it was embedded. 
Fundamentally, an organism’s genome or representation thereof only has a particular 
meaning in specific context such as a pig cell or representation thereof.15 So to reconstruct 
the pig from the representation of the pig’s genome the alien intelligence would also need a 
representation of the context in which it was embedded. So clearly genomes only provide
15 Indeed, theoretically, the same instructions which specify the development of a pig in a pig cell, in a 
different context could specify the development of another organism or entity.
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preformed instructions for development in a suitable context. In the case of pigs, a pig 
genome only provides preformed instructions for the development of a pig if it is contained 
in a pig zygote.
Yet if the context is necessary, can it be claimed that the genome fully and sufficiently 
specifies what shoulde occur in development? Surely, the specification of what shoulde 
occur is a joint product of genome and context. Indeed, it is widely recognized within the 
discourse of genetic explanation that the gene operates within other elements in the system, 
such as the rest of the genome, the cellular context, and the broader environment. As Lisa 
Gannet says,
If there is one incontrovertible fact about genetic causation, it is that there 
are, strictly speaking, no “single gene” effects. All traits, no matter how 
simple, result from the interaction of many genes and the environment. It 
may seem trivial to assert that a trait can only be deemed ‘genetic’ only 
relative to a necessary background of genetic and nongenetic factors.
[Italics in original.]16
But if this is correct, this means that the genome alone is not sufficient to specify what 
shoulde occur. This completely undercuts the appeal to development as it stands because it 
is based on the assumption that the genome alone specifies what shoulde occur. Yet clearly, 
the genome alone does not specify what shoulde occur. Rather it is some particular 
combination of genome and the environment.
This said, I am sure that proponents of the predominant account of development would 
be happy to accept attributing causal responsibility to the interaction between genome and 
environment. However, this move has significant problems. For instance, it makes it 
difficult to attribute causal responsibility for what shoulde occur to genomic contributions. 
Moreover, it also undermines the appeal to development where this is understood in terms
16 Lisa Gannett, "What's in a Cause?: The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations," Biology and 
Philosophy 14 (1999): 350.
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of the predominant theory because this effectively claims that what shoulde occur is 
preformed in the genome. Finally, if development really is caused by both the genome and 
the environment, we are also left with the issue of justifying the evident privileging of 
genomic causal contributions over the environmental causal contributions in explanations 
of development.
Then there is the fact that similar genomes may give a wide variety of developmental 
outcomes in different environments. In such a case, there are problems in ascertaining what 
shoulde occur and consequently there are difficulties in sustaining the Normative 
Distinction. Of course, one could argue that the genome G specifies X  in some typical or 
historical environment E, but then we have all the problems with the appeals to typicality 
and history already noted.
Moreover, attributing causal responsibility in a causal system is pragmatic. For 
instance, a short circuit in a switch has the effect of creating sparks. However, the effect of 
creating a fire requires a fuel load and the presence of oxygen. The absence of any of the 
other elements means that the fire could not occur despite there being sparks. Yet typically 
we would say that where there is a short circuit creating sparks in the presence of a fuel 
load and oxygen creating a fire, the cause of the fire was the short-circuit. This is in spite 
of the fact that every causal element is required for a fire to occur. So it seems to me that 
the description of the cause of the fire is a pragmatic short-hand for describing the entire 
operation of the causal system.
Of course, one could make the case that in this example the switch’s short-circuit is the 
cause because it explains why fire occurred then and not before. This makes the attributing 
causal responsibility a function of our explanatory interests which can and do vary.
167
However, while it is a reasonable move it effectively makes attributing causal 
responsibility subjective. That is, persons with different explanatory interests may well 
attribute causal responsibility differently for the same effect in the (objective) causal 
system. Take our fire for example. An agent could attribute the cause of the fire to the 
failure of the fire suppression system which was meant to flood the area with non­
combustible nitrogen. Or another agent could attribute the cause of the fire to the fact 
combustible materials (fuel) were present near the switch, when in fact the plan for the 
building specified otherwise.
The problem with this is that it gives rise to multiple incompatible attributions of causal 
responsibility for outcomes, which are all equally true, assuming the causal system is 
correctly characterized. For instance, the cause of the fire above is equally the switch’s 
short-circuit, the failure of the fire suppression system, and the mistake in implementing 
the specification for the building. If it is the case that attributing causal responsibility is 
pragmatic and relative to specific explanatory interests, then it is somewhat arbitrary to 
attribute causal responsibility for development to the genome.
Clearly, this blunts the appeal to development for justifying the normative assessment 
of living organisms because there is no single justifiable source which specifies what 
shoulde occur. We are left with appealing to the environment and genome together to 
ascertain what shoulde occur. In this case we would say something like “organism DNA in 
pertinent developmental environments <2, b, c shoulde produce developmental outcome p, q, 
r, s.”
However, there are at least two significant problems with this move. The first is that it 
would involve justifying some rather counter-intuitive normative assessments. For
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instance, if we followed this line, we would be committed to claiming that the 
developmental malformations caused by the drug thalidomide shoulde occur. This is 
because all other things being equal, human DNA in a pertinent developmental 
environment b containing thalidomide produces malformations. Obviously, this is at odds 
with our intuitive normative assessments of such developmental outcomes.
The second problem with this move is that sustaining the Normative Distinction 
becomes problematic. This is because using multiple privileged elements to specify what 
shoulde occur weakens the Normative Distinction where the specifications of the elements 
differ or conflict. For instance, one element specifies that X shoulde occur, and another 
specifies that Y shoulde occur, we are then left with the problem of ascertaining what
1 n
ultimately shoulde occur—X, or Y? And using every element in the causal order to 
specify what shoulde occur dissolves the Normative Distinction entirely. This is because 
there could be no distinction between what shoulde occur and what occurs or may occur 
since it is the entire causal order that determines what occurs or may occur.
Take for example how the sex of American Alligators is determined. It is determined 
by nest temperatures during the middle third of embryonic development.18 Females are the 
outcome at temperatures below 31.5°C; mixed ratios are the outcome at 32°C; and males 
only are the outcome between 32.5-33°C. Decreasing numbers of males are the outcome as 
temperatures approach 35°C, and beyond 35°C, only females occur.19 The genome in this 
case does not specify what shoulde occur. Rather it is the joint product of the genome and
171 should note that the possibility or fact of moral conflict does not imply there are no moral truths. Neither 
does the possibility or fact of conflicting shoulde’s show that there are no true shoulde-statements. My point is 
in such cases we cannot adequately ascertain what shoulde occur and thus we cannot adequately justify 
normative assessments over and against alternatives. In other words if X shoulde occur at t\ and Y shoulde 
occur at t\, then what shoulde occur at t{! (I assume that X and Y are both true but mutually exclusive.)
18 "American Alligator." (Last Updated: February 12, 2001). Available at 
www.csc.noaa.gov/acebasin/specgal/gator.htm. Accessed: 30 December 2002.
19 "American Alligator."
the environment. Yet the specification does not distinguish between what shoulde occur 
and what actually does occur. We can only say ceteris paribus what the sex will be given a 
particular incubation temperature during the middle third of embryonic development. 
Indeed, arguably, there is no prior specification for what shoulde occur. That is, when the 
fertilized egg is laid we cannot say what sex shoulde occur until after the middle third of 
embryonic development.
This said, one could make the case that what the genome of the American Alligator 
specifies is female alligators. Note that it is only within a number of temperature ranges 
that male alligators are born but otherwise female alligators are born. So we could say that 
American Alligators shoulde be born female, but in some situations it is over-ruled by the 
context. But even if we accept that this is the case, the Normative Distinction cannot be 
adequately sustained unless the privileging of genomic causal contributions to 
development can be justified over and against contextual causal contributions to 
development. And to do this it would need to be demonstrated that one kind of contribution 
to the causal system of development is more significant or important than the other. I argue 
that this cannot be demonstrated. Indeed my third objection is that one cannot justify the 
privileging of one kind of contribution to the causal system of development over and 
against the other.
3.3 Insufficient justification for privileging genomic contributions to the causal system 
of development
My third objection to the appeal to development justifying the normative assessment of 
living organisms is that it relies upon the privileging of genomic contributions over and 
against other kinds of contributions to the causal system of development, but this 
privileging cannot be justified.
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The appeal to development claims that what shoulde occur is that which is preformed in 
the instructions in the genomes of living organisms. Clearly then it relies upon the 
privileging of genomic causal contributions to development over contextual ones because 
it is genomic contributions rather than anything else that specify what shoulde occur. 
However, I argue that there are at least three reasons derived from the facts of development 
which indicate that the privileging of genomic contributions over and against contextual 
contributions is not justified.
The first of these is that this privileging is not consistent with the acknowledged fact 
that the specification of what shoulde occur is the product of both genomic and contextual 
contributions to the developmental causal system. In other words, it is clear that the 
specification for what shoulde occur is the joint product of at least two necessary but 
insufficient kinds of contribution. The point is that one cannot objectively privilege one 
kind of contribution over the other since both are necessary, and therefore the implicit 
privileging of one over the other which occurs is not justified. Indeed, as I demonstrated in 
my second objection, the genome itself does not specify anything absent being embedded 
in a very particular context.
One might respond to this point by denying it and claiming instead that one can 
objectively privilege one kind of causal contribution to the causal system over the other. 
Take for example striking a match and it lighting. The natural answer to the question 
“What causes the ignition?” is “Striking the match.” This is despite the fact that for 
ignition there needs to be sufficient atmospheric O2 and a functional match (and for safety 
matches a suitable surface). Clearly, in this case there is some privileging of the striking 
contribution to the causal system over and against the other operational contributions.
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My rejoinder to this privileging is to point out that the natural answer to the question is 
a pragmatic description—a short-hand explanation of the ignition in question. To be 
precise, the ignition involved many different contributions to the causal system which were 
necessary for ignition to occur in this case. These include: (1) sufficient atmospheric O2;
(2) heat source (striking); and (3) easily ignitable material. So did the O2 cause the 
ignition? Yes, but in part, in conjunction with the other contributions. Did the easily 
ignitable material cause the ignition? Again yes, in conjunction with the other 
contributions. Finally, did striking the match cause the ignition? Yes, it did, but in 
conjunction with the other contributions to the causal system.
To explain the ignition one needs every element, but to use every element in an 
explanation is cumbersome. While we might privilege one contribution to the causal 
system over and against the others in an explanation to simplify it; this simplification does 
not warrant privileging that contribution as the basis of specifying what shoulde occur. So I 
am not denying that in explanations of development there may be good reasons to highlight 
one contribution over the other. But I am claiming that these reasons do not warrant the 
privileging of one kind of contribution over another for specifying what shoulde occur.
Take phenylketonuria (PKU) for example.
PKU is caused by a mutation in the gene for the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxlase—a 
key component in the metabolism of the amino acid phenylalanine. So essentially, PKU is 
the disease state caused by un-metabolized phenylalanine. Signs and symptoms include 
epilepsy, severe mental retardation, and behaviour problems in children, although the 
severity of these varies significantly.
20 Furthermore, this pragmatism is effectively subjective.
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Classically, the disease is treated by abstaining from foods containing phenylalanine.
So not surprisingly, PKU is the main example of the necessity of particular environments 
for some genetic diseases. Generally, the genetic mutation is given primary causal 
responsibility even though a particular environment is required. I admit that such an 
attribution seems obvious and natural because normally the presence of phenylalanine in 
the diet does not cause PKU. Yet clearly the genetic element in this case is only a 
necessary but not sufficient contribution, like the environmental element. So while it seems 
natural to highlight the genomic contribution over the contextual contributions to the 
disease, it does not follow that either kind of contribution ought to be privileged.
Indeed, in any known case, where one divides an account for a biological trait into 
genetic and environmental elements, one cannot state the genomic cause of a trait without 
implicitly stating the environmental causal context (or vice versa). All genomic causal 
contributions to a causal system rely on an environmental causal context. As Sarkar 
remarks,
It has usually gone unnoticed that, before whether some feature is genetic 
can be determined, what must be agreed upon is what it means to call 
something “genetic.” No technical result defines that term and, 
unfortunately, there is no easy way to define it. Resort to the usual 
philosophical strategies of definition -  for instance, the introduction of 
genes as necessary or sufficient conditions for the features, or an appeal 
to genetic causation -  is of little help. If it be suggested that a feature be 
called “genetic” if and only if some gene (or set of genes) is necessary 
for its genesis, virtually all organismic features would turn out to be 
genetic because of the simple fact that many genes that act during the 
earliest stages of embryonic development are always necessary for the 
continued development of the embryo. If it be suggested that a feature is 
“genetic” if and only if some gene (or set of genes) is sufficient for its 
genesis, nothing would turn out to be genetic because any gene can act 
only in suitable (biochemical or developmental) environments.21
21 Sahotra Sarkar, Genetics and Reductionism (Cambridge, 1998), 4.
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This point tends to be forgotten because a minimal environmental causal context is 
generally assumed and placed without acknowledgement into the background.22
In the case of PKU we could argue that it is environmentally caused given a particular 
genetic causal context. In other words, we can say the presence of phenylalanine in the diet 
of human beings will cause PKU in the context of a mutation in the phenylalanine 
hydroxylase gene in the genome of a human being. Or we could equally argue that PKU is 
genetically caused given a particular environmental context. That is, we can say the 
presence of a mutation in phenylalanine hydroxlase gene in the genome of human beings in 
the context of the presence of phenylalanine in their diet will cause PKU.
The second reason why the privileging of genomic causal contributions to development 
over and against contextual causal contributions is not justified is that such privileging is 
not consistent with the fact that control of development is distributed between genomic and 
contextual contributions. We could only privilege genomic contributions to development 
over environmental contributions if the former were solely responsible for the control of 
development.24 That is, if genomic causal contributions provided the only organizational 
form and force for development. For instance, if they were the only means for organizing 
the assembly of the various components involved in development. But if both contribute 
then surely both have some responsibility.
On the other hand, the claim that genomic causal contributions to developmental 
systems specify development does have some prima facie plausibility. DNA specifies
22 See Gannett, "What's in a Cause?: The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations." for an excellent 
discussion of this point.
23 Generally, only the latter locution is used, and genetic explanation is reified compared to environmental 
explanation.
24 The reason one would privilege control of development is that this determines the outcome of the process.
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RNA and RNA specify proteins which are the building blocks of the cell. Indeed, the 
Central Dogma of Molecular Biology which claims that information flows only one way 
from DNA to protein gives further credibility to the claim since information and thus 
control flows one way.
However, clearly genomic causal contributions to development are not solely 
responsible for the control of development. One can point to a number of examples of non- 
genomic control of development. For instance, bithorax mutants of Drosophila may be 
caused either by an environmental or a genomic contribution—respectively the 
introduction of the volatile liquid ether into the developmental environment, or a change in 
the DNA. Then there is the example of the determination of the sex of American Alligators 
already discussed. In fact, control of development is widely distributed between and within 
genomic and contextual contributions.
A possible rejoinder to these points is that the genome controls the majority of 
development in comparison to the environment. That is, one could also privilege genomic 
contributions to development over contextual contributions to development if the former 
were mostly responsible for the control of development. But this is not the case either. For 
instance, the evidence shows that the genome is controlled by the intra and extra-cellular 
environments it is embedded within.
The third and final reason why the privileging of genomic causal contributions to 
development over and against contextual contributions is not justified is that this 
privileging is not consistent with the fact that inheritance in development extends beyond 
the genome.
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I admit that one could privilege genomic causal contributions to development over and 
against contextual contributions if only the former are inherited and thus significant in an 
evolutionary sense. Indeed, typically the only thing that is recognized in developmental 
and evolutionary biology as being heritable are genes. The reason why is well-stated by 
Dawkins:
The special status of genetic factors is deserved for one reason only: 
genetic factors replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic 
do not.25
It is in this process of replication, particularly the replication of genes between generations, 
that genes are heritable. The crux of heritability is that only entities with heritable traits are 
evolutionarily significant because only heritable traits are subject to natural selection and 
therefore the process of evolution. Indeed, because genes are the only entities that are 
typically recognised as being heritable, evolution is often defined in terms of changes of 
gene frequencies in populations.
However, it is not the case that only genes are inherited in development. At the 
beginning of development an organism inherits a number of variable developmental 
resources—both genetic and non-genetic. Indeed, most living organisms go to a great deal 
of effort to ensure their offspring inherit roughly the same developmental resources as they 
did. Salmon are the obvious example. Salmon go to a great deal of effort to breed and lay 
their eggs in the same part of the river they originated from. Presumably, this is because 
the fact that the parent or parents have survived to reproduce is due, at least in part, to the 
specific developmental resources they received.
25 Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype : The Long Reach of the Gene (Oxford ; New York, 1999), 99.
26 The point is not affected by the fact that salmon are, in some sense, genetically programmed to go a 
particular part of the river. If Dawkins is correct, it is genes controlling the ‘robot’ Salmon body which go to 
a great deal of effort to ensure they are placed in a particular environmental context. The evolutionary logic is 
that if they have survived to reproduce then clearly the environment they were placed in was conducive to 
survival. Unless luck played a role of course.
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So many different kinds of developmental resource are inherited in some sense from
generation to generation in numerous cycles in that lineage of organisms. Commenting on
this point, Griffiths and Gray note:
Development frequently requires gravity or sunlight or, for a hermit crab, 
a supply of discarded shells from other species. These factors are 
unaffected by the activities of past generations of the species that rely on 
them. Nevertheless, the organism must position itself so that these factors 
interact with it and play their usual role in development. While the 
evolving lineage cannot make these resources, it can still make them part 
of its developmental system. It is uncontroversial to describe these
9 7
resources as playing a role in development.
Furthermore, genes are not the only resource for development that provides heritable
variations within lineages. These are the variations needed for evolution to occur through
natural selection. While it is true that genes provide heritable variations within lineages, it
is also true that other developmental resources can also provide heritable variations. For
example, a particular population of a species that lives in the same location from
generation to generation inherits a particular relationship to the climate of that location,
which in turn may have an effect upon development. However, over time, especially over
considerable lengths of time, this climate is going to vary with consequences concomitant
to the kind of contribution climate makes to development in this population of a species
and their evolution. Furthermore, climates can vary between locations. Thus for different
populations of the same species, there can be reliably perpetuated differences between the
different populations in these places. For instance,
Many nongenetic resources are reliably passed on across the generations. 
Variations in these resources can be passed on, causing changes in the 
life cycle of the next generation. It is still more puzzling to find many of 
these very phenomena discussed, and their evolutionary significance 
recognised [in the light of the popular view that only genetic factors are 
inherited and of evolutionary significance] ... 28
27 Griffiths and Gray, "Darwinism and Developmental Systems," 196.
28 Griffiths and Gray, "Darwinism and Developmental Systems," 196.
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Or to take another example, virtually all adult mice that live in the London 
Underground have stumpy tails.29. No doubt this is due to the environmental exigencies of 
life in the Underground, where there are many opportunities to reduce tail length by 
accident. The point of course is that these environmental exigencies are reliably inherited 
in these mice’s life cycle.30 In other words, these exigencies are a consistent part of 
Underground mice from generation to generation, and will be for as long as the trains run 
on the Underground.
At the outset of development underground mice both inherit a genome and an 
environment. Both are reliably present in successive generations and explain (at least in 
part) why each generation resembles the previous one. Both reliably affect development. 
Tails are reliably amputated by the environment. Coat colour is reliably determined 
according to genetic specification.
One might reply to this point by noting that non-genomic developmental resources are 
not selected themselves and so are not subject to evolution. Consequently we could 
privilege genomic developmental resources on the basis that only they are subject to 
evolution in contrast to non-genomic developmental resources. I suppose we could 
privilege genomic resources on this basis. However, it does not follow from the fact that 
non-genomic developmental resources are not selected themselves and are not subject to 
evolution by natural selection that they are insignificant biologically (or indeed to the
29 The example is inspired and partly drawn from Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information, 2nd ed. 
(2000), 46-48.
301 realise that ‘reliable’ and London Underground do not sit comfortably together. Perhaps better would be 
‘reliable enough’ to cause stumpy tails in all adult mice living in the Underground. My point is that the 
concept of inheritance can be applied to any cause in development which is reliably present in successive 
generations which explains in part why each generation resembles the previous one. See Griffiths and Gray, 
"Darwinism and Developmental Systems," 196.
process of evolution). Broadly, any developmental resource that affects the fitness of an 
organism from generation to generation is significant in evolution, especially the evolution 
of that organism. And clearly, non-selected non-genomic developmental resources affect 
the fitness of organisms. The climate is one such example.
3.4 A radical epigeneticism
My fourth objection to the appeal to ontogeny to justify the normative assessment of living 
organisms is that development is radically epigenetic. Or in other words, my objection is 
that there is no preformation in the development of living organisms. Consequently, there 
is no way to sustain the Normative Distinction since it is some preformed element—the 
genome—which specifies what shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or may occur. It 
differs significantly from my other objections in that it rejects the present consensus view 
on how development is to be explained. So it is likely to be contentious.
I ought to note that my argument against the appeal to ontogeny does not depend upon 
this objection. I take it that the appeal to ontogeny fails if any of my three previous 
objections are correct. However, I discuss and consider radical epigeneticism because I 
happen to believe it is true. Moreover, while it is a minority and contentious view within 
developmental biology—the textbooks on the subject do not even discuss it—it does have 
considerable standing in the philosophy of science literature, particularly in the guise of 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST).
The radical epigeneticism I discuss and advocate here has its origins in the book The
31Ontogeny o f Information, written by the philosopher of biology Susan Oyama. This is
31 Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information.
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intended as a contribution to the debate over whether the development of human nature is 
largely due to nature or nurture, genes or environmental, biology or culture etc.
Her advocacy of a radical epigenetic account of development as a contribution to the 
debate over the development of human nature ought not to be surprising. I noted the 
connections between the explanation of development and the debates concerning the 
explanation of human nature above. First, the idea that development is explained by 
preformed instructions in genes neatly parallels the claim that human traits are explained 
by instructions in genes, which exist at the beginning of human development. Second, the 
idea that development is explained by epigenetic assembly is close to the idea that human 
traits are explained by interactions with the environment. And finally, the modern 
consensus explanation of development mirrors the modern consensus explanation of 
human nature. Development is explained by both epigenesis and preformation. Likewise, 
human nature is explained by genes and the environment, nature and nurture.
However, as I have already noted, it is generally accepted that development is caused 
by both nature and nurture—preformation and epigenesis. Moreover, the claim that 
development and human nature is explained by both nature and nurture seems to be 
obviously true. Consequently, one ought to ask, why does Oyama reject this view?
In short, Oyama rejects this view because she has an objection to preformationism. 
Specifically she has an objection to preformationism because it implies an ontology which 
separates form and matter, and advocates the idea that form precedes instantiation in 
organisms.32
32 Oyama, The Ontogeny o f Information, 1.
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So rather than preformation explaining how form comes about in the organism, she
proposes that epigenesis explains it. This is made clear in the following. She states:
... it is ontogenesis, the inherently orderly but contingent coming into 
being, that expresses what is essential about the emergence of pattern and 
form without trapping us in infinite cognitive regress (where was the 
pattern before it got here?). A proper view of ontogeny, however, that 
doesn’t simply resolve into one of the old ones, requires that the idea of 
ontogenesis not only apply to bodies and minds, but to information, 
plans, and all the other cognitive-causal entities . . . 33
The cognitive-causal entities that Oyama refers to are entities that impart design and
function to material. Examples include information, plans, or programmes, and in the
context of living organisms, genes are exemplars par excellence. As she notes,
The discovery of DNA and its confirmation of a gene theory that had 
long been in search of its material agent offered an enormously attractive 
apparent solution to the puzzle of the origin and perpetuation of living 
form. A material object housed in every part of the organism, the gene 
seemed to bridge the gap between inert matter and design; in fact, genetic 
information, by virtue of the meanings of in-formation as “shaping” and 
as “animating,” promised to supply just the cognitive and causal 
functions needed to make a heap of chemicals into a being.34
Clearly, the intuition behind the idea that genes are cognitive-causal entities is the
preformationist one, where material objects require design and function to be imparted to
them because they are separate from material and exist prior to any embodiment (in
material).
In place of preformation, Oyama argues that epigenesis is applicable to these cognitive
causal entities, such as genes. This means that
Developmental information itself, in other words, has a developmental 
history. It neither pre-exists its operations nor arises from random 
disorder. It is neither necessary, in an ultimate sense, nor a function of 
pure chance, though contingency and variation to its formation and 
function. Information is a difference that makes a difference (G. Bateson,
33 Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information, 3.
34 Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information, 14.
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1972, p. 315), and what it “does” or what it means is thus dependent on 
what is already in place and what alternatives are being distinguished.35
So for instance, information about an organism’s form comes to exist in the process of
development rather than being prior to it. Regarding this point, Oyama claims:
It is my contention that developmental information does “develop,” not 
by special creation from nothing, but always from the conditional 
transformation of prior structure—that is by ontogenetic processes.
Depending on the level of analysis, such transformation can be described 
as resulting from interactions among entities, such as cells or organisms, 
or from interactions within an entity, such as an embryo or family. Since 
sets of interactants can be at least partially nested, a change in focus is 
sufficient to shift from one perspective to the next.
So while it is true that information exists at every point in development it is not pre­
existing information fo r  a particular form, although in retrospect it would appear that way.
Therefore, in claiming that sources of form, such as developmental information, do not 
pre-exist their operations, Oyama rejects the preformationist assumptions concerning the 
origin of form in organisms. If sources of form do not exist before their operations then 
there is no prior instance of the form to explain the subsequent form in the organism. In 
other words, what Oyama is rejecting is the idea for instance that there is a blueprint or 
plan in acorns for causing adult oak trees. Whatever ‘form’ there is only comes to be in and 
after the processes of development.
Essentially, Oyama’s claim is that it is epigenesis all the way down—even to the level 
of information. Consequently, if her ontogeny of information thesis is correct, then there is 
no place for preformation within development at any level, including the genetic where it 
currently resides.
35 Oyama, The Ontogeny o f Information, 3. In text citation: G. Bateson, Steps towards and ecology of the 
mind (New York, 1972).
36 Oyama, The Ontogeny o f Information, 4.
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However, the significant point is that, if Oyama is correct, it would mean we could not 
appeal to development to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. This is 
because there could be no developmental outcome that shoulde occur in contrast to what 
actually does occur. For instance, the natural sciences could not appeal to development to 
justify the normative assessment “Porky the new-born piglet is defective,” where she is 
born with one eye, two legs, and no tail. This is because if she is right, there is no 
preformed information for Porky being born with two eyes, four legs, and a tail. 
Information on Oyama’s account only comes to be in the process of development, but not 
prior to it. Consequently, one cannot ascertain what shoulde occur in development and the 
Normative Distinction cannot be sustained.
Given that this or any radical epigeneticism is opposed to the modern consensus view 
why ought we consider it? As noted above, while it is a minority view with developmental 
biology, such views are gaining traction, particularly in the philosophy of biology. For 
instance, Developmental Systems Theory (DST) is in the forefront of philosophical debate 
concerning development.
DST builds upon, expands, and advances Oyama’s work in the Ontogeny of 
Information, and she is a central figure within it. DST is an alternative to orthodox general 
theoretical frameworks on development, heredity, and evolution. It has been built from a 
wide range of theoretical and practical disciplinary perspectives, which include animal 
behaviour and psychobiology, genetics, developmental biology, and molecular biology.37 
Moreover, it cannot be identified with a single person or within a single school of thought,
37 See n.3 Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, "Introduction: What Is Developmental 
Systems Theory?," in Cycles of Contingency, ed. Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001), 9. for references
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notwithstanding its connection to Oyama’s work.38 Furthermore, DST and developmental 
systems theorists draw on work and thinkers who would not be considered or consider 
themselves to be part of the movement.39
However, the main reason I believe one ought to accept a radical epigenetic account of 
development, such as DST, is that it provides a better explanation of development than the 
present orthodoxy. That is, I contend that DST provides explanations which are better 
representations of what is going on in development—better in the sense of being more 
truthful. For example, in orthodox theories traits are thought to be the joint product of two 
kinds of developmental causal contributions—typically classified as genomic (or genetic) 
and environmental contributions. Part of the rationale for this division is that genomic or 
genetic causal contributions are heritable but environmental contributions are not. Yet as I 
have shown this is rationale is not correct. Furthermore, such a classification is crude. For 
instance, it does not acknowledge the multiple kinds of environmental contributions 
operating in developing systems at different times and at different levels of abstraction. 
DST recognizes these points. It recognizes that environmental traits may be heritable, and 
it eschews this division between gene/genome and environment. Indeed, it insists that traits 
have multiple contributions from many developmental resources, and that these can be 
classified and thought of in a number of ways.
This said, even if one is unconvinced that a radical epigenetic account of development 
is correct, I take it that the other three objections provide sufficient reasons to deny that the 
natural sciences may appeal to development to justify the normative assessment of living 
organisms.
38 Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, "Introduction: What Is Developmental Systems Theory?," 2.
39 Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2001).
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4. Conclusion
The appeal to development to justify the normative assessment of living organisms in 
essence is the appeal to the causal system responsible for development to sustain the 
Normative Distinction. In the course of this chapter I have argued that such an appeal fails 
for four reasons.
The first is that the appeal as it stands justifies unintuitive normative evaluations. If we 
accept the appeal to development as it stands, then we are forced to justify unintuitive 
normative assessments such as “Porky the piglet shoulde be born with one eye, one ear, and 
no curly tail,” if this is what the preformed instructions specify shoulde occur. 
Consequently, it seems to me that there is something seriously amiss with this appeal. 
Therefore, either we are forced to give up on our intuitions surrounding normative 
assessment, or we ought to reject the appeal as being unsatisfactory.
The second reason the appeal to development fails is because what is held to be 
preformed alone does not specify what shoulde occur and thus sustain the Normative 
Distinction. The appeal to development to justify normative assessments assumes that what 
is preformed in the genome is sufficient to specify what shoulde occur. In other words, it 
assumes that one can determine from the genome alone what is preformed and therefore 
what shoulde occur. However, this is false.
The meaning of the genome is determined by both the genome and the environments it 
is embedded in, and the interaction between them. That is, we cannot say what is 
preformed in the genome without also specifying the contexts it is part of and how they 
interact. For example, we cannot say what sex is preformed in the genome of the American
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Alligator because this requires a specific interaction between the genome and the 
environment during the middle third of embryonic development.
The problem with this is that it effectively dissolves the Normative Distinction. This is 
because drawing upon the genome and the environments it is embedded in, and the 
interactions between them to specify what shoulde occur, means there is no distinction 
between what shoulde occur and what actually does occur. The interaction between the 
genome and the environments it is embedded in within development is the operation of the 
causal order. It determines what occurs.
My opponents might respond by saying “I agree that it is not that the genome alone that 
specifies what shoulde occur in development, but the genome in a specific environment.” 
For instance, this could be the typical or historical environment. But the developmental 
system is the genome in a specific environment. Consequently, specifying the genome and 
environment determines the outcome of the developmental system, which in turn 
effectively begs the question concerning what shoulde occur.
One might escape this charge if one could justify a particular environment over and 
against the alternatives. For instance, the ancestral environment is one obvious contender. 
Yet if my objections to the appeal to history are correct then the choice of this environment 
is not justified over and against the alternatives. Moreover, to assume the ancestral 
environment without justification begs the question concerning what shoulde occur.
The third reason the appeal to development fails is because the necessary privileging of 
genomic contributions to a developmental causal system to sustain the Normative 
Distinction obviously cannot be justified. As it stands, the appeal relies upon privileging
genomic contributions to sustain the Normative Distinction. This is because the Normative 
Distinction dissolves if other kinds of contributions are also involved in specifying what 
shoulde occur. That is, if both genomic and other kinds of contribution were involved in 
specifying what shoulde occur, then there would be no difference between what shoulde 
occur and what occurs or may occur. Yet clearly, development is caused by both the 
genomic and the environmental contributions.
Moreover, there is also no objective justification for privileging any kind of 
contribution over another. This is apparent particularly in the fact that every contribution in 
development is necessary but insufficient for its effects. The evident privileging is purely 
pragmatic.
The fourth and final reason the appeal fails is that the present consensus account of 
development is arguably false. That is the model that development is preformed in the 
genes and instantiated epigentically is incorrect. Rather every aspect of development, 
including information occurs via epigenetic processes. If correct, the appeal fails because 
development cannot sustain the Normative Distinction.
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Chapter 6: Why the appeal to species does not work
1. Introduction
The claim I am going to defend in this chapter is that the natural sciences cannot justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms by an appeal to species concepts. In other words, 
I argue that the natural sciences cannot appeal to the fact that living organisms belong to a 
particular species to justify normative assessments.
I realise this is a bold claim. The appeal to some kind of species concept to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms is pervasive in human discourse. Indeed, 
arguably, the most common kind of normative assessment is a comparison between a token 
living organism and a species type. For instance, take my standard normative assessment 
“Porky the piglet is defective [because'she was born with one eye, one ear, and no curly 
tail].” The most natural way to read this is as a comparison between Porky and some kind 
of set designated by the term ‘piglet’.
What underpins such assessments are some supposed relationships between the token 
and type such that the token shoulde have the pertinent characteristics of the type. In the 
case of Porky, it is supposed that there is a relationship between Porky and her species 
such that Porky shoulde have the characteristics of the species. Specifically, she shoulde 
have two eyes, two ears, and a curly tail.
Yet despite the fact that such appeals to species are common, I maintain that they 
ultimately fail. Broadly I argue they fail because there is at least one of four objections 
which may be levelled at this appeal. These are as follows:
Objection #1: The implicit or explicit ontology of the natural sciences is 
incompatible with the species concept being appealed to.
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Consequently, one cannot appeal to such notions of the 
concept on pain of ontological incoherence.
Objection #2: There are many different concepts of species, but no 
single concept of function can be objectively justified 
over and against the alternatives. Consequently, there are 
many different even contradictory normative assessments 
which are justified by an appeal to the concept of species.
Objection #3: For some concepts of species there are various parameters 
which require some specification but no specification can 
be objectively justified over and against alternatives. So 
there are many different and even contradictory 
normative assessments which are equally justified by an 
appeal to such concepts of species.
Objection #4: The species concept being appealed to is not normative.
Therefore, one cannot appeal to such concepts to justify 
normative assessments of living organisms.
Of course, these objections are essentially the same as the objections levelled against the 
appeal to functions. So again, together, these objections amount to the claim that presently 
at least there is no tenable appeal to species which adequately justifies the normative 
assessment of living organisms.40 By now, these objections should be extremely familiar 
and perhaps deserving of some labels. We could respectively call them the: 1. 
Incompatibility Objection; 2. The Pluralism Objection; 3. The Parameter Objection; and 4. 
The Normative Objection.
40 There may be some account of species that is compatible with a proposed ontology of the natural sciences 
that is normative and provides a single set of determinate and coherent normative evaluations which I am 
unaware of. This is a limitation of my thesis.
I ought to note that while the appeal to species is closely akin to the appeal to 
phylogeny they are not the same. Phylogeny is typically understood as the process of the 
development of species of living organisms through time.41 So the appeal to phylogeny is 
the appeal to the processes which bring species into existence. In contrast, the appeal to 
species is the appeal to the consequences of these processes. This said I do in effect 
examine the appeal to phylogeny because there are concepts of species based upon 
phylogeny. Not surprisingly, I argue that the appeal to phylogeny fails too to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms.
2. Species Concepts
As noted in the introduction, the appeal to species in the normative assessment of living
42organisms is pervasive. However, it is not apparent that such appeals are ambiguous. This 
is because the concept and its use in discourses are extremely diverse, especially in 
scientific discourse. For instance, in scientific discourse species are conceived in terms of 
sets, classes, individuals, and relations.
So there are at least four basically different ways of thinking about the ontology of 
species.43 This means that without clarification an appeal to species could be an appeal to a 
number of very different notions. So here is an overview of the different ways species are 
conceived. I ought to note that my discussion is not intended to provide a full and complete
41 It is usually contrasted with ontogeny. The point is to highlight that the development of living organisms 
occurs at different levels over time. To simplify, the latter is at an individual level, whereas the former is at 
some kind of corporate level.
42 At the outset, I wish to acknowledge my debt to David N. Stamos’ work The Species Problem in the 
following discussion of concepts of species. As we shall see, the concept is a complicated one, and I have 
benefited immensely from the map of the territory he provides. Indeed, I am sympathetic to his account and 
argument in the book for the view that species are real complex biosimilarity relations, although pace 
Stamos, I would contend that species and the concept species are plural, and reject his arguments that they 
are not.
43 David N. Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology 
(Lexington, 2003), 285.
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description of the various ways species are conceived. For instance, I do not discuss every 
species concept which falls under the categories below. Nor is it intended to criticize or 
justify any particular conception of species.
2.1 Species Nominalism
Species nominalism is the claim that “... biological species are not real, that they have no 
objective reality outside the mind, that they are ultimately arbitrary, man-made groupings 
of individual organisms conventionally bracketed together by general names for the 
purpose of linguistic convenience.”44
Apparently, it is not a popular view of species in either scientific or ordinary discourse. 
For instance, moral claims to preserve particular species, or to institute particular species- 
specific welfare practices are not generally thought to be based on some figment of human 
imagination. I suggest that this is because the intent and belief behind most appeals to 
species are intended as appeals to real entities.45
Yet species nominalism needs to be considered despite its unpopularity. Stamos 
suggests there are at least four reasons why it ought to be. The first one he proposes is that 
one cannot observe a species—only purported examples of members of species.46 In other 
words, he suggests that we cannot directly observe a type, only ostensible tokens of a type. 
That is, one cannot say for certain that what is being observed genuinely is a token of some 
type unless one begs the question concerning the reality of the type.
44 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 31.
45 This is irrespective of whether the intention and belief is ultimately justifiable.
46 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 31.
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The second reason is that species realists have come up with a number of different and 
incompatible theories of what species are.47 Evidently, they cannot agree which one is 
correct, or true, and how to resolve the disagreement, and even the contradictions between 
them.
However, arguing from “We cannot agree about X” to “There is not viable concept of 
X” is not a strong argument. One side of the argument could be wrong and as yet this 
cannot be determined. Furthermore, while the failure to justify a particular real species 
concept provides at least prima facie evidence that species are not real, it is not the only 
possible inference. For instance, they could be real and plural. If this is the case, they have 
no tenable means to objectively resolve disagreements between them. This is significant 
because then the appeal to species could equally justify contradictory normative 
assessments. For instance, where the appeal to species concept Si justifies normative 
assessment A, and appeal to species concept S2 justifies normative assessment not-A.
The third reason why species nominalism ought to be considered is that ontologically it 
is the most parsimonious solution to the problem of the nature of species.48 Of course, this 
assumes that parsimony is desirable, and typically it is, given Occam’s Razor. Yet one 
ought to be careful to note that Occam’s point is that entities ought not be multiplied 
beyond what is necessary to explain. It certainly is not the case that the simplest possible 
ontology is always the correct one.
The final reason why species nominalism ought to be considered is that it is a position 
which a few people have adopted.49 They have reasons for doing so which are at least
47 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 31.
48 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 31.
49 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 31.
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plausible prima facie, and thus this view needs to be considered, despite the fact species 
nominalists are apparently in the minority. Examples of species nominalists within the 
sciences of biology include: J. S. L. Gilmour, Benjamin Burma, and Alan Shaw.50
2.2 Species as Classes
Classes are real objective abstractions of various kinds.51 However, given that the term 
‘class’ may be understood in a number of ways, I take it that it is important to briefly 
describe what I mean when I use the term. When I use ‘class’, I am referring to an 
intensionally defined or conceived abstraction. For instance, the class PIG defined by ‘the 
animals in Farmer Brown’s North Field’ is intensionally conceived. In the world I am 
referring to, presently these are the four sows: Porky, Bacon, Brawn, and Trotters. Last 
year there were four sows: Grunt, Squeek, Squeal, and Snort. The class is abstract in the 
sense that its constitution is independent of particular animals. That is it does not matter 
who or how many pigs live in Farmer Brown’s North Field. Yet the class is still real—at 
least as long as Farmer Brown’s field exists.
In contrast, when I use ‘set’ I am referring to extensionally defined objects— 
collections—which by nature are concrete or particular. For instance, the set PIG this year 
are the individuals Porky, Bacon, Brawn, and Trotters. And the set PIG last year are the 
individuals Grunt, Squeek, and Snort. So the set PIG has changed between this year and 
last year. Probably the most important difference between sets and classes on this view of 
these concepts is that the latter must have common (nontrivial) properties in common, 
whereas, the former may, but need not. In other words, a set may be an arbitrary collection 
of objects, but a class cannot be.
50 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 74-97.
51 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 99.
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There have been a number of different kinds of class which have been proposed to 
account for the species concept. These include: species as elementary classes (of some 
sort); species as cluster classes; and even species as abstract classes, such as ecological 
niches.
Species as defined by a common genetic essence is an example of a species as an 
elementary class. The idea in this case is that species are defined according to a set of 
common genetic properties which every member shares. So an individual organism is a 
member of a particular species because it shares the requisite genetic properties or 
properties with all other members.
Another example of a class used to define a species concept are cluster classes. They 
differ from essential genetic classes in that they are, as Stamos puts it, “loosely 
essentialistic.” While there is a criterion which defines the class, there is no single property 
or a set of properties from the criterion, which is necessary or sufficient for membership. 
All that is required to be a member is possession of certain properties or sets of properties, 
within the set, which fulfil some minimum quorum. For instance, consider a set of 
organisms O, which potentially may have the following properties: (a, b, c, d, e,f, g) with a 
minimum quorum of four properties. E.g. O: Oi = (a, b, c, d, g); O2 = (a, b, c, e); O3 = (c, 
d, e,j)\ O4 = (a, c, e,f, g); O5 = (a, c, d, e, g); 06 = (b , e,f, g). There are no properties or 
single set of properties common to all yet there are various clusters of shared properties 
such as a and c.
Finally, we come to the notion of species as abstract classes defined by ecological 
niche. That is, a particular ecological niche defines a particular species, notwithstanding 
that there may be significant morphological and or behavioural differences between
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individual living organisms which occupy the same niche. Take for instance, the apex 
predator ecological niche. An apex predator is the predator at the top of a particular food 
chain. In essence, apex predators are organisms which are not preyed upon in their adult 
form. In other words, no other kind of living organism hunts apex predators as their 
primary source of food, although apex predators may kill each other for other reasons. 
Examples include, Lions, Tigers, Great White Sharks, Killer Whales, Crocodiles, 
Alligators, Pythons, Boa Constrictors, and Eagles.52
Niches are abstractions in the sense they are not constituted by their members at any 
point in time. That is they designate collections of individuals which change over time, but 
while membership changes, the niche itself does not change. For instance, over 
evolutionary time, apex predators have changed significantly, but the niche itself has not. 
For instance, once upon a time, an apex predator upon land was Tyrannosaurus Rex, 
whereas today an apex predator is Panthera leo.
Moreover, interestingly, I believe a case can be made for the view that Foot’s life form  
concept in Natural Goodness is a kind of abstract class very much akin to an ecological 
niche.53 Specifically, life forms are abstractions precisely in the same way ecological 
niches are abstractions. That is, they are not constituted by their members at any point in 
time. In other words, while membership of the life form changes over time, the life form 
itself does not change. Moreover, the propositions which describe niches such as ‘apex 
predator’ are logically unquantifiable in precisely the same way as the propositions which
52 Occasionally, different apex predators do try and turn another apex predator into a meal, but this is rare, 
probably because it is so dangerous and in the long-term damaging to fitness. For instance, where there is a 
long association of apex predators they tend to move in different circles even if they prey on the same 
animals. E.g. Killer Whales and Great White Sharks. However, where there is a more recent association the 
attempts are more common. E.g. non-native Boa Constrictors released in the Florida Everglades are known to 
try and kill Alligators, who are the native apex predator. Unfortunately, for Boa Constrictors at least, success 
is often fatal.
53 Foot, Natural Goodness, especially Chap. 2 pp. 25-37.
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describe life forms are unquantifiable: they do not speak of individuals, although they can; 
nor do they predicate something that is true of every apex predator. For instance, apex 
predators do not have predators predating upon them, but Allie the Alligator was predated 
by Peter the Python. Furthermore, in order to understand niches one must also understand 
the particular context of the niche. In other words, we cannot understand any particular 
apex predator unless we know something of its natural history. This parallels Foot’s claim 
that in order to understand the propositions which define life forms one needs to look at the 
context, or in Thompson’s terms, the originator of the concept of life form, “... the natural - 
history account of the life form  or species: of how creatures of this kind live.”54 Now if 
these similarities bear up, I believe a good case can be made for the notion that the life 
form can be understood in terms of the natural sciences.
2.3 Species as Individuals
The origin of the conception of a species as individuals is attributed to Michael Ghiselin’s 
1966 paper ‘On Psychologism in the Logic of Taxonomic Controversies’, which appeared 
in Systematic Zoology.55 Yet, it is his 1974 paper, ‘A Radical Solution to the Species 
Problem’ that initiated the movement.56 But as Stamos notes, Ghiselin does not claim that 
his view is original; rather he claims that all he has done is made explicit what biologists 
and naturalists have held implicitly in their practice and writings for some two hundred
57years.
Although Ghiselin is credited with originating the conception, the view is also 
normally linked to its other principle proponent: the philosopher of biology David Hull.
54 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28.
55 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 181. See: 
Michael T. Ghiselin, "On Psychologism in the Logic of Taxonomic Controversies," Systematic Zoology 15 
(1966).
56 Michael T. Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974). It is this 
paper that is most commonly cited in relation to the origin of the species as individuals view.
57 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 181.
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Indeed, his first papers on the subject, ‘Are Species Really Individuals?’ and ‘A Matter of 
Individuality’, published respectively in 1976 and 1978 in Systematic Zoology and the 
Philosophy o f Science, are usually cited in conjunction with Ghiselen’s 1974 article, when 
the view is discussed.58
Interestingly, this view of species is presently the predominant one within the sciences 
of biology. This is despite the fact it is a radical departure from how species hitherto 
typically have been conceived within human discourses. That is, the ‘species as individual’ 
conception of species differs quite significantly from common intuitions concerning 
species. Take the following case. In the 24th century, humanity discovers complex life on 
another planet in the universe. Amazingly they have pigs. That is they have organisms that 
in every respect have the same properties as the species Sus scrofa, except they originated 
on another planet. What species name would we give them? I take it that if we asked 
everyday folks on the street what scientific name they would give them they would name 
them Sus scrofa too, perhaps adding another name to distinguish their origin—i.e. Sus 
scrofa alienus. But according to the species as individual view, these pigs from another 
species would be an entirely different species because they are from a separate 
evolutionary lineage. They would give an entirely different name. Indeed we can see this in 
cases where animals are discovered in different ecosystems which look like and or play a 
similar role to already known animals. Take for instance, the discovery of the American 
robin after the European robin. While they look similar they are unrelated which is 
reflected in their scientific names Turdus migratorius and Erithacus rubecula respectively.
58 David L. Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?," Systematic Zoology 25 (1976), David L. Hull, "A Matter 
of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978).
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Or take this example. Tyrannosaurus Rex went extinct some 65 million years ago. 
However, say in the future, by natural or artificial means, organisms evolved such that they 
have (as far as can be ascertained) exactly the same characteristics as T. rex did some 65 
million years ago. What species name would we give them? I believe if we asked everyday 
folks on the street what scientific name to name them, they would name them T. rex. But 
according to the species as individual view, these organisms would need to be called 
something different.
The alien pig and the new T. rex would need to be named differently on the species as 
individuals view because species identity is maintained through descent. That is members 
of species are identified as belonging to the same species where they can trace unbroken 
ancestor-descendant relations. So when these relations fail species die and the identity is 
extinguished. Or when they have never been, perforce, they are separate identities. 
Moreover, the identity relation is largely independently of the characteristics they happen 
to exhibit: the important element is that members share unbroken ancestor-descendant 
relations.
2.4 Species as Relations
Conceiving species as relations of a particular kind is not new. Indeed, one of the main
species concepts in biology, the biological species concept, is conceived in terms of a
particular kind of relationship between living organisms—namely, interbreeding.
Specifically, Mark Ridley, author of the classic textbook Evolution, says:
The biological species concept defines species in terms of interbreeding.
Mayr (1963), for instance defined a species as follows: “species are 
groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups.” The expression “reproductively 
isolated” means that members of the species do not interbreed with
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members of other species, because they have some attributes that prevent 
interbreeding [Italics in original].59
However, the ‘species as relations’ conception of species is new within the literature. It is
proposed by David L. Stamos in his The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology,
and the Metaphysics o f Biology—a book this chapter is indebted to.60 While Stamos’s
account is not widely considered, I believe it ought to be discussed because it raises many
interesting issues. While it can be seen as a development of the biological species concept,
the genesis of Stamos’ account derives from philosophical, specifically metaphysical
considerations.
The bases of Stamos’ conception of ‘species as relations’ are, drawing upon Russell, 
the following claims concerning the ontology of the world.61 First, traditionally, everything 
falls into one of two general categories: universals and particulars. Secondly, if something 
does not fall into either category, it is not real. Thirdly, the universals category is 
dichotomous: on one hand qualities or properties, and on the other hand relations.
Following these claims, Stamos suggests that hitherto proposed solutions to the 
question of the ontology of species have argued: (1) species are not real; (2) species are 
particulars; and (3) species are universals qua instantiating particular qualities or
f<Dproperties. He says that missing from the range of possibilities given by these claims
concerning the metaphysics of the world was the view that species are universals qua
relation(s). For instance,
No one, as far as I know, including Russell, ever focused on the other 
universals category. In other words, no one ever emphasized relations in
59 Mark Ridley, Evolution, 3rd ed. (Oxford, New York, 2004), 351.
60 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 285.
61 The plausibility of Stamos’ initial case depends on whether one accepts his characterization of ontology. 
There is no reason to challenge it for or my purposes of describing the different kinds of species concept 
within the literature.
62 These correspond to the three different kinds of species conception discussed above.
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the ontology of species. This seems to me a possible fourth paradigm, 
one with potentially fruitful consequences, which ought to be explored.63
The reason he suggests for this failure to explore an obvious avenue to solve the species 
problem prior to his work is a certain prejudice of history.64 Whether he is correct, or not, 
is beside the point. Evidently, this avenue has not been explored in the literature.
What is significant for Stamos is that relations have a different ontology compared to 
classes and concrete particulars. He claims that relations “... constitute a sort of hybrid 
category, neither abstract nor concrete, but a fusion of both.”65 For instance, where a 
relation exists between two physical entities, the relation is not just its relata (the two 
individual physical entities) but something more.
However, as it stands the claim that species are relations is imprecise since there are 
different kinds of relations. So again drawing upon Russell, Stamos describes the 
distinction between internal and external relations to further develop his conception of 
species. To summarize, a relation is internal if a change in the relation entails an intrinsic 
change in the character of at least one of the relata, and it is external if the character of any 
of the relata does not entail any intrinsic change. For instance below is an example of an 
external relation since there is no impact in the intrinsic character(s) of a and b where a is 
below b or b is below a. On the other hand, difference is an example of an internal relation 
because changes in difference relations between a and b entail changes in the intrinsic 
character(s) of either a or b.
63 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 288-289.
64 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 289.
65 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 289.
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Stamos argues that the relations in the ‘species as relations’ conception are internal. 
Specifically, he claims that . species words denote a type of relation .. .and if species are 
a type of relation, then they must be internal relations.” Furthermore, the relations included 
go beyond similarity relations to incorporate what he calls “appropriate polymorphic 
relations”, which include, “...mating relations, ontogenetic relations, and sociomorphic 
relations”—the latter being the internal relations between members of different castes in 
social insects.66 So it is more accurate to call the ‘species as relations’ concept the ‘species 
as relation complexes’ concept—a point that Stamos makes himself in a discussion of a 
* misinterpretation of his view. He says “... I ultimately made it clear that I though of 
species as relation complexes, composed both of organisms and various internal relations 
between them.”67
It is this point which helps distinguish Stamos’ view from others, notably, the 
biological species view. This is a kind of relational view because it holds that species are 
interbreeding populations. It is an interbreeding relation which defines the species on this 
view. Interestingly, pace many biologists who use this concept of species, Stamos argues 
that it is not sufficient to group organisms into species and delimit them from one another
/TO
because it is only a single kind of relation. For instance, there are many populations, 
which one would group as belonging to the same species, which have the potential to 
interbreed, but do not actually do so. Moreover, this conception of species is manifestly 
unsuited to asexual organisms since on this view asexual organisms cannot be members of 
a species.
66 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 291.
67 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 292.
68 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 293.
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I take it that the critical issue is what relations ought to be included in the relation
complex. Stamos discusses a number including; (1) nurturing relations; (2) ecological
relations; and (3) similarity relations. Ultimately, he articulates a conception of species
which he calls species as biosimilarity complexes, which may involve elements of each.
He describes this notion of species as follows:
A species is a primarily horizontal, all the while dynamic, phenotypic 
similarity complex of organisms objectively and maximally delimited by 
causal relations, in the case of sexual organisms mainly interbreeding, 
ecological, ontogenetic, and possibly social and sociomorphic relations, 
and in the case of asexual organisms mainly ecological, possibly gene 
transfer, and possibly social (e.g., colony formation) relations.69
We have seen then that there are several different species concepts which might be 
employed within the natural sciences. Consequently, one could argue that prima facie any 
of these different kinds of species concepts could be used to justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms.
However, I argue that all these different kinds of species concepts are vulnerable to one 
or more of the following objections which mean that we cannot rightly appeal to them to 
justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
3. Objections
3.1 Objection #1: There are appeals to species which are incompatible with the natural 
sciences: The Incompatibility Objection
The Incompatibility Objection in this case is that if concepts of species are or are thought 
to be ontologically incompatible with the natural sciences, then we cannot appeal to them 
to justify the normative assessment of living organisms—at least, not if we are in the
69 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics o f Biology, 297.
business of showing how we might appeal to the natural sciences to justify evaluative 
claims. For instance, if the view of the natural sciences was that species are real entities 
then we could not appeal to species concepts which have a nominal ontology (and vice 
versa).70 So minimally, this objection delimits the space of possible species concepts to 
consider.
However, the objection is flawed for at least two good reasons. The first and foremost 
one is that clearly there are some species concepts which are compatible with the natural 
sciences. For example, the species as individual view derives directly from the theory of 
evolution by natural selection. Consequently, the objection can be easily met.
The second reason the objection is limited is that the obvious examples of 
incompatibility between concepts of species and the natural sciences are, arguably, not in 
fact incompatible. For instance, Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of species are thought 
to be incompatible with the natural sciences, but arguably they are not.
According to Plato, species (or the Forms) are not physical—rather they are a peculiar 
kind of abstract object.71 They are fixed and eternal. That is, they do not evolve. Species 
membership is constituted by resemblance to a Form.
This concept of species is thought to be incompatible with the natural sciences because 
species qua Forms are fixed and eternal and do not evolve. This apparently contradicts the
70 However, I should note that the ontology of the natural sciences is disputed and or disputable. Certainly, 
the majority of those in the natural sciences (without philosophical reflection and or training) believe that the 
entities they study are real. And (without concrete data) my impression is that most philosophers of science 
are realists of some stripe (as am I). Yet I believe contemporary scientific practice and knowledge is 
compatible with a nominalist ontology being the case. This is despite the fact I believe it is a false view 
because most of the complaints of the nominalists are resolved if one is a promiscuous realist (as I am).
71 Arguably, Plato’s forms are not abstractions as this notion is typically understood. In a sense, the so-called 
particular world is a world abstracted from the Forms. On Plato’s view, as I understand it, physicality is 
abstract or not (fully) real, or as fully real as the Forms.
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central explanatory theory of biology: evolution by natural selection, which largely 
explains why Platonic conceptions of species are generally not taken very seriously within 
the sciences of biology.72
One could also make a similar case for Aristotle’s or Aristotelian conceptions of 
species. For instance, the philosopher and scholar of Aristotle, James G. Lennox remarks 
“Aristotle is often characterized, by both philosophers and evolutionary biologists, as the 
fountainhead of a typological theory of species that is absolutely inconsistent with 
evolutionary thinking.”73 However, the case is disputed—indeed, Lennox himself denies 
these conclusions. Indeed, there has been an extensive effort to rehabilitate Aristotle’s 
biological and philosophical credentials.74 Arguably, the effort has been more successful 
than in the case of Plato given the paucity of literature defending Plato in contrast to the 
literature defending Aristotle.
The obvious reason for this greater success is because Aristotle’s conception of species 
differs significantly on a number of key points from Plato’s. For instance, for Aristotle, the 
Forms or species are not abstract, but are concrete. That is, they do not exist outside their 
particulars or instances. As Aristotle himself remarks, “... it is clear that no universal exists 
in separation apart from its particulars.”75 Moreover, while it is a disputed interpretation, a 
case can be made that for Aristotle the Forms or species independently are not eternal, 
rather their eternality depends upon an eternal generation of organisms. So under this 
interpretation, a species in an Aristotelian sense can go extinct, which is in accordance with
72 There have been some efforts to rehabilitate Plato’s concept in this context. See: Stamos, The Species 
Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 100.
73 James G. Lennox, "Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle's Biology," in Aristotle's 
Philosophy of Biology, ed. James G. Lennox (Cambridge, 2001), 160.
74 An effort spearheaded by James G. Lennox, among others, such as David Balme, Pierre Pellegrin, and 
Allan Gotthelf.
75 Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1040b27. See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi- 
bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Met.+7.1040b Accessed 28 April, 2007.
76 See James G. Lennox, "Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?," in Aristotle's Philosophy o f Biology, ed. James 
G. Lennox (Cambridge, 2001), 131. for the positive case, which is rejected by by Stamos in Stamos, The 
Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 102-113, esp n9 p. 104.
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evolutionary theory. On the other hand, it is clear, that for Aristotle, the Forms or species 
themselves cannot change or evolve. Consequently, it might seem that Aristotelian species 
ought to be condemned like Platonic species because species according to evolutionary 
theory do change and evolve. However, the fact that Platonic and Aristotelian species do 
not evolve does not mean that they are incompatible with the natural sciences in general 
and evolutionary theory in particular.
What Darwin demonstrated is that lineages of living organisms evolved through time, 
which hitherto had been thought to be impossible. This is because it was held that living 
organisms were members of particular Forms (or species) created by God which by 
definition could not evolve. The inference drawn from this belief was that since living 
organisms were instances of these Forms they could not evolve either and consequently 
neither would lineages of living organisms over time. So what Darwin demonstrated 
showed that this inference was mistaken.
But the fact that lineages of living organisms evolve is not incompatible with Platonic 
or Aristotelian concepts of species. Membership in either Platonic or Aristotelian species 
only requires that living organisms appropriately resemble the Form, and there is no reason 
why lineages of living organisms could not resemble different Forms (or species) at 
different times. For example, there is no reason why lineage L cannot resemble Form A at 
t\, and be classified as belonging to species A, and resemble Form B at *2, and be classified 
as belonging to species B according to Platonic or Aristotelian conceptions of species.
Moreover, to demonstrate that Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of species are 
incompatible with the natural sciences Darwin (or anyone else) would have to show that 
evolution by natural selection entails the evolution of classes. That is, Darwin or anyone
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else would have to show that a lineage L belonging to class A at time t\, and belonging to 
class B at t2, entails that class A has changed or evolved into class B. But he did not and 
neither has anyone else. The class (A or B) has not changed or evolved: only the 
classification of the lineage L, as belonging to class A or B.
Consequently, the fact that Platonic or Aristotelian concepts of species are not 
incompatible with the natural sciences leaves us with an intriguing possibility that we 
might appeal to them to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. However, I 
take it that such a conception of species suffers from a different problem. It is not that they 
cannot justify the normative assessment of living organisms. Rather the issue is choosing 
and justifying the application of a particular Form to a particular lineage, when the lineage 
evidently can resemble more or less many if not an infinite number of Forms. For example, 
the lineage of human beings over evolutionary time has resembled Forms of bacteria, 
Forms of amphibians, Forms of reptiles etc. And in the future the lineage of human beings 
may resemble other Forms very different from the present Form members of the lineage 
currently most closely resemble.77 The problem comes in justifying the claim that present 
members of the lineage shoulde be normatively assessed according to the Form they 
presently most closely resemble rather the Forms they may resemble in the future or have 
resembled in the past, when such resemblance is contingent and transitory. In other words 
the problem here is a problem of pluralism, which brings me to my next objection.78
77 One could also argue that there could be an infinity of human forms, although I believe this line of 
argument is problematic because it posits an infinite set of essences which designate ‘human’. In such a case 
it would be hard to get normative assessment of the ground for reasons we shall see.
78 This objection should be familiar by now since I have employed it in Chapters 3-5.
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3.2 Objection #2: One cannot choose and justify a single coherent appeal to species: The 
Pluralism Objection
The Pluralism objection in this case is the claim there is an ineliminable pluralism 
concerning different species concepts compatible with the natural sciences and no tenable 
objective justification within the natural sciences for choosing a specific species concepts 
to justify normative assessments of living organisms. The problem is that different species 
concepts can justify different even contradictory normative assessments. This is because 
different species concepts have different ways of delimiting species members and thus they 
can demarcate different populations who are members. Consequently, potentially at least, 
individual A may be normal in all populations of species concept X, but abnormal in all 
populations of species concept Y. Therefore, unless a single species concept can be 
privileged over and against the alternatives then the appeal to species to justify the 
normative assessment of living organisms is inadequate because it potentially conflicts.
Admittedly, the problem as stated is largely theoretical because different species 
concepts generally track the same population. No doubt this is because for the most part 
different species concepts are assessed on how accurately they demarcate particular 
populations which are believed to constitute species. For instance, the population 
demarcated by Homo sapiens is the same no matter what species concept one uses. This 
said, it is an issue are for populations which do not constitute a species on a particular 
species concept. For instance, populations of asexually reproducing organisms are not a 
species on the biological species concept because this concept is defined in terms of 
sexually reproducing populations which can interbreed.79 This is notwithstanding that such 
populations are given species names—presumably on the basis of another species concept. 
So for example, on a species concept based on morphology an organism may be
79 In asexually reproducing organisms there is no gene-flow between members of the population and 
variation only occurs due to gene mutation.
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normal/defective with respect to the concept but non-evaluable according to a biological 
species concept. It is also an issue because arguably it is not accidental that the different 
species concepts track the same population. Most of these concepts have different 
parameters which can take a range of values and these determine which individuals are 
members of the species. These are chosen—at least implicitly—such that they match the 
target population. Naturally, they can (possibly) take different values which in turn would 
include different individuals as members. So the choices of parameters are somewhat 
circular and relative to human interests. Consequently, they require objective justification 
if the appeal to species is to be objective . I argue later on in this chapter that this cannot be 
supplied.
Moreover, the claim that there is no single species concept (or set of species concepts) 
is a popular view, despite being contested by some. Stamos for one argues that one can 
justify a single species concept—his own. He contends that the premises of the argument 
for species pluralism are false. In particular, he claims that both the following claims are 
false: (1) no species concept can be privileged over and against another; and (2) every kind 
of biological investigation or interest requires its own species concept.80 However, I think 
his argument fails on many grounds and at many levels.
The first problem is that while his characterization is broadly correct, it only applies to 
a rather naive species pluralism. A species pluralist, such as I, need not hold that a species 
concept cannot be privileged. Clearly, there are some species concepts which work better 
and worse in different contexts, so at least pragmatically they can be privileged relative to 
some specific context.81 For example, species concepts which rely entirely on
80 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 96-97.
81 Yet the fact there are different context means that the pluralism objection is still in play and the 
justification is consequently limited and inadequate.
morphological similarity are not useful when we are interested in giving an account of 
evolutionary lineages because different lineages adapting to similar circumstances are 
often morphologically similar. For instance, dolphins are morphologically similar to fish 
because they have adapted to living in an aquatic environment. Yet dolphins and fish come 
from very separate evolutionary lineages.
However, to sustain pluralism, species pluralists need only show that there are a 
number of real and objective species concepts which cannot be reduced to a single concept. 
And clearly, given the above exposition, there are a number of real and objective species 
concepts which cannot be reduced to each other. For instance, species concepts based on 
the possession of some set of essential properties cannot be reduced to species concepts 
based on common lineages. This is because similarity in morphology or difference in 
morphology does not track one hundred percent with being part of the same lineage.
Neither does the fact that every kind of biological investigation or interest does not 
require its own species concept count against pluralism. Again to show pluralism, all one 
needs to show is that different species concepts cannot be reduced or eliminated.
In addition, Stamos’ argument against species pluralism is weak at best. His argument 
against the species pluralist is seemingly solely based upon the claim that horizontal
species concepts have ontological priority over vertical species concepts and thus that
82horizontal species concepts (at least) can be privileged over vertical species concepts. For 
instance, he says
82 The distinction between horizontal and vertical species concepts draws from the metaphor of the Tree of 
Life inaugurated by Darwin. Cutting the Tree horizontally gives the species that exist at that point of time. 
These are horizontal species. Following the distinct branches shows the species which exist through time. 
These are vertical species. See Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the 
Metaphysics of Biology, 67-68.
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At any rate, what I find most conclusive against species pluralism, 
whether realist or nominalists, is that two of its essential premises can be 
shown to be quite false. First, the premise that no species concept can be 
privileged over another is falsified by the fact, as I argued earlier, that 
horizontal species concepts are logically prior to vertical species 
concepts. As such, the species concepts of palaeontology and 
phylogenetic taxonomy must yield to species concepts of neontology (the 
study of living organisms). This is not because of the fact that most of the 
work is done by biologists is done at the horizontal level, as in population 
genetics, ecology, biological control, medicine, ethology, etc. My 
argument is not based on numbers or an appeal to popularity. Neither is it 
based on the fact, in contrast to Shaw (1969) claim for species concepts 
in palaeontology, that species concepts in neonology convey a lot of 
information ... No, my argument is not based on greater amount of 
information content at the horizontal level either. Instead it is based 
solely on the logic of the ontology of the situation, as discussed earlier
83
He claims that horizontal species are logically and consequently ontologically prior to 
vertical species because the reality of the former necessarily entails the existence of the 
latter but the reverse is not true.84 Yet even assuming this claim is true, it certainly does not 
undermine species pluralism greatly as he claims.85 There are a number of horizontal 
species concepts which cannot be reduced to each other. For example, biological species 
concepts cannot be reduced to ecological-niche species concepts. The former is constituted 
by interbreeding relations whereas the latter is constituted by niche relations.
Consequently, pace Stamos, the claim that there is an ineliminable pluralism concerning 
different species concepts compatible with the natural sciences can be defended.
3.3 Objection #3: For some species concepts there are various parameters which require 
specification but cannot be justified: The Parameter Objection
The Parameter and Pluralism objections in this case are premised on the fact there are 
multiple kinds of species concepts compatible with and usable within the natural sciences. 
Both are about problems with objectively justifying choices over and against possible
83 See Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 96-97.
84 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 79.
85 Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology, 96.
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alternatives. In essence both objections turn on the idea that there is no adequate objective 
justification of these choices. The justification can only be subjective.
The Parameter Objection is aimed at individual species concepts which have various 
parameters which determine who are, and who are not members. The objection is that 
there is no adequate objective justification for particular parameters over and against 
possible alternatives.
The monophyletic species concept is one example. The parameter in this case is the 
common ancestor which all members of the species must share in order to be a member of 
the species. If an individual living organism does not share a common ancestor then it 
cannot be a member of the species in question no matter how similar it is them. For 
instance, our alien pig cannot be a member of Sus scrofa qua monophyletic species concept 
because it does not share any ancestor in common with members of Sus scrofa (on Earth) 
despite being otherwise identical.
The Parameter Objection in this case is that the choice of particular common ancestor 
cannot be objectively justified. Admittedly, it is possible to objectively determine the 
common ancestor for a particular contemporary population. But this does not justify the 
choice of ancestor. This is because it is a function of the choice of population and thus it 
begs the question unless the choice of population can be objectively justified.
Now we could objectively justify the choice of population a number of ways. For 
example, we could select the population according to some similarity relations that the
86 For any particular population at time t there is at least one ancestor in the past which everyone shares. For 
instance, every human being alive today shares a common female ancestor commonly called Eve.
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members bear to each other. Or we could choose them because they form an interbreeding 
population. Or we could use some combination of criteria. However, notice that these are 
also effectively criteria for other species concepts, which are also vulnerable to the 
Parameter Objection. For instance, if one uses similarity relations, there is the question of 
ascertaining and objectively justifying the particular properties which need to be similar 
and how similar they need to be over and against the possible alternatives. Moreover, the 
fact that we could select the population according to many different ways or combination 
of ways also raises the Parameter Objection.
Stamos’ species concept is another example. The biosimilarity relation complexes 
require both the choice of particular kinds of relations and parameters of relation to delimit 
the requisite species. However, there is no objective way to choose and justify these—or at 
least Stamos does not provide one. The ones he proposes seem to arise from a black box. 
And unless there is an objective way to choose and justify these then his concept of species 
is vulnerable to the Parameter Objection too.
3.4 Objection #4: The appeal to the particular species concept cannot sustain the 
Normative Distinction: the Normative Objection.
The Normative Objection in this case claims there are species concepts which cannot 
sustain the Normative Distinction. That is the species concept in question either does not or 
cannot adequately distinguish between what shoulde occur and what actually does occur. 
The point is that if the species concept cannot sustain the Normative Distinction then we 
can hardly appeal to it to justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
An example of a species concept that does not adequately distinguish between what 
shoulde occur and what actually does occur are classes based on the possession of essences 
of some kind, such as genetic essences. The problem with such classes is that they do not
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permit the gradations in assessment which is part-and-parcel of normative assessments in 
discourse. In other words, an individual either is or is not a member of a class defined by 
an essence. Individuals cannot be more or less a member because it is necessary for them 
to have the requisite essential properties. Yet normative assessments typically claim that an 
individual is more or less a member of a particular class.
For instance, it is quite typical to say that organism x is ‘defective’ in contrast to the 
class/kind S x belongs to. For example, “Porky the Piglet is a defective Sus scrofa” is a 
common kind of assessment. Yet if my objection is correct, then the ontology of essential 
classes/kinds does not allow such a form of assessment. The reason is because for 
classes/kinds constituted by possession of essences, members must possess every essential 
property; otherwise, they are not members of the class/kind. It is an all or nothing concept. 
For instance, it would be wrong to say x is a ‘defective’ S, even if x  lacks ONE of two 
thousand essential properties p, which constitutes the class/kind S. Rather it would be 
correct to say x  is not a member of S, and thus cannot be assessed by the norms of S. 
Whereas, in the language of assessment, if x lacked one of two thousand properties p, we 
would probably say x  is a ‘normal’ S.
It might be objected that one need not assess an individual x of essential kind/class S on 
the basis of its essential properties. For instance, one could assess it on the basis of non- 
essential properties. However, how would one assess on the basis of non-essential or 
accidental properties? The obvious route to take would be to appeal to typicality. That is, 
we look for typical accidental properties and normatively assess according to these. 
However, as I have shown in Chapter 3, the appeal to typicality fails because it justifies 
significantly counter-intuitive normative assessments and because of the parameter 
problem.
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Moreover, the remaining conceptions of species based on classes are more or less 
vulnerable to the Normative Objection. That is, depending on how the particular classes 
are framed, they are more or less vulnerable to the charge they do not sustain the 
Normative Distinction—i.e. the distinction between what shoulde occur and what occurs or 
may occur. For instance, broadly framed cluster classes and ecological niche classes are 
too diffuse to adequately sustain the Normative Distinction. Specifically, they do not 
adequately specify what shoulde occur in contrast to mutually exclusive alternatives. In the 
case of ecological niche classes, take apex land predators. Tyrannosaurus rex is quite 
different from a tiger, yet both fill this niche well, albeit in very different timeframes. 
Consequently, with respect to this niche one cannot say which alternative Tyrannosaurus 
rex or tigers shoulde occur since they both fit the niche well. Indeed, any form that fitted 
the niche well would do, no matter how different they happened to be. Of course, the class 
may be tightly framed or drawn, but this is open to the problems noted above.
Furthermore, the species as individuals or species concepts based upon evolution by 
natural selection are also vulnerable to this objection. The first problem is that it makes the 
required comparison between the characteristics of the tokens of the type with the 
characteristics of the type in the normative assessments either untenable or arbitrary.
It is untenable because there is no meaningful comparison between an individual 
(token) and a population of individuals (tokens) per se, which defines the type. Of course, 
one could compare an individual with another individual token. But the problem is 
choosing which one when there are many possibilities and these vary considerably. Our 
individual may be very similar or very different to the comparator. However, given that the 
population of tokens are all equally members of the type, the comparison of individual
with another individual token is arbitrary. One could retort that some plausible comparator 
(norm) could be derived from the lineage—the population of tokens which defines the 
type. For example, there could be some statistical aggregation of the characteristics of the 
lineage through a period of time and space. But this move is arbitrary. It is arbitrary 
because it would involve some selection of time and or space for aggregating the 
characteristics of the individual members into some statistical representation of the lineage. 
The obvious choice here is to choose and count all possible members of the lineage in all 
their locations up until the point of normative assessment. But this in my view 
unreasonably privileges the past, and is an effective endorsement of conservatism. It would 
label any significant difference as deviation, whereas it could be innovation. For instance, 
if human beings lived during the time of the dinosaurs and saw the predecessors of birds, it 
is probable they would label them abnormal dinosaurs, rather than primitive birds.87 In 
other words, individuals who arise out of speciation events risk being labelled deviant 
when in fact they are different.
The second fundamental problem is that this conception of the species naturally does 
not rule out the gradual change or evolution of a species, such that the characteristics of the 
lineage at one point of time differ markedly from some later period, either by nature or 
human beings.88 Consequently, under this conception of the species, the basis of normative 
assessment can change over time, albeit usually over very long periods of time. This raises 
the issue of ascertaining which version of the species one ought to normatively assess a 
living organism by because different timeframes are going to give different characteristics 
as norms.
87 This is assuming that birds evolved from dinosaurs very slowly.
88 It also does not rule out rapid changes either.
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These problems raise doubts regarding whether the sciences of biology can explain 
normative assessment through evolutionary theory. At least part of the reason is because 
the phylogenetic conception of the species is the concept of the species derived from 
evolutionary theory.
4. Conclusions
The appeal to species to justify the normative assessment of living organisms is an appeal 
to the fact that individual living organisms bear a certain relationship to entities designated 
‘species’.89 The thought is that the relationship, such as being a token of a particular type, 
adequately sustains the Normative Distinction. For instance, the appeal to species to justify 
the claim that Porky the pig is defective being born with one eye, one ear, and no curly tail 
could be to the fact that she is a token of a particular interbreeding community. Or it could 
be the fact that she is a token of a particular lineage. However, in the course of this chapter 
I have argued that such an appeal fails because it is vulnerable to one or more of three fatal 
objections.
The first was the Incompatibility Objection. This turns on the point that that if concepts 
of species are incompatible with the natural sciences, then we could not appeal to them to 
justify the normative assessment of living organisms. However, I noted that the force of 
this objection was limited for at least three reasons. Namely: (1) there clearly are species 
concepts compatible with the natural sciences; (2) the restriction is quite narrow and can be 
avoided; and (3) the obvious examples of incompatibility are in fact not incompatible.
89 These may be abstractions and lineages.
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The second and third objections encompassed the Parameter and Pluralism Objections. 
The Parameter Objection turns on the difficulty of justifying the choice between one way 
of specifying the various parameters and another. In other words, it rests on the claim that 
there are no objective reasons within the natural sciences to prefer one way of specifying 
the parameters to another.
The Pluralism Objection arises because there are many different and irreducible species 
concepts compatible with the natural sciences. It turns on the difficulty of justifying the 
choice between different species concepts. In other words, it rests on the claim that there 
are no objective reasons within the natural sciences for preferring one species concept (or 
set of species concepts) to the other alternatives.
The fourth objection was the Normative Objection. This holds that some species 
concepts cannot sustain the Normative Distinction. That is the concepts themselves cannot 
adequately sustain the distinction between what shoulde occur and what occurs or may 
occur. Examples included species concepts based on essences and lineages. Clearly, if this 
objection applies then we cannot appeal to these species concepts to justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms.
Chapter 7: Meeting the challenge
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how my objections to the appeals discussed in 
Chapters 3-6 apply to the views of Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot, 
which were examined in Chapter 1. These philosophers apparently provided a challenge to 
my claim that the natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral judgements about 
human beings. This is a challenge I aim to defuse.
Broadly speaking, over the previous chapters, I have offered five different kinds of 
objection to the natural sciences adequately justifying the normative assessment of living 
organisms. I have labelled four of the five as: 1. The Incompatibility Objection; 2. The 
Pluralism Objection; 3. The Parameter Objection; and 4. The Normative Objection. To this 
I could add another label: The Implausibility Objection. This maintains that the appeal or 
appeals in question justify implausible normative assessments. My argument has been that 
the various kinds of appeal offered for justifying the normative assessments are more or 
less vulnerable to these objections.
However, at the outset, I ought to say that I do not believe the Incompatibility
Objection applies to the views of Arnhart, Casebeer, and Foot. Specifically, I do not
believe it applies to the particular versions of the appeals these authors make to justify
moral judgements. While a case could be made that the Incompatibility Objection applies
to Foot, it is not a case I care to make. That is, I see no reason why her account of moral
judgement cannot be understood in terms of the natural sciences. For instance, as I have
noted in my previous discussion of Foot, her central notion of the life form can be
%
understood in terms of the natural sciences. Consequently, my argument against challenge
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provided by the views of Arnhart, Casebeer, and Foot relies upon applying the remaining 
objections.
2. Larry Arnhart
Larry Arnhart in his work Darwinian Natural Right provides an account of human nature 
which draws deeply upon the natural sciences, especially the sciences of biology. It claims 
that the good for human beings is the desirable for human beings, where the desirable for 
human beings is defined by the 20 typical natural desires of the human species described 
by the sciences of biology.
The challenge to the Central Claim came from the fact that Arnhart used this account of 
human nature to make moral judgements about human beings, which presumably he 
believes are adequately justified. Specifically, different practices are judged according to 
whether they fulfil or frustrate some twenty species-typical natural desires. For instance, he 
negatively judged the practice of female genital mutilation because it frustrated the typical 
natural desire for sexual pleasure and bodily health in Homo sapiens.90
My objection to Arnhart’s account comes from the fact that his account makes use of a 
number of the appeals discussed above, but does not adequately address the objections I 
raise to them. Specifically, the key element of his account of moral judgement is the 
fulfilment or frustration of some twenty species-typical natural desires. For instance, in the 
case of female genital mutilation, it is the frustration of the typical desires for sexual 
pleasure and bodily integrity in female Homo sapiens, which justifies his negative
90 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 14, 248.
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judgement of this practice and its practitioners.91 Clearly, this involves an appeal to 
typicality.
The first minor point to make is that Arnhart does not say anything about how he 
measures the typicality of human desires. So it is not surprising that the offers no 
justification for how this is done. This is a problem because different measures of 
typicality can give different answers about what is typical.
The second minor point to make is that Arnhart’s account is also vulnerable to the 
charge that it permits contradictory moral judgements. The desirable can change over time 
such that at time t\ the desirable is A but at ^  the desirable is not-A, leading to a 
contradiction concerning whether A shoulde occur. Of course, one could respond by 
claiming that what shoulde occur is the desirable at any particular time t. But then we run 
into the familiar problem of justifying the timeframe within the natural sciences.
According to the Parameter Objection there is no justification within the natural sciences 
for choosing the ancient past, recent past, present, or even future. Yet this is a problem that 
Arnhart is quite willing to accept. He claims that the desirable for species is stable 
enough.921 disagree for the reasons already stated.
However, the most serious objection to Arnhart’s appeal to typicality is that it justifies 
some rather odd if not counter-intuitive moral judgements about human beings. For 
example, one of his species typical natural desires is the desire for war.93 So according to 
account of human nature, the good for human beings is the desirable for human beings and 
this is constituted by 20 species typical natural desires. Therefore, according to Arnhart it
91 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 14, 248.
92 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 9-10.
93 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 34.
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is desirable to go to war, and frustration of this desire is wrong. Consequently, those who 
seek to frustrate this desire—peacemakers and pacifists—shoulde be morally judged 
negatively. This is a somewhat odd move to make even when there may be some rational 
justification for going to war.
Arnhart’s account also apparently engages the appeal to history. For example he says:
I will argue that these twenty natural desires are universally found in all 
human societies, that they have evolved by natural selection over four 
million years of human evolutionary history to become components of 
the species-specific nature of human beings, that they are based in the 
physiological mechanisms of the brain, and that they direct and limit the 
social variability of human beings as adapted to diverse ecological
94circumstances.
Yet he does not address any of the problems I noted with this kind of appeal discussed 
previously. This said, arguably, this is not an appeal to history. Rather it is an appeal to the 
fact that during some period of time in the past a species-specific nature has been fixed into 
Homo sapiens?5 In other words, arguably, it is a kind of appeal to species.
In any case, it is clear that Arnhart does make some kind of appeal to species. For 
instance, he invokes the twenty typical desires of Homo sapiens to justify his moral 
judgements of human beings. While the appeal to species in this case does not directly 
justify moral judgements—the fulfilment or frustration of twenty typical desires does 
that—the choice of species concept is important because it defines the population for 
which the typical desires are ascertained.
One potential problem with Arnhart’s appeal to species is the fact he does not say 
which species concept he is using, let alone offer any justification for the choice. So the
94 Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 36.
95 Furthermore, presumably, it does not matter how long it takes for a species-specific nature to be fixed as 
long as it is fixed and there is a set of species typical natural desires.
twenty typical desires derived from the population defined by the species concept are 
unjustified. Consequently, the moral judgements based upon whether these natural desires 
are fulfilled and frustrated are also unjustified.
However, one might respond that for Homo sapiens at least, it does not matter which 
species concept is employed. This is because different species concepts in the case of 
Homo sapiens designate very similar, if not identical, populations. But this is only the case 
because the parameters of specific species concepts are such that they designate similar, if 
not identical populations. (The parameters could well be different.) So it seems to me that 
the parameters are such as they are because we already have a particular population in 
mind. But this makes the choice of parameters circular as I have discussed previously.96
Yet, even if a particular species concept can be justified over and against alternatives, 
there is the issue that species evolve over time. This raises the problem of justifying the 
timeframe again for ascertaining what the species typical desires are because these may 
change. But as I have already noted, Arnhart is willing to accept this problem because he 
believes the desirable for species is stable enough, and I disagree with his contention.
The remaining appeal Arnhart makes is an appeal to what is natural. In his account, 
different practices are judged on whether they fulfil or frustrate species-typical natural 
desires, which have been formed by some four million years of natural selection.
However, as noted in Chapter 3, there is no scientific basis for distinguishing between 
natural and unnatural causes and privileging the former over the latter.97 An agent may 
distinguish and privilege the natural over the unnatural but this falls outside the scope of
96 See pp. 201-202.
97 Natural human desires in this case are desires that originate and occur independent of human action and 
choice whereas unnatural human desires are desires that originate and occur via human action and choice.
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the natural sciences. Moreover, Arnhart fails to offer any justification for such a 
privileging. This leaves his account open to all the objections to both appeals noted in 
Chapter 3.
3. William Casebeer
In Chapter 1 1 also discussed the work of the philosopher William Casebeer who, along
with Larry Arnhart and Philippa Foot, apparently provided a challenge to my claim that the
natural sciences are not adequate to justify moral judgements about human beings. In
Natural Ethical Facts, Casebeer attempts to provide and defend a naturalized ethic in terms
of the natural sciences. He argues that one can better understand the nature of moral
theory and its role in moral judgement(s) if we properly understood what morality is.98
Regarding this he claims:
Such an understanding will be best informed by treating morality as a 
natural phenomenon subject to constraints from, influenced by, and 
ultimately reduced to the natural sciences, particularly the cognitive 
sciences and biology.99
And regarding moral claims, which presumably include moral judgements, Casebeer says
that they ought to be reduced to functional claims, where functional claims are understood
in terms of Godfrey-Smith’s “modern history” theory of functions.100 A theory discussed in
Chapter 4.
Consequently, I take it that Casebeer’s project fails because of the problems with 
adequately justifying normative assessments of living organisms via an appeal to recent- 
history accounts of function, as noted in Chapter 4. Clearly, Casebeer escapes my first two 
objections raised in chapters 4 and 6. Recent-history accounts of function are compatible
98 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 3.
99 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 3.
100 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 4.
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with the natural sciences and they, like other aetiological accounts of function are 
normative. However, his is vulnerable to the remaining two objections.
My third objection to the appeal to functions is that there are many different concepts
of function, but no single concept of function can be objectively justified over and against
alternatives. Casebeer acknowledges the many different concepts of function, although he
does not consider teleological or propensity accounts.101 However, his reason for choosing
recent-history accounts over capacity and ancient-history accounts is that it avoids
perceived problems with these alternatives.
Peter Godfrey-Smith has an enlightening analysis of function that steers a 
path between the Scylla of functional vacuousness (represented by the 
capacity account) and the Charybdis of functional single-mindedness 
(represented by the deep-history proper function approach). It is an 
analysis of proper function as well; however, it relates the functions of 
traits and characters to their recent evolutionary history.102
I accept his point about capacity account of functions. But I am unwilling to accept that the
‘single-mindedness’ he refers to as a problem in the above quotation, is a unique problem
for ancient-history accounts.
What Casebeer is referring to by ‘single-mindedness’ is the idea that the only content 
one can derive from ancient-history functions is ultimately reproduction. For instance, he 
says, “If we gravitate to the distal, super-historically laden conception of function, then the 
only content we can squeeze out of function is that the ultimate function is to 
reproduce.”103 However, if this is a problem for ancient-history accounts of function it is 
also a problem for recent-history-accounts of function. The content of functions—what 
functions are—is delineated according to the contribution which explains the traits
101 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, see Chapter 3, esp. pp 
49-54.
102 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 52.
103 The claim is not argued. See: Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral 
Cognition, 52.
continuing existence under natural selection. The only difference between ancient and 
recent-history accounts is the timeframe for the operation of natural selection. In both cases 
the content of functions is ultimately reproduction.
One also gets the impression that a recent-history history account of functions was
adopted because it suited his theory and project. For instance he says,
For present purposes, then, a modern-history of functions gives us 
everything we need from the biological use of the term ‘function’ to 
naturalize Aristotle. The other conceptions of function are useful—there 
is some sense in which the distal function of all living things is to 
reproduce, but that is not to say that all the capacities we exercise have as 
their immediate telos the end of reproduction or that their modern history 
is to be explained in terms of that capacity.104
This demonstrates that his appeal to the natural sciences is not doing all the work of
adequately justifying moral judgements.
My fourth objection to appeals to functions was that some accounts of functions have 
various parameters, which require objective justification, but none can be found. This is 
particularly a feature of aetiological accounts of function. The major parameter in these 
accounts of course is the timeframe one considers the contribution which explains the 
presence of a trait under natural selection. In recent-history accounts the timeframe is 
‘recent’ whereas in ancient-history accounts the timeframe is ‘ancient’. My contention in 
this case is that there is no objective justification for choosing any particular timeframe 
whether this be ancient or recent.
Disappointingly, while Casebeer acknowledges the issue, he avoids it. Rather than 
supplying a justification for adopting a recent timeframe he defers to Godfrey-Smith. That 
is he says,
104 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 53.
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How far back need one go in order for the history to be ancient rather 
than modern? This is an empirical question, as Godfrey-Smith notes: 
“The answer is not in terms of a fixed time—a week, or a thousand year. 
Relevance fades. ...”105
So Casebeer is vulnerable to my fourth objection too.
4. Philippa Foot
The philosopher Philippa Foot is the remaining philosopher I discussed in Chapter 1 who
apparently provides a challenge to my claim that the natural sciences are not adequate to
justify moral judgements about human beings. Interestingly, Foot connects moral
judgement with normative assessment. For instance, her explicit aim is to set out
... a view of moral judgement very different from that of most moral 
philosophers writing today. For I believe that evaluations of human will 
and action share a conceptual structure with evaluations of characteristics 
and operations of other living things, and can only be understood in these 
terms.106
She argues that there are ‘natural norms’ for living organisms, including human beings, 
derived from the fact they are living, which refer to what Foot calls the ‘natural goodness’ 
of living things.107 These ‘natural norms’ are not attributes of individuals but to some 
abstraction variously referred to as the ‘species’ or ‘lifeform’.108
Foot connects her species concept to the normative assessment of living organisms by 
linking specific individuals to a particular species such that these individual shoulde exhibit 
the characteristics definitive of the species. These characteristics are captured by the form 
‘S are F ’, ‘The S is F’, and even ‘S’s do V’, where S is a Footian species, F  is some
105 Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, 52.
106 Foot, Natural Goodness, 5.
107 Foot, Natural Goodness, 27.
108 For Foot, the terms ‘species’ and ‘lifeform’ are interchangeable. So for reasons of economy I shall use 
either interchangeably.
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predicate, and V is some verb. For instance, “Dogs are carnivores,” “The Dog is spotty,” 
and “Dogs do eat meat.”
As we saw in Chapter 1, she makes two significant claims concerning these 
propositions. The first is that propositions of this form are logically unquantifiable, 
meaning, in the example above that they do not speak of an individual dog, although they 
can; nor do they predicate something true of every dog.109 The second is that in order to 
understand what such propositions assert or claim one needs to look at the natural-history 
account of the species—or the context of how it lives. That is, we cannot understand 
reproduction, and propositions concerning reproduction in living organisms unless we 
know something of their natural history. For instance, reproduction in bacteria differs 
greatly from reproduction in dogs.
However, while Foot uses the term ‘species’, I take it that she is not using any of the 
conceptions of the term typically used in the sciences of biology—notwithstanding she can 
be interpreted that way. This is because her exposition of ‘species’ is dissimilar to the 
conceptions of the term typically used in the natural sciences.
On the other hand, as I have discussed in Chapter 6, her account of ‘species’ does 
resemble ecological niche species concepts in some respects, although these are not 
typically used in the biological sciences.110 That is, one can see significant similarities 
between the concept of a ‘niche’ and the concept of a ‘life form’. Furthermore, my 
understanding is that she is comfortable with using the natural sciences to fill out the
109 Foot, Natural Goodness, 28.
110 I.e. Ecological niche concepts of species only have narrow applicability within biology. Cf. morphological 
species concepts.
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specifics of her account of ‘species’ and ‘lifeforms’. For instance, there is no reason why 
her natural history propositions cannot be understood in terms of the natural sciences.
However, my objections to Foot do not depend on whether Foot does or does not use a 
concept compatible with the natural sciences. Rather my objections are based on features 
of the concept of life form and the nature of living organisms.
My first objection is that her account of the concept of the life form is too permissive. 
By this I mean there is little or no restriction on how natural history propositions may be 
grouped together to define a life form. So potentially, there are an infinite number of ways 
they could be and thus the choice of any particular grouping needs to be justified. 
Furthermore, it raises the problem of determining and then justifying which life form an 
individual belongs to, when it could belong to many different life forms. In turn this makes 
it difficult to ascertain what shoulde occur for individuals by reference to their life form.
One could try to justify a particular grouping of natural history propositions by the fact 
there are already specific groupings of natural history propositions in existence embedded 
in particular populations. For instance, there are specific groupings of natural history 
propositions embedded in various species or sub-species. However, clearly this does not 
solve the problem given that there are multiple kinds of species concepts and no objective 
way within the natural sciences to privilege any one over the other.
Another point to be made is that a justification based upon there already being specific 
groupings of natural history propositions associated with populations is effectively is an 
appeal to history. This is because the particular and specific association of natural history 
propositions with a population is due to how the process of evolution by natural selection
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has occurred over time with respect to a particular lineage. Consequently, it also suffers 
from all the problems with the appeal to history identified in Chapter 3. The most 
significant, in my opinion, is that it essentially begs the question concerning what shoulde 
occur. This is because it assumes, without adequate justification, that the past is 
normative—the standard upon which those in the present and future ought to be judged, 
which brings me to my next objection.
My second objection is based on the fact that living organisms evolve and change. 
Consequently, at some point, there is a grey area concerning whether lineages of living 
organisms ought to be assessed by their current life form or by the life form they are 
evolving into. (There could be multiple possibilities.) So at some point there will be 
ambiguity over what shoulde occur—the traits associated with old life form or the new one. 
So at least for some timeframes, appealing to a life form cannot tell us what shoulde occur 
and thus they are not adequate to justify normative assessments.
5. Conclusion
In Chapter 1 Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, and Philippa Foot ostensibly provided a 
challenge to the Central Claim that the natural sciences are substantially independent of the 
natural sciences because they are not adequate to justify moral judgements about human 
beings. However, as this chapter has shown, each of these authors is vulnerable to the 
various objections noted in subsequent chapters. This is because these authors effectively 
or directly draw upon one or more of the various appeals to justify normative assessments 
of living organisms examined in the thesis. These include appeals to typicality, history, 
what is natural, natural selection, species, and function. Consequently, they are vulnerable 
to the objections already discussed to them justifying the normative assessment of living 
organisms and thus the moral judgement of human beings.
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Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to defend the claim that ethics is substantially but not 
completely independent of the natural sciences because the appeals made to the natural 
sciences are not adequate to justify moral judgements. Or in other words, the main task of 
the thesis has been to defend this central claim and in doing so ascertain the extent to 
which ethics depends upon the natural sciences.
The justification of moral judgements is an essential element in any ethical theory. In a 
nutshell the justification of moral judgements involves sufficiently privileging some moral 
judgement X  over alternative moral judgements Y, Z, etc. (These include the negation of 
moral judgement X .) This is essential because without adequate justification one cannot 
rightly ascertain what shoulde occur. That is, without adequate justification competing and 
contradictory moral judgements cannot be resolved. Specifically, one cannot rightly decide 
between whether X  shoulde occur in contrast to alternatives Y, Z, etc. Consequently, my 
main contention is that various appeals to the natural sciences to justify moral judgements 
do not sufficiently privilege X  over the other possibilities Y, Z, etc.
My conclusion that ethics is substantially but not completely independent of the natural 
sciences is not new. However, one thing that distinguishes my argument for it from the 
others is that I do not draw upon the traditional arguments within the philosophical 
literature. For example, I do not draw upon Hume’s Law. Indeed, like my opponents I do 
not see this as an objection to the natural sciences justifying moral judgements. Indeed, I 
showed that it is a mistake to hold that the logical gap between is and ought precludes the 
natural sciences justifying the moral judgement of living organisms. This is because 
logically it is possible to supply bridging premises. In particular, it is a mistake to argue:
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(1) Human beings are social, rational, animals;
(2) Therefore, human beings ought to be social rational animals
because the argument is invalid. However, it is possible to supply bridging premises. For 
example:
(1) Human beings are social, rational, animals;
(2) Human beings ought to be what they are;
(3) Therefore, human beings ought to be social, rational, animals.
This is a logically valid argument. Of course, it is another matter whether the premises are 
true and or justifiable.
In contrast, what I demonstrate is that the appeals made to the natural sciences do not 
adequately sustain the justification of the moral judgements of human beings. But my point 
is not that the natural sciences cannot sustain the justification of the moral judgement of 
human beings, but that they do not sustain it. In other words, I assume that the natural 
sciences could do the job, but when it comes to doing it, the natural sciences do not do the 
job pace those who claim that they do. While the natural sciences can provide various 
means to distinguish between what shoulde occur and what occurs; these are not adequate 
for one or more of the following reasons: (1) they fail to sufficiently privilege what shoulde 
occur over and against alternatives; (2) they justify normative assessments which are 
strongly counter-intuitive; or (3) some appeals, or some versions of some appeals are not 
compatible with the natural sciences.
One of the main reasons the appeals fail to sufficiently privilege particular occurrences 
over and against alternatives is that they fail to adequately sustain the Normative 
Distinction. The Normative Distinction is the distinction between what shoulde occur and 
what actually does occur. So when I am claiming an appeal does not adequately sustain the
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Normative Distinction, what I am claiming is that the appeals to the natural sciences do not 
adequately sustain this difference between what shoulde occur and what does. In other 
words, I contend that the appeals do not sufficiently distinguish some determinate and 
coherent (non-contradictory) set of occurrences in the past, present, and future (what 
shoulde occur) from all possible occurrences in the past, present, or future (what does 
occur).
But evidently, the appeals to the natural sciences justify either multiple internally 
incoherent (contradictory) claims concerning what shoulde occur or multiple internally 
coherent (non-contradictory) claims concerning what shoulde occur. Obviously, the appeals 
to the natural sciences in the former case are problematic because they justify claims that X  
simultaneously shoulde and shoulde not occur. And the appeals to the natural sciences in 
the latter case are problematic because they equally justify claims that X, Y, and Z shoulde 
occur. The issue in this case is ascertaining what shoulde occur—X, Y, or Z. Any choice 
between them requires justification and my contention is that this cannot be done on the 
basis of the appeals to the natural sciences alone. Rather, I argue that any sufficient 
justification would need to rely upon some appeal beyond the purview of the natural 
sciences, such an appeal to personal values. However, it is my contention that such appeals 
would not resolve the problem of pluralism.
I established my claim that appeals to the natural sciences do not justify the moral 
judgement of human beings by establishing a broader claim. Namely, I claimed that the 
appeals to natural sciences do not justify the normative assessment of living organisms.
The reason for doing this was that surprisingly it is simpler because it avoids many of the 
distracting complications of human rationality and agency. Moreover, my choice of 
exemplar organism highlighted some important and interesting issues. For example, my
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choice of the domesticated pig highlighted the various problems of utilizing the fact of 
what is ‘natural’ to sufficiently sustain the Normative Distinction and thereby adequately 
justify their normative assessment. The appeal to the fact of what is ‘natural’ relies upon 
distinguishing between effects that are dependent and independent of human action, yet the 
causal order itself does not so-distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ effects.111 To 
do so, it must be possible to distinguish between identical effects where they are caused 
naturally or artificially. For example, hypothetically, it must be possible to distinguish 
between a domesticated pig from present-day Earth caused by human action and a pig from 
a parallel Earth caused entirely by natural selection where they have exactly the same 
characteristics or properties. But this is not possible.
Of course, it is possible to distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ causes. But the 
significance of these is either an accident of causal history (objectively speaking), or the 
consequence of some privileging by subjects. Both are poor bases to justify the normative 
assessment of living organisms. The former is poor because it seems inconsistent with 
normative assessments in discourse that they are accidental or arbitrary. For instance, when 
it is claimed that Porky the sow shoulde not be confined in a farrowing crate, the thought is 
not that this is somehow accidentally or arbitrarily wrong. The latter is poor because the 
privileging is entirely dependent upon the interests of subjects which can and do vary 
significantly, and these interests go beyond the ambit of the natural sciences which of 
course is significant for my project here.
The argument for the broader claim began by providing an account of the normative 
assessment of living organisms. This seems an obvious and necessary step for
111 For example, the ‘domesticated’ pig of the present-day Earth could arise via natural selection in an 
alternative or parallel Earth.
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demonstrating how (and why) the natural sciences do not justify the normative assessment 
of living organisms. One could hardly demonstrate a failure if one does not give a clear 
presentation of what the natural sciences fail to do. I used the example of domesticated 
pigs, in three different although related contexts where they are normatively assessed 
within the scientific literature. These were their: (1) characterization; (2) health; and (3) 
welfare.
This literature used the following appeals. The assumption was that given that they are 
appeals within the scientific literature that they represent proper appeals to the natural 
sciences. These included appeals to: (1) regularity; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) 
natural selection; (5) the experience of pleasure or pain; (6) functions; (7) development; 
and (8) species.
The general strategy was to show how each appeal either justified counter-intuitive 
moral judgements or failed in various ways to sufficiently sustain the Normative 
Distinction. In the latter case, generally, either there was an outright failure by the appeal 
to the natural sciences to sustain the distinction (the Normative Objection) or they 
sustained the distinction but generated a plurality of incoherent options that could not be 
distinguished by appeal to the natural sciences (the Pluralism and Parameter Objections).
In other words, the appeals could not distinguish between what shoulde occur and what 
occurs or may occur. Or, they could distinguish between them, but they distinguished 
many different incoherent options of what shoulde occur in contrast to what occurs or may 
occur, which could not be justified and or privileged.
An example of the former was the appeal to development. Even assuming the standard 
combination account, which employs preformationist and epigenetic elements, the appeal
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to development, as it stands, does not adequately distinguish between what shoulde occur 
(or not) and what occur or may occur (or not). This is because on this account it is the 
genome alone which specifies what shoulde occur. However, the genome alone clearly 
does not do so. Any specification by the genome concerning what shoulde occur actually 
depends upon a specific environment. (Typically, this is assumed.) Yet the specification of 
the genome and the unjustified assumption of a specific environment essentially dissolve 
the distinction between what shoulde occur and what does occur. This is because the 
specification and assumption effectively stipulates the behaviour of the causal order—that 
is, what occurs or will occur. (The reason is that the genome and the environment together 
encompass the entire causal order.) Now this issue could be avoided if some justification 
could be supplied for assuming a particular environment. Otherwise, one effectively begs 
the question concerning what shoulde occur. The obvious candidates are the typical 
environments for genome X, or the historical environments of genome X. But these run 
into the problems of the appeals to typicality and history.
An example of the latter was in the appeal to history and ultimately in the appeal to 
functions too.112 As I discussed in Chapter 4, the only scientifically compatible account of 
functions which is plausibly normative is based either on an appeal to the history of 
contributions to fitness under natural selection, or the propensity to contribute to fitness 
under natural selection. By far the most popular account is the appeal to the history of 
positive contributions to fitness under natural selection.113 So typically, appeals to function, 
ultimately are a kind of appeal to history—the history of natural selection. However, one of 
the main problems is that such an appeal to history of organisms is sensitive to the 
timeframe. This is because the nature and extent of the causal contributions to fitness may
112 The only scientifically compatible account of functions which is plausibly normative is ultimately based 
on an appeal to the history of positive contributions to fitness under natural selection or the propensity to 
positively contribute to fitness under natural selection in the future.
113 That is causal contributions that increase fitness.
change significantly over time. In particular, over time the same cause may positively 
contribute to fitness, negatively contribute to fitness, or have no significant contribution to 
fitness. And over significant periods of time the kinds of contribution are likely to change 
significantly. Consequently, under an aetiological account of functions we need to know 
the causal contribution(s) (if any) that entity A makes which increases fitness in order to 
designate the function (if any) of A. For instance, during the timeframe Ti the causal 
contribution(s) c of A, may positively increase fitness, but at timeframe T2 the causal 
contribution(s) c of A may make a negative contribution. Thus, at timeframe T\ A has the 
function c, but at T2 it does not. The issues of course are the choice(s) and justification of 
the choice(s) of any particular timeframe T\ ... Tn. Unless one can objectively choose and 
justify a particular timeframe for function(s) designation, the appeal to history, in effect, 
distinguishes many different and incoherent options of what shoulde occur (or not) in 
contrast to what occurs or may occur (or not), especially over evolutionary time. While one 
could designate ‘ancient’ history or ‘recent’ history as the proper timeframes, such 
designations suffer from two significant problems. The first is that there is no tenable 
objective way of choosing between ancient history and recent evolutionary history because 
there are examples in functional discourse where both give the intuitive answer to what the 
function of entity A is. The second is that even if one could objectively choose between 
ancient history and recent history accounts there are problems with both kinds of accounts. 
For example, ancient history accounts produce counterintuitive results, such as in case of 
vestigial organs. And recent history accounts in some cases negatively assess 
contemporary change as being defective contrary to intuition. Furthermore, such accounts 
are unable to justify prospective normative claims without unjustifiably privileging the past 
over the future. These make up a significant proportion of all normative claims.
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Probably the primary limitation of my argument that appeals to the natural sciences are 
inadequate to justify the normative assessment of living organisms are inadequate is that 
there may be appeals I have missed, appeals which are believed wrongly to be false or true, 
or appeals hitherto undiscovered, which intuitively justify normative assessments and 
adequately sustain the Normative Distinction. However, the burden of proof is upon those 
who contend that this is the case.
So notwithstanding these real limitations, what follows from my arguments? If correct,
I take it that there are two responses. The first is a rejection of ethical naturalism conceived 
in terms of the contemporary natural sciences. While Hume’s Law does not necessarily or 
logically preclude the move from fact to value; presently at least, the move via bridging 
premises cannot be made via the natural sciences because the appeals to the natural 
sciences to justify these premises fail. To reiterate, they fail because: (1) some appeals, or 
versions of some appeals to the natural sciences actually are not compatible with the 
natural sciences; (2) they justify normative assessments which are strongly counter­
intuitive; and (3) they fail to sufficiently privilege what shoulde occur over and against 
alternatives.114
It also seems to me that for such an ethical naturalism conceived in term of the natural 
sciences to be successful, the appeals to the natural sciences would need to adequately 
justify both the normative assessment of living organisms and the moral judgement of 
living organisms. But if I am correct, they do not.
114 There are at least two kinds of failure to sufficiently privilege what shoulde occur over and against 
alternatives. The first is the failure of a single kind of appeal to privilege what it claims shoulde occur over 
and against other kinds of appeal. For example, the failure of the appeal to typicality to privilege what it 
claims shoulde occur in a particular situation over and against say the appeal to development. The second is 
the failure of an appeal to privilege what shoulde occur in contrast to possible alternatives generated by the 
same appeal. This occurs in appeals which have various parameters whose choice cannot be adequately 
justified.
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However, this is not a response I would advocate. For starters, as Charles Pigden points 
out, ethical naturalism is not necessarily committed to the natural sciences as most 
conceptions suggest.115 That is, one need not be committed to the form of ethical 
naturalism which holds that ethical properties are natural properties where a natural term or 
property is one that can be employed or referred to in natural scientific explanations.116 
Natural properties or terms may stand outside natural scientific explanations as they are 
presently conceived. My point is that for ethical naturalism to be true all that is required is 
that the ontology of the world be entirely ‘natural’ and not include the ‘supernatural’. But 
this commitment does not require that we rely solely upon the natural sciences 
notwithstanding they are apparently successful in describing the ‘natural’ world. Therefore, 
the second response to my arguments is to embrace a wider ethical naturalism which goes 
beyond the natural sciences.
This is the response I would advocate. The implications, however, are left for future 
research.
115 Charles R Pigden, "Naturalism," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford, 1993).
116 Crisp, "naturalism, ethical."
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms
Normative Distinction The distinction between what shoulde occur in the past, 
present, or future; and what occurs in the past and present, or 
possibly will occur in the future.
The Central Claim Ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences 
because appeals made to the natural sciences are not adequate 
to justify moral judgements about human beings.
The Normative 
Objection
The claim that a certain scientific concept is not normative. 
Hence we cannot appeal to it to justify normative assessments.
The Parameter 
Objection
The claim that a certain appeal to the natural sciences to 
justify normative assessments presupposes certain parameters, 
the choice of which cannot be justified by an appeal to the 
natural sciences alone. Consequently, such an appeal begs the 
question concerning what shoulde occur.
The Pluralism Objection The claim that a certain appeal to the natural sciences to 
justify normative assessments involves multiple irreducible 
conceptions, but it is not possible to justify the choice of one 
single conception over and against alternatives. Consequently, 
such an appeal gives rise to different or contradictory 
normative assessments.
The Incompatibility 
Objection
The claim that the appeal (or a version of the appeal) to the 
natural sciences to justify normative assessments uses a 
concept that is incompatible with the natural sciences.
The Implausibility 
Objection
The claim that an appeal to the natural sciences to justify 
normative assessments gives rise to implausible normative 
claims.
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